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ABSTRACT

Incentivizing Injustice: Why no high-level executive
prosecutions from the financial crisis?
by Sari Krieger Rivera

Adviser: Professor Charles Tien

More than ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, which sparked America’s
Great Recession, many citizens are still asking why no high-level bank executives were
prosecuted for criminal fraud. This question becomes even more perplexing when they
remember that many powerful executives did face jail time during the Enron-era
accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s.
This sense of injustice Americans felt in the wake of the biggest economic disaster of
their lifetimes has had reverberating political consequences, such as populist movements
like Occupy Wall Street and populist political campaigns from Bernie Sanders and
Donald Trump in 2016. Millions of Americans were left in financial ruin, but the banks
were bailed out, with no lasting consequences for their leaders. If this represents a highwater mark in recent memory for most citizens’ distrust and anger in their government,
why do we still have no satisfying explanation of how the bankers “got away with it?”
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Commentators, journalists and lay people have offered seemingly plausible, yet
shallow explanations over the years since the crisis. Many of these explanations say
powerful, wealthy Wall Street people use campaign donations and lobbying connections
to get bailed out by the politicians who take this money. However, this explanation falls
short because wealthy campaign donors existed in the previous crises where they did face
jail time for their fraudulent behavior. This study uses the lens of political science to
attempt a deeper and more satisfying explanation for the phenomenon of “Too Big to
Jail.” The popular idea that wealthy campaign donors bought their way out of trouble will
be more thoroughly explored, as will the clubby atmosphere between Washington and
Wall Street, and presidential leadership. However, I ultimately reject them as less
compelling explanations in favor of the internal incentive structure of the Justice
Department itself and external incentives for prosecutors.
Prosecutors who are hired as civil servants, not political appointees, are
responsible for the majority of the work in bringing cases. They are disincentivized to
bring difficult and lengthy cases that they may lose, as this kind of high-profile loss may
reduce their chances for private sector, high-paying partnerships in the near future.
Prosecutorial discretion is an underappreciated and under studied topic in political
science literature, considering its vast power and importance to American society. The
discretion prosecutors have to bring cases and the incentives they face within the
institutions in which they operate offer the most compelling evidence for an answer.
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“What the 2008 crisis exposed was a fragile underpinning of a highly leveraged financial
system. Had bank capital been adequate and fraud statutes been more vigorously
enforced, the crisis would very likely have been a financial episode of only passing
consequence.” – Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve chairman, Financial Times,
August 17, 2015
“We need to value the public sector again,” Jon Lovett, Lovett or Leave It, June 1, 2018

Chapter 1: Introduction
After the $700 billion Wall Street bailout passed by Congress and signed by
President Bush in October 2008, millions of middle class and poor Americans who lost
their homes or jobs were seething with anger. People were tired of a government that they
believed favored Wall Street millionaires at the expense of ordinary people suffering on
Main Street. Nor was their plight quickly remedied. By January 2011, four million
families had lost their homes, another four and a half million were in danger of
foreclosure,1 and many others in constant fear of eviction continued to occupy their
foreclosed homes. Later that year, the Occupy Wall Street movement sprang up in New
York City, soon spreading across the country and propelled by the slogan, “We are the
99%.” A few years later, this populist sentiment could be heard in the different but both
populist-fueled presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Even
Hillary Clinton, hardly known for populist rhetoric, invoked the applause line “there
should be no bank too big to fail and no individual too big to jail.”2

1
2

FCIC report, p. 402
Official Hillary Clinton Twitter Account, Jan. 17, 2016
1
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In 2009, President Barack Obama and a Democratic majority in Congress swept
into office on a wave of “hope” and “change.” Initially, the Obama Administration was
preoccupied with stabilizing the economy before addressing reform. Then in 2010, he
signed into law the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which was intended to reduce the
likelihood of a similar crisis occurring in the future. However, new regulations were not
the only possible remedy for the ills of the crisis. Nor were they the only action the public
demanded. The American people wondered why no one prominent faced jail time. The
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (known as the bailout)
successfully criminally prosecuted forty-four bankers between 2010-17, but none were
responsible for the systemic failures of the financial crisis. They were largely executives
from smaller banks, such as Brian Hartline, CEO and President of NOVA Bank, and
Gary Patton Hall, CEO and President of Tifton Bank.3 Certainly, none had the notoriety
and power of a major bank CEO, whose demise would have a real chilling effect on
criminal behavior in the industry and mollify public resentment. Bankers and their
institutions were unpopular with the American public during and after the crisis. Polling
shows that public confidence in banks drops after crises and economic downturns.
Americans’ confidence in banks dropped below thirty percent during the financial crisis
of 2008 and has yet to recover. This is compared to sixty percent of Americans saying
they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in banks in 1979, fifty-one percent in
1985 and fifty-three percent in 2004.4
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SIGTARP Report to Congress, 2017
McCarthy, Justin. Americans' Confidence in Banks Still Languishing Below 30%.
Gallup News. Gallup Inc.
4
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Figure 1.1
Gallup Poll June 2016 Shows Americans’ Confidence in Banks Sinks5

Prominent bankers had been demonized in the media with a ferocity not seen
since the Great Depression. A CBS News MoneyWatch column from September 2010
compared 2008 Wall Street executives with those of the Enron and savings and loan era
who could be seen making “perp walks.” “Not so after the financial crisis. Forget perps no one is even shouldering the blame, other than by engaging in the minor self-

http://news.gallup.com/poll/192719/americans-confidence-banks-languishingbelow.aspx?g_source=position1&g_medium=related&g_campaign=tiles, accessed
September 21, 2017
5 McCarthy, Justin. Americans' Confidence in Banks Still Languishing Below 30%.
Gallup News. Gallup Inc.
http://news.gallup.com/poll/192719/americans-confidence-banks-languishingbelow.aspx?g_source=position1&g_medium=related&g_campaign=tiles, accessed
September 21, 2017
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flagellation we've gotten from many of the prime suspects. These apologies, cheap as tin,
are also couched in the ready alibi that while "mistakes were made," everyone made
them. In that moral equation, collective guilt amounts to collective innocence.”6 A
Washington Post blogger wrote in 2013 “Of the rogues’ gallery who led the major Wall
Street firms to the brink of the abyss, only to have a multitrillion-dollar taxpayer bailout
pull them back, why have none become familiar with our nation’s federal prison
system?”7 Questions remain years after the crisis, as evidenced by this July 2017 headline
from The New Yorker; “Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail.”8
All this rhetoric suggests there were excellent partisan, political, and ethical
reasons for vigorous criminal prosecutions of major bankers. However, under the Obama
Justice Department, none of these prosecutions took place. This is in stark contrast to
earlier financial crises of the late 20th century, such as the savings and loan crisis in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, during which hundreds of executives were criminally
prosecuted. The lack of criminal prosecutions of prominent and systemically important
executives after the recent Great Recession also contrasts with the CEOs and other
executives who went to jail during the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, with

6Sherter,

Alan. September 10, 2010. No Time: Feds Have Given Up Trying to Send
Bankers to Jail. CBS News MoneyWatch. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-time-fedshave-given-up-trying-to-send-bankers-to-jail/, Accessed January 5, 2018
7 Irwin, Neil. September 12, 2013. “This is a complete list of Wall Street CEOs
prosecuted for their role in the financial crisis.” Washington Post: Wonkblog.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/12/this-is-a-complete-list-ofwall-street-ceos-prosecuted-for-their-role-in-the-financialcrisis/?utm_term=.d2277f1244de. Accessed January 5, 2018
8
Keefe, Patrick Radden. July 31, 2017. “Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail.” New Yorker.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail.
Accessed January 5, 2018
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Enron’s leaders being the most prominent example. Both of those crises saw executives
criminally punished under Republican presidential administrations, while a Democrat,
Barack Obama, saw no high-level executives face jail time on his watch. This defies
conventional wisdom that Republicans are more pro-business than Democrats and
therefore a Democratic administration would be more likely to prosecute finance industry
executives. In this work, I seek to understand how this scenario came to be, and to tie it to
larger theoretical frameworks. I will consider several alternative explanations.
Firstly, as President Obama explained, “some of the most damaging behavior on
Wall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street, wasn’t
illegal.” In evaluating this explanation, I will examine the elements of the crime of fraud
and consider the likelihood of obtaining convictions. Although I can only speak in theory
and in hindsight, I will make a series of arguments for individuals who may have been
charged successfully by Justice Department prosecutors with the incentives to do so.
Capture/Interest Group Influence - Secondly, I will explore the popular
explanation that top bankers escaped prosecution because they are rich and powerful, and
politicians do not bite the hand that feeds them. In evaluating this explanation, I will
inquire as to whether these bankers escaped prosecutions because they used monetary
influence after the 2008 crisis, but not during the previous crises. I will consider whether
finance executives sought to influence politicians across crises and political parties. I will
address the common wisdom and academic research on capture.
Presidency – Thirdly, I will consider the explanation that President Obama’s
leadership style was that of compromise, consensus and caution, leaving him disinclined
to take an aggressive stance on prosecutions and given to appointing individuals with a
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similarly cautious approach. I will also consider whether the president really can
influence the decision of whether or not to prosecute and whether political party makes a
difference in finance industry focus.
Cultural Capture - A fourth explanation is that prosecutors were personally
sympathetic to the bankers, viewing them as respectable high-status individuals who
“made mistakes,” rather than as potential criminals who violated laws. In evaluating this
explanation, I will examine whether attitudes towards bankers have changed across the
crises and consider how much influence this idea could have. It could be said that cultural
capture is simply a variation on or a subset of traditional capture or interest group
influence. However, I argue that it deserves a separate treatment, as it goes beyond
economic incentives to issues of social status and cognitive bias.
Resources - A fifth explanation is that the Justice Department, heavily invested in
terrorism in a post-9-11 climate, lacked the resources necessary to defeat the extremely
talented, experienced, and well-funded defense teams hired by the top bankers. In
evaluating this explanation, I will examine the Department’s resource allocation to white
collar criminal prosecution both before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Justice Department Institutional Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion - A sixth
explanation considers the inner workings and incentive structure of the Justice
Department and its employees. I will discuss what happened in the years leading up to the
crisis when prosecutors were intimidated by recent high-profile defeats, which left them
in no mood to take on risky prosecutions. Another explanation I consider is the idea that
prosecutors avoided criminal actions against individuals because they believed this would
undermine career advancement to top law firms. This may be counterintuitive, as former
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United States Attorney’s Office and Justice Department prosecutors are a hot commodity
at prominent white-collar defense firms. Those firms advertise their attorneys’ history
prominently on the firm websites. However, a prosecutor who takes a risky swing at a
difficult and high-profile case and loses, will not be so valuable in the private sector.
Prosecutors place a premium on their win-loss records. If they can be assured of a win in
a high-profile case, a rational prosecutor thinking about their future would likely proceed
with the case. However, a high-profile loss in prosecuting someone like former Lehman
Brothers’ head Dick Fuld, would be a major stain on the prosecutor’s record and would
have taken much of their time and effort as a prosecutor, leaving them with little else to
show for a win record. In evaluating this explanation, I will consider the career paths of
prosecutors and the changing incentives they faced over time that made a private sector
job even more attractive. As a safer alternative, federal government prosecutors heavily
relied on plea deals with the corporations involved in the crisis (not the individual
executives responsible for fraudulent actions). Certainly, the series of high-profile losses
in the years leading up to the crisis and a decline in resources – mentioned earlier in this
chapter - contributed to this strategy.
While each of the suggested hypothesis has some merit, I will argue the evidence
favors the theory that incentives faced by government prosecutors and internal Justice
Department incentive structures can best explain the question of why no high-level
executives were prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis. I have researched these
conclusions based on written records and interviews. I then examined what changed
between the time prosecutors successfully jailed similar types of high-profile white-collar
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criminals in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s and when they declined to do so after the
2008 financial crisis.

Methodology
The preceding hypotheses will be tested through a combination of approaches.
Firstly, I sought to interview former or current Justice Department/ U.S. Attorneys' Office
attorneys and/or former federal high-level regulators. Firstly, I focused on former
government attorneys, as they are significantly more likely than current employees to
speak candidly on Department practices. I also sought out others who might be
knowledgeable on the subject, but were not necessarily former Department prosecutors,
such as researchers or other former government employees. Before conducting any
interviews, I completed a CUNY Internal Review Board application and was given
expedited approval, based on the low-risk nature of my sources. I received this approval
on July 11, 2016. I took all interview notes on my laptop computer.
The list of questions I submitted to the IRB and began with on interviews were as
follows. However, if the conversation naturally veered in a different direction, I let it take
its course organically.

-Why did the Justice Department pursue deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements against companies instead of criminal cases against individuals, as in
the savings and loan crisis?
-What explains the rise of deferred prosecution in the past ten years?
-Why do you believe there were no case referrals to DOJ for criminal prosecutions
for financial crisis fraud, when there were hundreds during the S&L crisis?
-Why weren’t any lower-level company officials flipped?
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-Were there adequate resources if the Department wanted to prosecute? If not, why
not?
-What went wrong for the government in the case prosecuting two Bear Stearns
hedge fund managers?
-Why prosecute insider trading instead of fraud? Didn’t the frauds have greater
impact on the national economy, while insider training principally affects only
investors?
- How much do future career incentives, past work experiences or personal
relationships factor into prosecutorial decision making?
- How much of a role do you believe the president played in the decisions?
-While at the Justice Department or before your time there, discuss the nature and
extent of your social or professional contact with Wall Street officials?

I began with a former Justice Department attorney whom I had interviewed when
I worked as a reporter for the Financial Times group, covering asset-backed security
litigation and regulation. This attorney worked in white-collar defense at the time of our
interview and had worked at the Justice Department in white collar prosecution, making
him an ideal candidate. We met for approximately an hour in the offices of his Manhattan
law firm.
As was consistent with my approach of a non-random snowball sample to collect
narratives on how and why certain prosecutorial decisions were made, the first attorney
recommended another person with a similar history who had also written publicly on
financial crisis prosecutorial approach. I met with the second attorney at the Harvard
Club in Manhattan, where the attorney is a member.
I then interviewed Neil Barofsky, whom I had also met while working as a
reporter. Barofsky was a prosecutor in the white-collar case mecca, the Southern District
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of New York. He also served as the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
Rescue Program, otherwise known as “The Bailout.” Subsequent to his experience as the
“SIGTARP,” he wrote a book about his experience called “Bailout.” We met in his
Manhattan law office.
I conducted an in-person interview with Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist Jesse
Eisinger, author of The Chickenshit Club, a book that provides a narrative discussion of
the Obama Justice Department and its prosecutorial willingness in white collar cases. I
met with federal Judge Jed Rakoff, of the Southern District of New York, and
interviewed him in his office for approximately 45 minutes. Rakoff has not only heard
important post-financial-crisis cases in his courtroom, but has written publicly, such as in
the New York Review of Books, about the lack of criminal prosecution in the wake of the
crisis. Lastly, I conducted phone interviews with Dr. Henry Pontell, Professor William
Black and Isaac Gradman, who had all written extensively on financial crisis topics from
their perches as an academic, former banking regulator and an attorney, respectively.
After collecting a variety of opinions, data and narratives through these
interviews, I also sought out historical and recent textual records relevant to the financial
crisis and the Justice Department’s response to white collar finance crime in recent
decades. I also compared attorney salaries listed on Justice Department websites with a
those reported in a respected legal industry journalistic publication for private sector
corporate defense attorneys. I looked at both average numbers and partner-level or top
prosecutor status numbers.
The framework for analyzing all of the above data to discern why no top
executives were prosecuted from the 2008 crisis was in comparison with previous
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modern crises. Specifically, each theory was examined for whether it held constant across
the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Enron and related
accounting fraud scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008 crisis. In other words, since
many prominent executives were criminally prosecuted during the earlier two crises,
what changed between then and the 2008 crisis?
The 2008 crisis will be explained in detail in a later chapter. What I am calling the
“Enron-era” crisis occurred in the early 2000s, when “creative” accounting and
misrepresentation of company profits to shareholders for the financial benefit of
executives plagued corporate America, resulting in fraud cases against executives of
companies such as energy company Enron Corporation, telecommunications company
WorldCom, cable television company Adelphia Communications Corporation, and
security systems company Tyco International plc. The “savings and loan” crisis occurred
in the late 1980s and early 1990s when nearly one-third of America’s 3,234 savings and
loan associations failed, partly due to fraudulent actions from their own officials. While
these two economic crises and the 2008 crisis were not exactly the same in terms of
economic scale, all three crises created significant economic losses for many Americans,
a reverberation throughout the economy and a regulatory and law enforcement challenges
for the United States government. However, the earlier two saw successful criminal
prosecutions of many systemically important corporate executives for fraudulent
behavior that contributed to the crisis, unlike the 2008 crisis.
Firstly, I selected various case studies from the crisis to establish evidence that
intentional fraud existed and therefore criminal prosecutions should have been conducted.
I selected the starkest examples of fraud from the crisis based on information available in

12
government documents, media reports and those I had personally reported on as a
journalist covering post-crisis litigation and regulation. I chose the cases with the most
evidence available, as prosecutors would have been likely to do when seeking to make a
winning case. These cases include Lehman Brothers Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer Dick Fuld, Countrywide Financial Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Angelo
Mozilo, AIG Financial Products Chief Executive Officer Joseph J. Cassano, Citigroup
executives, and rating agencies executives. Information from Clayton Holdings, a
company that analyzed the quality of mortgages used in securitized mortgage products,
was also used in support of a pattern of fraud.
Based on those analyses, I proceeded on the assumption that fraud did exist in
2008, but was not prosecuted, unlike the earlier crises. Ultimately, fraud is not entirely
objective, unlike the crimes of shoplifting or murder. For the most part, someone either
steals an object or not, or unlawfully kills someone, or not. Legal fraud, particularly in
complex cases, is opaquer. Ultimately, in these cases, it matters what a prosecutor can
prove to be fraud. This idea has been expressed by various prosecutors, and they certainly
face an immense challenge proving fraud in finance cases that are difficult to explain to
juries and top lawyers working to convince them otherwise. However, the savings and
loan crisis and Enron-era accounting cases were both complicated for juries to understand
and successfully prosecuted, making the “it’s too hard to prove to a jury” argument a
flimsy one.
The question remains, what is the difference between these earlier crises and that
of 2008? Using the evidence from my research, I will examine whether each theory’s
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scenario stayed constant over time, and therefore could not explain a change, or was a
variable that had changed itself and could explain the change in prosecutions.

Crux of the Argument
My argument is that a change in the incentive structures inside and outside the
Justice Department provides incentives for prosecutorial decision-making. It is the “lineprosecutors”, or those who aren’t politically appointed, who prosecute cases. The
attorneys working on high-profile financial cases will most likely be located in New York
City, in the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, which
has a long track record of prosecuting the highest profile, white-collar cases, and
therefore has the most institutional experience. In comparison, many of the other 93
United States Attorney’s offices prosecute much less complicated, more parochial cases;
one attorney called them “lobster cases,” referring to his temporary stint at a small New
England U.S. Attorney’s Office. 9 However, some cases could have been brought from
other offices, such as those located in Brooklyn, N.Y., Washington, D.C. or parts of
California – all places with extremely high cost of living.
Assistant United States Attorneys (A.S.U.A), faced a stark change in personal
financial incentives over time. The cost of living in New York City is painfully high, as
any resident knows all too well. An ambitious, smart, often Ivy-league educated A.U.S.A
might want to work in government service as a prosecutor for his or her entire career.
However, the moral or emotional satisfaction of this career path has become an
impractical and unlikely choice over the much more lucrative choice of a private defense

9

Moon interview
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firm position, and eventually partnership. These firms prize attorneys with prosecutorial
experience, as they have insider knowledge of how a government prosecution works. Top
firms boast in their staff biographies any white-collar government experience. The firms
are paying top dollar, but they wouldn’t value “unsuccessful” former prosecutors – in
other words, those with a big loss on their record.
In previous decades, according to my own analysis based on government and
other publicly available data, the gap was much smaller between top federal prosecutor
salary and what their private sector counterpart could earn as a partner. This change
mirrors the time period when government prosecutors stopped being prosecutors and
became negotiators. Settlement agreements with major banks and certain banking figures
were standard practice for the 2008 crisis, while the previous crises saw a focus on
prosecutions and jail time. The ability to make much more money in an increasingly
economically unstable world and outrageously expensive city would be a powerful
incentive to be more cautious, seeking a safer settlement agreement, rather than the more
difficult and riskier prosecution. Firms want to see prosecutors who handled big name,
complex cases, but not those who tried them and lost. Seeking settlement agreements is
clearly the safer path for government prosecutors. They can garner headlines that sound
like being tough on banks, splashing big dollar amounts on the news pages. However, it
takes only a little knowledge to realize that paying a fine has become simply the cost of
doing business for major banks who made vastly more money from the practices for
which they are being fined. It is certainly not a deterrent for future criminal activity.
At the same time, the Justice Department experienced two major internal factors
that only encouraged caution. In the early years of the new century, the Department
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experienced a series of high-profile embarrassments in white collar cases. For example,
when energy company Enron Corporation collapsed due to a major accounting fraud
scandal, the Department prosecuted the accounting firm Arthur Anderson as Enron’s
proverbial partner in crime. The firm subsequently went out of business due to
reputational annihilation. The Supreme Court later overturned the conviction on
procedural grounds. The Department took much of the blame for destroying the
company, rightly or wrongly. Settlement agreements were not going to put a company
out of business and put the Justice Department on the public opinion hook for the job
losses experienced by many innocent employees. Therefore, the Department increasingly
relied on them, and entirely so with the major banks responsible for the 2008 crisis.
Somehow, a fear of holding individuals criminally accountable got lumped in with the
more legitimate fear of prosecuting companies. Secondly, after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, federal criminal justice resources in terms of budgets and
manpower, underwent a massive shift to counterterrorism from everything else. It
became a better time to be a white-collar criminal, as the country was busy looking
elsewhere.
The popular narrative that the banks and their executives buy themselves out of
legal jams with campaign donations and lobbying is a compelling one. Certainly, the
excesses of money in politics has powerful implications. However, the fact remains that
during the previous crises, lobbyists and campaign influence was rampant from the
business executives involved in criminal behavior and who were later prosecuted.
Therefore, this is a constant and can’t explain the change in prosecutions. The same can
be said for business executives donating to presidential campaigns and the elite, clubby
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atmosphere between many in Washington and the private sector. There simply isn’t
enough change in those behaviors between crises to explain the vast difference in Justice
Department behavior. Lack of resources by itself carries less weight as an answer than in
conjunction with the greater prosecutorial incentive theory.
Ultimately, the weight of the evidence from these case studies provides
compelling reasons to believe it is prosecutorial discretion that provides the answers that
an enraged public and academic community still seeks. Specifically, prosecutors’
decision-making was informed by internal Justice Department institutional factors (a
recent preference for caution and a lack of resources) and the personal incentives faced
by government prosecutors. This will be a surprise to anyone pushing the popular
narrative that the banks are simply too politically powerful. Certainly, there is a strong
case to be made that they indeed are too powerful and “too big to fail,” causing perverse
economic incentives for them and making them harder to regulate. However, that is a
policy question. I am seeking to answer a question that is fundamentally about law
enforcement; about crime and punishment; and about what are the best deterrents to
crime.
It should be noted that I did not directly ask former government prosecutors why
they or others leave government service and join the private sector. There are a few
reasons for this approach. Firstly, people are not always honest about their intentions.
They also may not remember a long-ago decision-making process when asked about it
years later. People may not fully understand their own intentions even in the moment.
Humans have a tendency to justify decisions they make based on whom they perceive to
be judging those decisions. In other words, when asked by a coworker at a private firm,
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an attorney may say they left government service because of the more comfortable life
afforded by a private defense firm. However, when asked by an interviewer from a
university, they may say because they believed in the mission of the private firm. Both of
these answers may be true, or at least true at the time they are spoken. In short, humans
are not always reliable sources of their own motivations. In order to minimize human
error, I chose to zoom out, looking at the incentive structures presented to these humans,
rather than the individual humans themselves. This is a broader view and assumes that
humans will likely make a range of predictable decisions give a certain set of incentives.
It is a more rational way to examine the likelihood of making certain choices given a
certain set of circumstances compared to asking people for explanations after the fact.
A just society demands constant self-reflection on its legal system. It should seek
to deter would-be criminals through a fair application of the law. The current legal
environment is even more fractious, yet government lawyers who are not political
appointees do their best to cling to the rule of law. However, they can’t escape the
personal and institutional incentives they face when exercising their prosecutorial
discretion and we shouldn’t expect them to. Therefore, institutions must be designed to
incentivize the behavior we as a society want to see. Adherence to justice and the rule of
law is one of the foundations of American government and it must be incentivized in our
institutions if we do not want to see it slip away.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

Was there fraud? – Over exuberance or investment mistakes are not the same as
conspiracy or fraud, say finance industry defenders, such as the defense attorneys in the
2009 unsuccessful Bear Stearns hedge fund manager prosecution.10 Also, a successful
case would be very difficult to prove to a lay jury “beyond a reasonable doubt,” due to
the vastly complex nature of financial products and institutions, wrote prominent white
collar defense attorneys Johnathan Sack and Elkan Abromowitz in the New York Law
Journal.11 If there was no reason to believe fraud occurred or they had little chance of
proving it, there is no need to look any further in answering the question of why
executives were not prosecuted. I will argue there could be ample evidence for a case,
but I will discuss this idea in a later chapter devoted entirely to it.

Capture/Interest Group Influence/Monetary Influence - Carpenter and Moss
define regulatory capture as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and
toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry
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itself.”12 Regulatory capture can result in less regulation to protect consumers or more
regulation that favors some businesses over others. Utilities, trucking companies and rail
roads have often been examples of industries benefiting from either deregulation or
regulation favoring a particular firm or industry over others. 13 de Figueiredo and
Richter, in their survey of lobbying literature, argue lobbying has a greater impact than
direct campaign donations, with its spending exceeding campaign contributions fivefold.
14

They define lobbying as “the transfer of information in private meetings and venues

between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents.” 15 Lobbying by
corporations and trade associations account for approximately eighty-five percent of
lobbying spending on both the federal and state level. Additionally, larger corporate
groups are much more likely to lobby than smaller interests. 16
Schattschneider’s classic work says that the Madisonian pluralist ideal of factions
checking each other is inaccurate, as wealthier interests have inherent advantages and
will capture government officials in a transaction or consumer-like approach.17 The idea
that Wall Street firms and executives’ campaign donations have influence over
lawmakers is no exception to this story. However, some political science studies fail to
find measurable direct influence.18 Other authors point not to direct influence, but the
agenda-setting power of interest groups to control what is and is not considered in the
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legislative arena.19 Lowery challenges the traditional literature’s frequent historical
conclusion that a connection between lobbying and policy outcomes cannot be found. He
redefines the concept of influence and argues for a more inclusive methodology, claiming
the focus on observable and measurable results may overproduce null results and miss
important factors. In fact, influence may exist, but it is difficult to directly measure.
Influence in all its forms is complex and diffuse, and the nature of academic research is to
focus on direct effects, “narrowly observed.” 20 Simply because influence may be
difficult to measure, does not mean we should discount it.21 Indirect influence is
particularly relevant to the Justice Department, as there is no opportunity for interest
groups to provide money to career prosecutors, but budgetary influence and campaign
finance promises to political appointees for future campaigns offer opportunity for
capture, albeit far removed.
Ernesto Dal Bo finds in a review of capture literature that capture is possible due
to information advantages companies have over citizens, who likely are not
knowledgeable about the relevant issues or even aware that policy is being considered. If
government regulators are not lured to the private sector with exponentially higher wages
and they are constantly monitored in their decision-making process, they may be less
likely to make decisions that favor narrow interest groups over best practices or the
public interest. However, Dal Bo finds this impractical alone and suggests institutional
remedies, such as information sharing, legislative oversight and support for consumer
groups. He does note that they are already in place to varying regional degrees in the
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United States. 22 Additionally, interest groups may capture regulators by providing an
abundance of information that plays in their favor and encouraging regulators who lack
the time to research alternative views thoroughly to share their worldview. Dal Bo
advocates for finding optimal term lengths for government regulators, as overly long
tenures allow collusion with a firm and too short a time makes regulators fear “rocking
the boat” too close to the time when they may seek a job with the industry. Elected
regulators tend to have a more pro-consumer stance, as they are more responsive to
popular will, he says. However, consumers may not be able to discern their own selfinterest when there is an information imbalance. Electing regulators is an option, but may
have a different but powerful set of capture problems based on campaign finance
concerns. Regulators with an industry background tend to be more lenient to industry, but
“not particularly so” when controlling for party affiliation. The promise of an industry job
only tended to impact leniency when the regulator’s tenure is almost over.23

Presidency – Greenstein stresses the importance of personality when it comes to
presidential leadership. The Constitution’s Article II gives little guidance as to how a
president should lead and carry out the vaguely listed powers. Presidents as individuals
have shaped the office dramatically, filling in the blanks and moving the institution of the
presidency in various directions. Therefore, Greenstein looks at the various personality
styles of presidents to examine how they have shaped the office. He considers the
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cognitive style, emotional intelligence, public communication, organizational capacity,
political skills and policy vision of presidents. 24
Greenstein says Barack Obama is a gifted public speaker, adept politically and
organizationally. Obama also has a “first-rate temperament and a first-rate mind,”
according to Greenstein. When it comes to vision, Greenstein says, Obama’s style is one
of pragmatism and political compromise. 25 In certain political environments, this would
be a political asset. But in the partisan atmosphere that President Obama faced, it was
unrealistic at times. When it comes to President Obama’s role in prosecutions, this
cautious and compromising approach could have influenced his choices to run the Justice
Department and the U.S. Attorney’s offices. It could be argued that he would choose
individuals who were like-minded and would seek compromises and settlements, rather
than be pugnacious and aggressive. Also, a president seeking bipartisan compromise
would not focus on an aggressive task force to punish fraudsters, but would seek to
problem solve and move on. It could be argued that the focus on the Dodd-Frank
financial reform law of 2010, rather than a more aggressive reform law and prosecutions
adhered to that prediction. Another practical reason for President Obama’s caution in
certain policy areas may be that as the first black president, he was already pushing
political boundaries and realized he could only push so far without backlash from the
American public.
Skowronek’s concept of political time is useful for this study, as well. This theory
posits that instead of examining presidential administrations in terms of linear time, there
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are predictable cycles, or political time periods, that presidencies go through. He begins
with the reconstructive presidency, such as under Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, which repudiate what came
immediately before. These presidents disrupt existing approaches and reshape the office,
which Skowronek calls the “politics of reconstruction.” The ability to do so depends on
the authority the president has to reject what came before. Skowronek says it is no
coincidence that great presidents usually follow inept ones. A prime example is the
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt following a decade of rather passive Republicans.
Roosevelt and the Democrats in Congress reshaped the entire concept of the federal
government, despite extensive initial pushback from the Supreme Court, and “succeeded
despite stunning defeats because he remained throughout the sponsor of an alternative to
a bankrupt past.”26 Following reconstructive presidents are those who are successors
continuing the new paradigm, such as Harry Truman and George H. W. Bush.
Skowronek calls this the “politics of articulation.” Next are presidents, like Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Bill Clinton, who represent a first shot at takeover by an opposition but
operate within the established framework. He calls this the “politics of preemption.”
Following this type of president is another president adhering to the established
orthodoxy, like John F. Kennedy/Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush. Next, there is a
second attempt at challenging the orthodoxy, like Richard Nixon and most interestingly
for this study, Obama. Lastly, is the “politics of disjunction” president, who clings to
orthodoxy in the face of a mounting crisis that cannot be effectively addressed by the
policies of the past. These tend to be the presidents we think of as failures, like Herbert
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Hoover, John Quincy Adams, Jimmy Carter, and James Buchanan.27 In an interview with
The Nation on November 22, 2016, Skowronek opined on the Obama presidency in light
of the 2016 election and his political time theory. Although Obama may have seemed to
be a transformational president during his campaign of “hope and change,” we may have
misunderstood what he meant by transformation. “The closer you look at what Obama
was proposing in 2008, we see that what he meant was forgetting about transformation in
the Jackson/Reagan mode and replacing it with a rational, problem-solving government,”
Skowronek said.28 If Skowronek’s model is correct, Obama could not be truly
transformational because of the still potent Reagan-era orthodoxy to the effect that
government is the problem, not the solution, and the free market and business are
sacrosanct. Additionally, his more rational, problem-solving style didn’t lend itself to
calling for aggressive prosecutions. Impactful Wall Street prosecution may have simply
not been ripe for Obama in political time.
Stanley Renshon’s model of presidential analysis takes a psychological approach,
“focused on three core elements - found in everyone, not just presidents - ambition,
character integrity (ideals and values), relationships with others (relatedness), and their
relationship to political leadership and decision making, the latter two being the twin
cores of presidential responsibility.”29 According to Renshon, Obama saw the failed
ambitions of his father and grandfather, leading him to aim high with his own ambitions.
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He carried a sense of moral leadership, justice. and fairness from his mother, who also
worked for these types of changes in Indonesian villages. These relationships influenced
who the adult Obama would become. The roots of his deliberate and careful nature may
be found in his relationship with his mother, who has been described as impulsive and
reckless. She and Obama’s father did not know each other well when they married and
had a child. After Obama’s father abandoned the family and moved back to his native
Africa with another woman, his mother married another man and moved the family to
Indonesia, a country that was foreign to her and had recently experienced a bloody coup.
She also left Obama with his grandparents for a time to work on field research. Renshon
points to this recklessness as “impacting his determined deliberativeness.” 30 Obama is
known for his cool, calm and rational persona and as a pragmatist. Renshon focuses on
Obama’s assertive progressive agenda on health care and alternative energy, despite his
pragmatism.31 These may be examples of his focus on social justice; however, it should
be noted that the Obama administration did attempt to include Republicans and others in
these efforts.32 More importantly for this study, it is Obama’s tendency to be cautious,
perhaps overly so to compensate for the recklessness of his parents. This overly cautious
tendency may help explain why he did not aggressively push for punishment of financial
crisis-era executives.
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Cultural Capture – James Kwak has posited a kind of capture based on cultural
affinity – or sharing important aspects of one’s fundamental identity - describing three
mechanisms through which this cultural capture occurs; identity, status, and relationships.
First, regulators are more likely to trust or adopt the positions of those with whom they
identify and perceive as being an in-group member.33 Kwak points to the revolving door
between Wall Street and Washington as a key driver of this shared group identification,
saying, “the normalcy of moving from an administrative agency to the financial sector
and the sheer number of people making the transition imply that regulators and the
representatives of financial institutions are really the same people, only at different points
in their careers.”34
In the decades leading up to the financial crisis, he claims, finance industry
regulators often thought of themselves as stewards of an efficient free market system, not
protectors of the public, identifying with bankers over consumers.35 Alternatively, it
could be argued that some believed an efficient free market system – however abstract
this idea may be - would benefit consumers, as regulation would increase the cost of
borrowing for all.
Secondly, people behave favorably toward those they perceive to be of a higher
status. Kwak points to the glamorization of Wall Street in popular culture coming from
The Bonfire of the Vanities, Wall Street, and Liar’s Poker. These may be problematic
comparisons, as many people would describe the Wall Street men in those books and
movie as despicable. However, many others may have seen them as ruthless but
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successful alpha men winning in a social Darwinist society. In general, wealthy people
are idealized as smarter and of a higher status. The increased technical nature of Wall
Street products and operations also caused regulators, who may not have fully understood
them, to defer to the bankers or prestigious academic economists, many of whom
advocated free markets, self-regulation, and financial innovation.36 Wall Street may have
been demonized after the collapse by many average Americans, but in professional legal
and finance industry settings, everyone was still a respectable business professional, not
“some common street criminal.” Somehow, they could not have been “real criminals,” in
this view.
Lastly, psychological studies have shown that the more frequently we interact
with a person and the more that person can observe our behavior towards him, the more
likely we are to treat him favorably. Kwak argues that the revolving door creates social
connections between regulators and the regulated and may influence even those
regulators.37 Considering cultural capture, it would be unlikely for a government
prosecutor - who admires financially successful and prestigious Wall Street executives
and sees himself as a fellow professional - to bring charges. These executives would be
more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt with the explanation of “making bad
business decisions” instead of acting illegally. In fact, this is the narrative many such
people espoused after the crisis.
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Resources – Roe and Jackson take a multi-national look at the efficacy of
security law enforcement. The resources a country devotes in terms of budget and
staffing to enforcing securities laws is an important factor in this study.38 After
September 11, 2001, a massive shift in resources at the FBI and Justice transferred to
counterterrorism, at the expense of everything else, including white-collar crime. During
the savings and loan crisis there were 1,000 FBI agents investigating crime in that
industry. As of 2007, when the recent crisis hit, there were only 120 FBI agents covering
mortgage fraud, with more than 1,800 agents, or nearly one-third of all agents in criminal
programs, having moved to counterterrorism duties.39 This was despite the fact that in
September 2004, the FBI warned of an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud. According to an
investigation by the New York Times, in the early months of the financial crisis, the FBI
requested more than 1,100 agents to investigate crimes not related to national security, 40
specifically asking Congress for more money to hire new white-collar crime agents, but
was continually rebuffed. It is clear Congress was as yet unwilling to shift the FBI’s
priorities. Likely, Congress members were simply responding to the political
environment and pressures of the time to address terrorism, but a thorough analysis of
Congress’ role in the crisis is outside the scope of this inquiry. The Times writes that the
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bureau asked for an increase of $800 million during those years but received only $50
million more. 41
In addition to resources shifting to counterterrorism after September 11, 2001,
prosecutors have had to use these more limited resources to tackle more potential cases.
Sara Sun Beale points to an explosion of federal criminal statues since the late 1960s. An
American Bar Association study found that more than forty percent of federal criminal
laws passed since the civil war came between 1970 and 1998. 42 “The mismatch between
the broad scope of federal criminal law and the relatively narrow scope of federal
resources requires federal prosecutors to select a small fraction of cases to prosecute in
federal court, leaving the remainder to be prosecuted under state law.”43 White collar
defendants often have more resources to battle a government prosecution than street
criminals, making these cases that much harder to prosecute in a constrained budgetary
environment at the federal level and essentially impossible at the state level, with even
less money and resources. Additionally, key federal criminal statutes can be ill-defined,
leaving prosecutors with significant room for interpretation. A lack of resources and
loosely-defined statutes are components of a modern federal law enforcement system that
has shifted from an “adversarial trial-focused” one to an “administrative” system. The
threat of harsh federal sentences (compared to those at the state level) give prosecutors
leverage to make settlements, which is something they have come to rely on en masse as

41

Similarly, the IRS remains seriously underfunded, even though additional resources
would prove a bonanza for the federal government. Prosecutions of financial industry
fraud in general dropped forty-eight percent from 2000 to 2007, and securities fraud cases
dropped seventeen percent.
42 Beale, 2009, p. 399
43 Beale, 2009, p. 400

30
an easier alternative in a resource-limited environment. “In contrast to the traditional
expectation that the prosecutor will be subject to multiple checks in an adversarial
process that ends in a public jury trial supervised by an independent judge … more than
ninety percent of all federal convictions are obtained by a guilty plea.” Beale points to
2004 as a case in point, during which 83,000 federal defendants’ cases were closed but
there were only 3,346 federal criminal trials. 44
Additionally, the Justice Department’s resources were lacking in the form of
expertise and case referrals from regulatory agencies. During the savings and loan crisis,
financial regulators referred hundreds of cases to prosecutors and helped the attorneys
with information needed to successfully bring the cases. During the 2008 crisis,
regulatory agencies did not play this role. Indeed, they did not refer any cases to Justice
for prosecution.45
Perhaps explaining the lack of referrals and overlapping with the capture theory,
an investigative report written about the financial crisis by the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (SPSI) concluded that regulators were too deferential to
management in the years leading up to and even after the financial crisis struck. The
report details how one regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, found many problems
at Washington Mutual Inc. (WaMu), but continued to merely give recommendations for
change, even after previous recommendations were ignored and risk continued to grow.
Enforcement action was not even discussed for WaMu until 2008, and even these non-
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public actions “contained few mandatory measures or deadlines and weren’t enough to
save the bank.” 46

Justice Department Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion - The prosecutors at the
Justice Department and the 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the United States are tasked
with bringing criminal and civil cases for federal offenses. Additionally, only they can
bring criminal charges, while other agencies can work on civil cases. By definition,
prosecutors have to choose which cases to bring, as there are a seemingly infinite number
of criminal and civil violations of federal law and only so much time or money. A longstanding norm in the United States says that criminal prosecutorial decisions should be
made independently by these attorneys, without political influence, in order to uphold the
rule of law. Political prosecutions are the purview of non-democratic countries.
Therefore, this norm mandates that the President not try to influence the Justice
Department’s prosecutorial decision-making. The strength of this norm has been tested
by President Donald Trump’s efforts to thwart it. President Trump has repeatedly
publicly stated which actions he believes the Justice Department should take and has
expressed his frustration at not being able to have more control over it. In fact, he said
this to the New York Times in December 2017: “I have absolute right to do what I want to
do with the Justice Department,” he said, echoing claims by his supporters that as
president he has the power to open or end an investigation. “But for purposes of
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hopefully thinking I’m going to be treated fairly, I’ve stayed uninvolved with this
particular matter.”47
Prosecutorial discretion and fairness also necessitate a good deal of independence
from Congressional control. To be sure, Congress asserts its control over the federal
bureaucracy through its lawmaking, oversight and budgeting powers. But Presidents have
fought for control of the executive branch since George Washington and continue to do
so. Lastly, prosecutorial discretion is made without judicial review. While a case may
reach a courtroom, which would be controlled by judicial oversight, the decision about
whom to charge with what crimes are not subject to judicial review. Judges will largely
defer to prosecutorial discretion, except in clear cases in which motives based on race,
religion or bad faith can be attributed to the prosecutor.48 Prosecutorial decision making
is also not made public unless charges are filed. Considering that the vast majority of
cases never reach a courtroom, as they are settled, and the decision-making process
before charges are filed is not entirely made public even in cases that are filed,
prosecutors operate outside of the public spotlight.
This secretive process has caused the Justice Department and U.S. Attorney’s
offices to receive less study than many other areas of the bureaucracy. However, the
following literature argues that prosecutors are not solely calculators of whether or not a
law was broken and if there is sufficient evidence available to make a case. In reality,
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there are myriad factors that matter when a prosecutor decides when, where and against
whom to file charges.
Albonetti argues that prosecutors seek to minimize uncertainty when deciding
whether to file charges, considering evidence, number of witnesses, defendant-victim
relationship, gender, race, prior record, offense-type, victim-type and statutory severity. 49
Criminal procedural constraints, high caseloads, limited staffing and shared values and
norms within the group of other prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys with whom
prosecutors form working relationships are also important factors. 50 Additionally, the
prosecutors’ “self-concept” is as a lawyer, not as a law-enforcement official. Therefore,
they will likely be cautious about embarrassing themselves by bringing a case lacking
sufficient evidence, and less concerned with the practices of police investigative decisionmaking.51
Bibas found that instead of simply their perception of a suspect’s guilt or
innocence, prosecutors may be motivated by personal incentives. “They may be
extremely risk-averse to protect their win-loss records, which further their employment
prospects and political ambitions. Thus, they may press their own agendas at the expense
of victims and the public.”52 Wilson argues that professional norms and post-government
service expectations can influence the way tasks are performed in an agency. However, it
is not always the case that this desire to impress a private firm will result in industryfriendly behavior. Rather, it is behavior that “conveys evidence of energy and talent.” In
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some cases, a former government employee who “knows how to pull strings” or “thinks
our way” may be favorable to industry, but it may also be one who simply knows how to
win cases on the relevant subject matter. The latter applies to Justice Department
attorneys well. “A law firm wishing to hire a government attorney who knows antitrust
law will not hire a person who has lost a case against a big client of that firm, it will hire
somebody who won such a case.”53 A very high profile and high risk case against a
defense firm’s major client or one of its executives – such as a “Too Big to Fail” bank –
may be too much of a risk to take for a government prosecutor.
Not only will prosecutors and regulators act in their own self-interest; cognitive
psychology offers a useful analysis of the decision-making processes they use as
“irrational” beings – or imperfect calculators of all information and all possible outcomes
without any self-interest. “All human decision makers share a common set of
information- processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.” 54 In fact, an
understanding of cognitive biases may provide some predictability in the way people
“distort perfect information processing.” 55 Burke examines how cognitive bias impacts
prosecutorial decision-making, looking at a racially-tinged rape and murder case, in
which DNA evidence exonerated a convicted mentally impaired black farmhand but
prosecutors continued to insist he remained a viable suspect.56 While prosecutors may
exhibit confirmation biases in assuming the guilt of a mentally impaired black man
accused of raping and murdering a white woman, they may exhibit such biases in favor of
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other educated, professional men - like themselves – in the world of finance. “From both
the cognitive and behavioral economics literature emerges a theory of bounded rationality
that seeks to explain how cognitive biases and limitations in our cognitive abilities distort
perfect information processing in nonrandom, predictable ways.” 57
Eisner and Meier, relying on a study of antitrust enforcement cases, argue that
internal factors and not outside political control are the driving force in Justice
Department decisions.58 When the antitrust approach of the Department changed in the
1980s, they conclude that it was not the Reagan political agenda that was responsible, but
instead a change in the internal structure of the Department itself, which relied
increasingly on Chicago School economists’ advice in decision- making processes.59
However, this argument must also consider the fact that the Reagan political agenda was
certainly more sympathetic to free market advocates than conventional Democrats, which
helped the Chicago school theories gain prominence.
The law aids prosecutors by giving them options beyond simply the decision to
prosecute. For example, deferred prosecution – an agreement between the government
and the accused party to reform behavior to conform with the law in lieu of prosecution was originally created as an alternative to prison for juvenile and drug offenders.
Greenblum cites this practice as one that gives prosecutors too much power, with the
result of unfair punishment for companies and innocent parties within companies, all
outside judicial review.60
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More generally, prosecutors may seek agreements in lieu of trials. Moohr argues
that since approximately ninety-five percent of people charged with federal crimes settle
out of court, the United States is not quite the adversarial legal system that we imagine.
Instead, it bears some similarities to the French inquisitorial system, in which “the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence is determined through an official inquiry that is
initiated and conducted by the state. In this system, the trial is most accurately
characterized as a continuation of the official investigation. The investigation, rather than
the trial, is paramount.”61 The French system also calls for more supervision in
prosecutorial decision making, while American U.S. attorneys are largely unrestrained,
with much deference to local concerns. U.S. prosecutors’ power to arrange guilty pleas
outside the public light of a trial may result in inconsistent sentences, creating disrespect
for and mistrust of the law, as well as the inability to publicly display and clarify often
opaque white-collar crime, missing an opportunity to truly deter criminal behavior. 62
On the other hand, Buell argues that prosecutors actually disclose a surprising
amount of information on prosecutorial decision making when it comes to corporate
crimes, despite the common notion that prosecutors are secretive. 63 Buell points to the
series of “memos” created since 1999 guiding Justice Department attorneys on
procedures for charging corporations. Why would the Department be vocal about white
collar prosecutions when they aren’t required to and why more so in the case of corporate
crimes than other criminal categories? The idea that prosecutors attract press attention to
influence jury pools or further their own careers is dismissed first. Influencing jury pools
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with gory details in the press may backfire more than help. Most federal prosecutors, he
argues, are not aiming for elected office that would lend itself to building a reputation in
the press. More likely, they are seeking higher positions in the DOJ itself, a partnership at
a “marquee” law firm – the kind that would have a lucrative white-collar defense practice
- or a counsel position at a major corporation or investment firm. 64 Press coverage and
name recognition may help in this quest, but it may not. What prosecutors seek, Buell
says, is a resume with “big” prosecutions, “whether measured by complexity, size of
settlement, importance of defendant, or seriousness and extent of wrongdoing.” 65 Citing
Garrett and Eisenger, Buell points to the idea that career motivations have steered
prosecutors to easy-to-win cases or settlements, rather than difficult cases against
individuals. Although this assertion will play a major role in this study, Buell dismisses it
as having any relevance to why criminal prosecutors are more public about their
decision-making process in white-collar cases. Instead, he argues prosecutors seek to
explain their work to a public that may want to punish corporations that have acted
immorally but not criminally. The prosecutors may use these disclosures to prove they
are as tough on crime as possible. They may also use charging guidelines to mollify
Congressmembers who feel DOJ is too tough or too lenient on corporations, as
Congressmembers are sensitive to the needs of corporate constituents. Prosecutors are
also sensitive to the needs of corporations and the defense bar that represents them. Buell
describes a situation in which white collar defense attorneys are treated with more respect
and their clients are considered generally law-abiding citizens, as opposed to violent
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criminals. Therefore, federal prosecutors disclose more about their corporate charging
procedures than they would for a mobster or drug dealer. Lastly, Buell considers that
prosecutors may disclose more about corporate crime decision making to achieve a
policy-making goal of deterring corporate crime in the future by giving firms guidance.66
Stemen and Frederick place prosecutorial discretion within the context of criminal
procedural constraints, high caseloads, limited staffing, and shared values and norms
within the group of other prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys with whom
prosecutors form working relationships. 67 Andrew B. Whitford argues that agency
structure and design determine whether U.S. Attorneys respond most to national, local or
personal considerations. Political appointees, such as United States Attorneys, determine
some of the organizational structures that govern the boundaries of line prosecutors’
behavior. The U.S. Attorneys set guidelines for in-office conflict resolution, caseclearance policies and hiring procedures. While Whitford argues that this design allows
for more nationalized control of the geographically dispersed U.S. Attorneys’ offices
across the country, it also shows that institutional design of the Justice Department has a
significant impact on prosecutorial decision making. 68
Rachel E. Barkow emphasizes the importance of institutional structures within the
Justice Department in “mediating prosecutorial impulses” and writes that some are more
successful than others.69 Institutional design influences the culture of an agency, which
emphasizes some actions over others. The Justice Department’s structures favor a law
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enforcement mission and appearing tough on crime over more long-term policy reforms
or other interests. There is the imperative not only to bring prosecutions, but successful
ones. 70 “Prosecutors want to make it as easy as possible for them to win at trial, and that
will-to-win can create cognitive biases in even the most well-intentioned prosecutors.” 71
They are also interested in maintaining their reputations and are therefore protective
against scrutiny of their decision-making process.72 Barkow discusses this desire to avoid
scrutiny of their decision-making process in terms of opposing clemency reforms, but it
can also be applied to the desire not to have one’s reputation marred by a high-profile
loss in a riskier case. Barkow writes that the Department itself is invested in the status
quo and Congress seeks to keep powerful interest groups happy. In this case she is
referring to law enforcement over criminal defendants and their allies, although she
allows that white collar defendants are also powerful.
A strong president with a popular mandate could at least attempt to make
institutional changes to the Justice Department within the boundaries of path dependency
and congressional control, as evidenced by President Trump’s willingness to publicly
criticize and direct the it. Regardless of who directs reforms of prosecutorial decision
making, as may be called for when one considers the 2008 financial crisis, Barkow
argues prosecutors are likely to resist any change that seeks to reduce their power to win
cases or make decisions. Currently, the institutional structure of the Justice Department
encourages prosecutors to focus on winning cases and doing so quickly, as “judged from
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their perspective.” 73 Prosecutors may only make different decisions if they are
incentivized to do so. Barkow argues that prosecutors shouldn’t be expected to make “the
right policy decisions” while stepping “outside of themselves to reach decisions that may
undercut their own interests.” Even if they are entirely acting in good faith, their own
cognitive biases may favor certain interests over others. Institutional design needs to take
these human attributes into account, Barkow argues in the case of street crime
prosecutions. White collar cases have extremely powerful defendants compared to street
crime cases, making strong institutional design even more important to allow prosecutors
to achieve important policy goals. Incentivizing desired policy outcomes while
accounting for the natural human instinct toward self-interest, even in the most dedicated
individuals, is an essential feature of American government’s original design. 74
Indeed, this is the motivation behind our entire system of government and the
separation of powers. Unfortunately, these lessons were forgotten when DOJ
began accumulating additional powers. But for a leader who wants to improve
decision making, it is never too late to shift course. 75

James Eisenstein argued in a 1978 comprehensive study of the United States
Attorneys’ Offices that personal values and career considerations motivate prosecutorial
decision making. He argued most Assistant U.S. Attorneys did not intend to spend an
entire career in that position, rather they sought to move on to private practice. Therefore,
they preferred high-profile cases to prove themselves as valuable for defense firms.76
Much subsequent literature agrees with Eisenstein’s assertion that assistant U.S. attorneys
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looking for a lucrative private sector job will prosecute high-profile cases. Assistant
United States Attorneys would benefit from a high-profile case if they desire a lucrative
career in the private sector. They want to create a record that would look attractive to
elite private firms, if that is their target. Therefore, historically, these attorneys would
seek to prosecute an attention-grabbing, difficult case to make a name for themselves as
tough, smart and talented. However, of course, they must not pick a case they believe is
potentially too difficult to win.

Chapter conclusion
Prosecutorial discretion provides the most compelling theory for this study. With
a change in resources providing additional context, a change in incentives for prosecutors
in the form of salary disparity will be the evidence that best explains the change in
prosecutorial behavior over time. Presidents have long been subject to political pressures
from the powerful financial industry, as have other government officials in the form of
potential interest group pressure or cultural capture. This consistency will be
demonstrated in the forthcoming chapters. However, subsequent chapters will show that
while government salaries may have consistently lagged behind private sector salaries,
the gap between the top salaries in government versus private partnership has
significantly widened in the time period in which high-level financial prosecutions have
stopped.
To be sure, resources diverted away from financial crime prosecution was a
contributing factor, as well as a series of Justice Department embarrassments and
accusations of overzealousness in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. The
resources factor gives prosecutors less ammunition, and the embarrassments make
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shooters gun-shy. However, when a massive salary increase depends on precisely hitting
a difficult target, a rational person would search for a safer shot, while still looking like a
talented gunman. High-level financial prosecutions would be one chance at an extremely
difficult shot to make or break one’s career. A series of easier wins is a much safer target.

Chapter 3: Setting the scene - white collar crime
To understand why the 2008 financial crisis saw no systemically important
executives criminally prosecuted, we need to understand both the incentive structure
inside the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys’ offices, as well as examine how the
government previously handled accused economic criminals.

Blue Sky and Beyond
To understand the Department, we need to look back at its institutional
foundations, how its culture and incentive structures developed and the progress of whitecollar law itself. Before the Great Depression and the New Deal, the laws under which
white-collar crimes could be prosecuted were generally limited to the state level, as was
much governing in the United States of America. In the first three decades of the
twentieth century, state government began regulating the stock market, as increasing
numbers of average Americans began investing. States responded to complaints of fraud
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from investors by passing “Blue Sky” laws, known as such because if they were not
enacted, “financial pirates” would sell investors “everything but the blue sky.” 77
However, enforcement of these laws varied and faced some fundamental
challenges. Government officials were inexperienced and underfunded in their
enforcement efforts. Even more significantly, fraudsters could simply pay off a
complaining witness, and the government would be forced to drop the case for lack of
evidence. The Investment Bankers Association told its members in 1915 that they could
evade blue sky laws simply by operating across state lines. 78 States competed with each
other to attract investors and they were reluctant to adopt stringent regulations that might
discourage business. New York’s Martin Act, passed in 1921, for example, had potential
to be an effective Blue Sky law, as much of the nation’s securities were originated in
New York. However, New York also did not want to diminish its role as an investment
hub, and lawmakers feared a too powerful law would encourage graft by officials
enforcing the law.79 Additionally, stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were
exempted from Blue Sky laws. These early attempts at protecting investors and
consumers were only a small step from the almost entirely lassies-faire economy of
America prior. Lying about a financial product was still quite easy.
In the 1920s, demand for securities continued to increase. Unscrupulous securities
dealers created fake stocks to meet this demand. Other than promising quick riches,
dealers gave little information when selling stocks to eager buyers, making fraudulent
sales quite easy. Lawmakers estimated that approximately half the securities issued in
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that period were “worthless.”80 Several bills were proposed in Congress to rectify the
situation, but the Roaring Twenties’ exuberant mood made them unpopular until people
began to lose money. In 1922, Illinois Congressman Edward Dennison proposed a law
that would make it a crime to use the U.S. mail system to commit financial fraud, closing
a major loophole in the Blue Sky laws. But some questioned the constitutionality of such
a federal law, as the Supreme Court was narrowly interpreting the commerce clause, and
the Coolidge and Hoover administrations were committed to keeping financial regulation
at the state level.81
By November 1929, the stock market had lost approximately $26 billion in value
for a fifty percent decline. On October 28th, 1929, known as Black Monday, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average declined thirteen percent that day alone.82 Frantic depositors
demanded withdrawals from banks, causing “bank runs,” and thousands of banks closed,
unable to meet withdrawal demands. In a time before deposit insurance, many Americans
lost their life savings and commerce slowed dramatically. By 1932, approximately
twenty-five percent of Americans were unemployed, and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average was eighty-nine percent below its pre-crash peak.
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President Hoover signed a bill creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to
help railroads, banks, and other businesses that were illiquid but had collateral to borrow
against. This quasi-public agency could provide discount loans to struggling institutions,
as well as state and local governments. However, by the summer of 1932, the federal
government reversed these expansionary activities that had been aiding a recovery, and
the crisis returned by the next winter. 85
Hoover did ask the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to investigate stock
market practices, and it began doing so in March 1932, nearly three years after the crash.
At first, bankers stonewalled the process, evading questions and failing to produce
internal documents. The Committee made little progress until the Republican Chairman,
Peter Norbeck, hired a New York deputy district attorney and skilled investigator,
Ferdinand Pecora, as chief counsel. Also, the new Democratic Chairman, Duncan
Fletcher, in April 1933 offered a resolution to expand the scope of inquiry to private
banking practices.86 A series of financial scandals, for example involving Richard
Whitney, the head of the New York Stock Exchange, also helped effect change.
The so-called “Pecora investigation” culminated in a 400-page report in June
1934, highlighting the finance industry’s legal and ethical transgressions. It helped turn
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popular sentiment against laissez-faire capitalism and “banksters,” who had been
celebrities only a few years prior. Percora’s dogged investigations and these public
hearings paved the way for Franklin Roosevelt and the new Democratic party majority in
Congress to pass the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – which
created the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate the industry - and the
Banking Act of 1933, also known as Glass-Steagall, which separated investment banking
from commercial banking and created deposit insurance. 87 Roosevelt and Congress also
passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 to regulate debt securities, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 to minimize conflicts of interest in companies that both trade in
and issue their own securities, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to regulate those
giving investment advice. The SEC is responsible for enforcement of these laws, as well
as in part enforcing the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd Frank Act of 2010.
A key provision of the Securities Act of 1933 was the registration statement,
which required numerous disclosures to the federal government and a securities
prospectus for buyers. Although some criticized these components as unhelpful for
average investors, the requirement potentially empowered at least those who could read
the documents or hire experts to understand them. Written disclosures also meant that
they could be cited in a court of law. The law allowed civil and criminal penalties for
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failing to release a compliant registration statement or releasing one with false or
misleading information.88
In the decades since, these laws have facilitated many criminal prosecutions. In
fact, prosecutors have a variety of tools available and tremendous discretion about whom
to charge with what. Including securities fraud under the above laws, prosecutors may
bring charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud, plus actions under the savings
and loan crisis-era Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) and other statutes. Fraud charges under most of these laws carry a five-year
statute of limitations, as well as civil and criminal penalties. However, FIRREA law has a
ten-year statute of limitations, so long as the government can show the defendant’s
actions “affected a financial institution."89 Also, local Blue Sky laws, like the Martin Act,
still apply, as well. More specifically, the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, authorized by the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, is perhaps the most often cited tool in tackling financial
crime. It specifically applies to “the purchase or sale of any security” and is used to
prosecute both fraud and insider trading. Notably, it requires proof of “willfulness,”
meaning intent to break the law, rather than simple negligence, meaning carelessness.
Individuals found guilty under this rule can spend up to twenty years in prison and be
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fined up to $5 million. Companies found guilty under this rule can be fined up to $25
million.90

Corporate Conditions
Punishing people for disobeying society’s rules is as old human civilization itself.
However, punishing corporations is newer and less intuitive. Like many American
institutions, the corporation was built upon its British beginnings. In England, only the
crown could grant a corporate charter to certain preferred entities, mostly municipal
governments. After the revolution, the founders democratized this process by changing
these municipal corporations to cities, schools, and charitable organizations. American
corporations became business enterprises, such as banks and infrastructure projects,
which were limited in scope and time. Corporate charters granted by legislatures after
successful citizen petitions delineated capitalization limitations, length of existence,
operation, function, and election by shareholders of directors. These corporations could
enter into contracts and enforce them in court. In the early nineteenth century, states
passed laws allowing for general corporation processes, rather than having the legislature
and governor chose each one based on petitions by citizens with access, seeking to
further democratize and privatize the process. In the decades after the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, courts heard many cases where plaintiff corporations sued over
alleged violations of its equal protection clause.
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A corporate charter also allowed limited liability, protecting shareholders from
being held personally legally responsible for the deeds of the corporation. This provision
encouraged investment and economic growth. 91 However, the legal rights of
shareholders were quite minimal beyond limited liability. For example, there were few if
any disclosure or reporting requirements, no accounting standards, and the rights of an
average shareholder to sue directors was uncertain.92 By the turn of the twentieth century,
corporate structure had changed from few shareholders who also managed the company
to many diffuse shareholders and professional managers separate from ownership. 93
This was also the era of the trust and industrial progress. At the same time the
new masses of industrial workers who toiled in incredibly unsafe and by today’s
standards inhumane conditions would band together and advocate for better treatment,
supported by some politicians like President Theodore Roosevelt in what came to be
known as the Progressive Era. Reforms arose in this environment, with new laws
protecting workers and limiting some corporate excesses. In 1909, the United States
Supreme Court declared in New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v United States
that a corporation, as an abstract legal entity, could form the necessary criminal intent
vicariously, and, therefore, that criminal charges could be brought against it for the
actions of its employees on behalf of the company.94 Over the years, federal courts have
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clarified the conditions under which a company may be held vicariously criminally liable
for the actions of its employees. In 1970, a court ruled that a company may be held liable
for criminal acts committed by a subsidiary, even if the illegal acts began before the
merger or consolidation.95 In 1972, a federal court said a company could be liable if a
criminal act is committed by the employee in his or her general line of duty. 96 In 1989,
this was expanded to include acts committed on behalf of the company, even if they are
against the company’s general policies or compliance programs. 97 The company must
take proactive measures to enforce these policies, as well.98 Legal criminal intent may
take various forms, including willful blindness to the crime(s); collective knowledge of
criminal behavior within the firm, even if no single agent had enough knowledge to be
convicted of the crime; active concealment of criminal behavior; and conspiracy to
commit a crime.99
In the 1990s the idea of prosecuting a corporation received a boost in the form of
an academic argument. A New York University professor, Ronald Goldstock, argued that
prosecutors should focus on the criminogenic environment of corporations.
Corporations, he maintained, are not simply collections of individuals; they also
constitute environmental cultures, with incentive structures that may be conducive to a
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wide range of behaviors. If these behaviors are criminal, the corporation should be held
criminally liable.
But this liability, he believed, should take a new form. Ideally, law enforcement
officials provided victims and society with a sense of fairness, rule of law, and justice, as
well as a deterrence of future crimes, by investigating and punishing human criminals.
Goldstock argued that prosecutors should attempt to reduce illegal behavior by targeting
the organizations whose cultures encouraged this behavior. For example, in the case of
certain types of crimes, like union corruption and mob influence, he argued that criminal
prosecution of union leaders was not the best way to reduce criminality and in fact may
be counterproductive. Instead, a more productive tool for these unions was court-ordered
trusteeships to instill more democratic practices. These structural changes of
criminogenic organizations, potentially aided by self-monitoring, private auditing firms,
public opinion, and other restructuring mechanisms required by government, could prove
more useful than simply putting criminals in jail, he argued.100
Why look to prosecutors to change a criminogenic environment in a union, a city
or a bank? Goldstock argued that prosecutors are uniquely situated to have extensive
knowledge of relevant laws and alternative options for enforcement, may have sole
access to data from electronic surveillance, and possess the requisite discretion to
negotiate for various reform measures in a settlement agreement (like the settlement
agreements used extensively to deal with banks after the 2007 financial crisis). 101 Federal
Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff - who served as chief of the business
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and securities fraud unit for the last two of his seven years (1973 – 1980) as an Assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District and then as a white-collar defense
attorney until he was appointed to the bench in 1996 – said this idea of “prosecutor as
problem solver” was adopted by federal prosecutors in recent decades. “It is the shift that
has occurred, over the past thirty years or more, from focusing on prosecuting high-level
individuals to focusing on prosecuting companies and other institutions,” he wrote in a
2014 New York Review of Books article.
Charging companies and individuals need not be mutually exclusive practices, but
experience shows that the Justice Department at times may prioritize one over the other.
The decade before the 2008 crisis saw the Justice Department take a rare turn to focusing
on the idea of charging companies, but being afraid to do so. Instead they relied on
settlement agreements with these companies. Holding high-level systemically-important
individuals accountable seems to have been lost entirely in this decade. “It is true that
prosecutors have brought criminal charges against companies for well over a hundred
years, but until relatively recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and
prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their managerial agents
were even rarer,” Rakoff said. In an interview, he contrasted this trend with his tenure as
division chief in the 1970s. “I used to say to my assistants … we used to think it was
admission of defeat if we couldn’t find the individuals,” he said.
Pulitzer prize-winning investigative journalist Jesse Eisinger echoed Rakoff’s
assertion that the Southern District of New York - a hub of white-collar criminal
enforcement – historically focused on prosecuting individuals until recent decades.
Additionally, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse – a research and data
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gathering organization at Syracuse University – reported in July 2015 that white collar
prosecution of individuals was at a twenty-year low.102

Figure 3.1
Federal White-Collar Crime Prosecutions at 20-Year Low103

Figure 3.2
White Collar Crime Prosecutions as of July 2015
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Department Dealings
So, why would the Justice Department make such a drastic shift in tactic just in
time for the 2008 financial crisis? Firstly, the Justice Department focused more on a high
conviction rate as the 20th century drew to a close. The “conviction rate,” defined as the
percentage of cases closed by guilty plea or conviction at trial, has been tracked and
reported by the Justice Department for decades. But in the last few years of the 20 th
century, the rate climbed. Whereas the Department reported a conviction rate in the mideighty percent range previously, between 1995 and 2000, the rate steadily climbed until it
remained over ninety percent in the new millennium. 104 A higher conviction rate looks
like success, but actually what it reflects more is caution. The more a prosecutor is
willing to chase a difficult, but important case, the more he is likely to have some losses,
regardless of skill. Increased risk might mean increased reward, but increased losses as
well.
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Figure 3.3
U.S. Attorney’s Office Conviction Rate 1991-2013105
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Secondly, by the turn of the 20th century, businesses and their defense attorneys
complained of an increasingly aggressive approach to prosecuting corporation and felt
that the Justice Department had no coherent policy for charging corporations. In
response, Assistant Attorney General Eric Holder, who would later become the Attorney
General under President Obama, responded to these complaints with a memorandum,
attempting to articulate a consistent and coherent policy.106 The first in a series of memos
that would by 2008 would evolve into a virtual “Get Out of Jail Free” card for executives,
was written in 1999 as a directive to prosecutors and was known as the “Holder Memo.”
It allows for the possibility of taking into consideration the “collateral consequences” of
charging a corporation with a crime, such as the punishment of innocent employees or
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other economic consequences. It also outlines the potential for using deferred- or nonprosecution agreements, in which the company agrees to make internal changes in
exchange for the government withholding prosecution. Key factors the government
would consider, according to the Holder memo, would include the company’s willingness
to cooperate, which controversially could include waiver of attorney client privilege and
trade secrets.107
The Holder memo would sow the seeds of non-prosecution for the next financial
crisis, but for the Enron-era officials, the Justice Department’s corporate timidity had not
yet fully sprouted. In an effort to show toughness in the high profile Enron-era cases and
convince individuals involved in these corporate crimes to “cooperate with the
government – or else”, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson wrote a memo to
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a
department within the DOJ. The memo directed Sawyer to change the BOP’s policy of
placing some non-violent offenders with short sentences in halfway houses when
recommended by a judge.108 The Department prosecuted systemically important
executives like Enron’s CEO Kenneth Lay and COO Jeffrey Skilling and Adelphia
Cable’s Rigas family.109 Additionally, the Enron scandal included corporate prosecutions.
The criminal prosecution of accounting giant Arthur Andersen in 2002 marked a turning
point in the Justice Department’s quest to change the criminogenic environment of
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companies. It was a new concept to many who dealt with corporate fraud that corporate
executives could gain personal wealth at the expense of the corporation through
accounting fraud, a lesson not well-enough learned from the savings and loan crisis, in
which executives looted their own banks through creative accounting.110 A 2010
American Bar Association (ABA) article praised the Enron prosecutions as a “watershed
moment” for the Department in pursuing “greedy executives.”111
“Post-Enron, prosecutors became comfortable with casting a much broader net in
the pursuit of fraud in the capital market,” wrote Jacob Frenkel, a former federal
prosecutor and a partner at the suburban Washington firm, Shulman, Rogers, Gandal,
Pordy & Ecker in the ABA article “The Bush administration and opportunistic
prosecutors saw the opportunity to bring high-profile, big-dollar cases against corporate
leaders and public officials for how they conducted business.”112 The Justice Department
also wanted to prosecute those who facilitated these accounting fraud scandals. And why
shouldn’t they? These executives cost many Americans significant sums of money;
putting them in jail would show a prosecutor’s toughness and would be a huge, public
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win for them personally. The calculus of this decision would change by the time of the
2008 crisis, but at that moment, it was a difficult but worthy challenge. The Department
obtained a grand jury indictment in March 2002 for Arthur Andersen, Enron’s long-time
auditor, charging the firm with obstruction of justice for destroying documents to
knowingly and willingly prevent an investigation, according to a Department
statement.113 The Department alleged that Andersen began destroying documents related
to special business entities that it helped Enron create - an integral part of what would
later be recognized as Enron’s accounting fraud - after the Securities and Exchange
Commission began an investigation of the energy company. “As the indictment lays out,
the destruction initiative began on or about October 10, 2001, as Andersen foresaw
imminent government investigations and civil litigation. The destruction continued
through the SEC's announcement that an investigation had been launched and only ended
nearly one month later when the SEC officially served Andersen with a subpoena for
Enron documents,”114 said Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson in a March 14,
2002 statement. A series of follow up press questions focused on the potential that this
indictment would put Andersen out of business. Thompson, a Republican George W.
Bush administration political appointee, replied:
“. . . as I said in our statement, these are serious charges, and it shouldn't be a
surprise to anyone that serious charges have serious consequences. And again, without
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talking about any particular matter, but just generally, I think it would be unfortunate for
our criminal justice system if any individual or any entity could say that he or she or it
was too big or too important, so as it couldn't be indicted.” 115 (emphasis added.)
In reference to individuals, Department memos assert that charges against a
corporation should not preclude charging individuals within that corporation. 116 The
Holder memo explicity states: “Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Further,
imposition of individual criminal liability on such individuals provides a strong deterrent
against future corporate wrongdoing.”117 They also say the criteria for charging a
corporation should be the same as for charging an individual.118 Thompson’s iteration of
the memo reads:
“Because a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of individual
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate
wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued,
even in the face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.” 119 (Emphasis added.)

However, this prosecution wound up causing serious embarrassment for the
Department, which would have consequences for the 2008 crisis. The Department would
be blamed for the destruction of an almost one-hundred-year-old, highly respected
company and the loss of many innocent people’s jobs. In 2002, Arthur Andersen lost
most of its employees and clients after it was convicted of obstruction of justice. The firm
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could not operate without a trustworthy reputation, and a criminal conviction of this kind
was undoubtedly poisonous. Thousands of blameless employees lost their jobs,
shareholders were devastated, and vendors and others dependent on the corporation
suffered. This could be seen as an unfortunate but perhaps necessary side effect of a
successful prosecution. However, in 2005, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme
Court on procedural grounds, making the company’s destruction seem all for naught. The
high court found that the district court, agreeing with the government’s interpretation of
the relevant law, failed to properly instruct the jury that it needed to find “consciousness
of wrongdoing” when Andersen employees shredded documents. The Fifth Circuit court
of appeals upheld the lower court’s interpretation of the law that the “jury need not find
any consciousness of wrongdoing to convict.” 120 However, the Supreme Court wrote that
simply shredding documents, even those related to a government investigation, should
not have been enough to convict. 121
Whether the firm would have been convicted if the jury had received the stricter
instructions as interpreted by the Supreme Court remains unknown. The Justice
Department could have retried the case, but by that time Andersen was a shell of its
former self, and the Department was blamed for destroying the company and
prosecutorial overreach. 122, 123, 124
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Although the district court was responsible for the jury instructions, Supreme
Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in the 2005 decision that prosecutors
should have been more careful in their interpretation of the relevant federal laws, since
the underlying act of shredding documents to hide them from the government is not
“inherently malign,” even though the shredding was done on Andersen’s instructions.
The corporate community and the press accepted Rehnquist’s placement of blame and
pounced on the Justice Department, which took this backlash seriously. “There’s a big
lobbying effort by corporations and the white-collar defense bar, saying Justice is abusing
power,” Eisinger said. “White collar lawyers say the Department of Justice is overcriminalizing business behavior and that there is prosecutorial abuse.”125 The Justice
Department responded with more memos and a markedly more cautious approach to
charging corporations. Somehow, charging individuals, which does not punish innocent
others like charging companies can, was caught in the web of caution as well, despite
Holder’s and Thompson’s earlier writings on the importance of individual culpability.

After Andersen
The American Bar Association (ABA) lobbied hard against the Holder and
Thompson memos. Specifically, it objected to the provision seeking a waiver of attorneyclient privilege for a corporation willing to cooperate in exchange for non-prosecution.126
Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum sought to allay these concerns with
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an addendum to the Thompson memo that would require each U. S. Attorney’s office to
have a written waiver policy. However, as there was no requirement of consistency
across offices, nor that the policies be made public, the policy did little to soothe the
ABA’s concerns. Senator Arlen Specter, a former prosecutor, introduced the AttorneyClient Privilege Protection Act of 2006, which provided increased protections for
attorney-client privilege in corporate settlement negotiations. Also, Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty issued a new memo to replace the Thompson version, which had
replaced the Holder iteration. The McNulty memo changed the privilege waiver
requirement policy to make it sought only if necessary. However, the edit did not bend
entirely to the ABA and corporate pressure, as prosecutors could still maneuver around
these restrictions by suggesting to a corporation that a waiver would benefit them even if
not required.127
Despite the corporate and legislative pushback, and the Department’s subsequent
reforms, major embarrassments continued for Justice as the decade drew to a close. In
2007, a federal judge dismissed thirteen of the sixteen indictments in a tax shelter case
against former employees of the accounting firm, KPMG. U.S. District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan said the defendants’ constitutional rights had been violated when prosecutors
pressured KPMG not to pay their legal fees in exchange for not indicting the company – a
practice described in the Thompson memo. An appeals court later upheld the dismissals.
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KPMG may have decided to cooperate with the government for fear that a criminal

indictment against the company would mean a similar fate to that of Arthur Andersen
only a few years prior. The Department again looked like it was abusing its power.
Another high-profile embarrassment for the Justice Department was a botched
corruption case against a powerful Senator; Ted Stevens of Alaska.129 Although the
Stevens case did not involve the exact same type of corporate fraud as KPMG and
Andersen, it was an extremely high-profile white-collar embarrassment for the
Department, adding another nail in its bold prosecution coffin. In 2009, federal judge
Emmet Sullivan overturned the Senator’s conviction for failing to disclose thousands of
dollars in gifts from an oil industry executive.130 The Senator was indicted by the Justice
Department less than 100 days before the November 2008 election, in which he would be
seeking reelection. Stevens was found guilty in October 2008, 131 just in time to lose his
seat to Democratic Anchorage Mayor Mark Begich. Stevens had been the longest serving
Republican in Senate history at the time.132 Obviously, the loss attracted attention.
In December 2008, an FBI whistleblower said the government failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence in Stevens’ trial. Failing to turn over this kind of evidence to the
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defense is known as a “Brady violation” after the 1963 Supreme Court case Brady v.
Maryland. Judge Sullivan announced in 2009 that he had appointed a non-government
attorney to investigate the Justice Department’s misconduct in the Stevens case. Attorney
General Holder declined to bring a new case against the Senator. 133 Stevens never
served jail time, but the conviction obviously negatively influenced his reelection. The
government lawyers were not legally held accountable for misconduct, which would have
been highly unusual. However, the lead prosecutor on the Stevens case was found to have
exercised “poor judgment” and left his government job. Two other prosecutors on the
case were suspended (and later reinstated), and one committed suicide before the
investigation was completed. Also, before the investigation ended, Stevens died a 2010
plane crash. 134
Lastly, the unsuccessful prosecution of two mid-level Bear Stearns fund managers
by Eastern District of New York attorneys in 2009 amounted to another major
embarrassment for the Department; a final nail in this metaphorical coffin. The jury
found the fund managers not guilty of fraud in November 2009, a verdict that William D.
Cohan, a former Wall Street banker and author, wrote was “surprising – for its failure to
conform with the zeitgeist,” concluding that the prosecution “blew it.” The response from
the jury seems to confirm this notion. One juror told the New York Times that the jury felt
the prosecution failed to make a good case. 135 After this loss, it was clear that the Justice
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Department had confirmed its own fears that financial crisis cases - based on proving
fraud with intent, rather than overly zealous or unwise business decisions - were too
difficult to prosecute successfully. However, I argue this was a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Some wonder why the case was brought by the Eastern District of New York which includes Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and both Long Island counties (Nassau
and Suffolk) – rather than the Southern District of New York, which covers Manhattan,
the Bronx, and several counties in the northern suburbs of New York City. Since
Manhattan is a global financial Mecca, many major white-collar cases have been tried
there. This is how the Department of Justice itself describes the office:
“Today, the Office is at the forefront of many important areas of criminal law
enforcement, including terrorism, white collar and cybercrime, mortgage fraud,
public corruption, gang violence, organized crime, international narcotics
trafficking and civil rights violations. Similarly, the Office litigates among the
most complex and significant civil cases the Department of Justice handles - from
large affirmative civil fraud cases to cases in the environmental, health care,
immigration and bankruptcy areas, as well as cases implicating classified
information.”136

Attorneys from this office have prosecuted major politicians, insider traders, and
other prominent figures.137 Known for its aggressive leadership and staff, it has been
headed by the likes of Rudolph Giuliani, James Comey, and Preet Bharara. Yet the
Southern District never filed a criminal fraud case against a senior banking executive for
crisis-era fraud. The Eastern District has prosecuted some important criminal cases, but
the Southern District is thought to have jurisdiction over Wall Street, and the Eastern
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District has a reputation for a “blue-collar approach.”138 Also, the Eastern District has
fewer than 100 Assistant United States Attorneys, a vastly smaller staff than the Southern
District.139 Even the Bear Stearns defendants themselves argued the Southern District was
the appropriate jurisdiction choice in this case. They filed to dismiss the case first without
prejudice and then with prejudice, since the government brought the case in what the
defendants believed to be an unjustified jurisdiction.140 It is unclear why the defendants
would demand a jurisdiction that has more seasoned prosecutors, but one plausible
scenario is the desire to have a Manhattan venue, which could potentially have more Wall
Street-friendly jurors than Brooklyn, even if they would be taking a chance with more
experienced prosecutors. In the end, it worked out for the defendants in Brooklyn.

Settling for Safety
Of the ninety-four U.S. Attorney’s offices throughout the country only some
would have experience bringing major financial crime cases because only a few locations
have financial centers or major financial firms. These U.S. Attorney’s offices generally
deal with offenses within their geographical jurisdiction. Since Wall Street firms exist in
New York City, and not Bangor, Maine, prosecutors working in New York City would
naturally see more financial cases than in Bangor. John Moon served as a prosecutor at
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Main Justice in Washington from 1991 to 1993, during some of the savings and loan
prosecutions. Some of the cases were brought in New England, and Moon was dispatched
to help. “I brought some cases in Vermont and Maine. Assistant (United States)
Attorneys would say, ‘we don’t even know how a bank works.’ They bring lobster
cases.”141 In other words, most federal prosecutors are not in New York or Washington
and are focused on local cases. Even in New York or Washington, where financial crimes
are the region’s “lobster cases,” the Obama-era prosecutors were still gun shy. The
Justice Department maintains a ninety percent conviction rate for all criminal cases.
Conscious of their success record, they are unlikely to bring a case if they are not
confident of victory.142 The series of high-profile embarrassments – especially including
a wholesale destruction of a prominent business such as Arthur Andersen - created a
chilling effect within the Department when measuring risk, leaving them even more
cautious. “They got walloped in the press and they didn’t want to lose again,” said Neil
Barofsky. This chilling effect means a career prosecutor who wants to move on to a more
lucrative private practice after a few years will need to be more cautious. Whereas being
an assertive and tough prosecutor, especially in a high-profile case, used to be a good bet
for a prosecutor’s future career prospects, the very real possibility of blame for destroying
a major company now added major weight to the strategy of playing it safe.
Despite the walloping in the press, there is no evidence the embarrassment ruined
the careers of the individual attorneys involved. Take Andrew Weissman for example. He
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was a key player in the Andersen prosecution. However, he also was instrumental in the
successful prosecution of Enron executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling and earned
a reputation as a tough prosecutor. Indeed, he was director of the entire Enron Task
Force. Clearly, the Andersen loss, while embarrassing for the Department, didn’t tarnish
Weissman’s tough record. He went on to positions as the General Counsel of the FBI and
a prosecutor in Robert Mueller’s Special Counsel’s Office while it investigated Russian
interference in the 2016 presidential election. 143 However, he had high-profile wins as
well. Not all attorneys stay at the Department for as long as Weissman did. In fact,
according to Harvard Law School, “a significant portion” of Assistant United States
Attorneys spend five to seven years in the role before moving on to other work. 144
The Department as a whole took on a more cautious tone anyway. New attorneys
in this era would be incentivized by the culture of caution and the Departmental
reputation when thinking of their future careers, instead of taking a cue from the
Andersen prosecutors. Ultimately, even a young prosecutor looking to repeat Weissman’s
aggressive approach, despite the risks and damaged Department reputation, may be
standing alone, which falls far short of what is needed for a complicated government
prosecution. Weissman had an aggressive task force behind him after all. Additionally, he
was already in a prominent position, not looking for a career-making or –breaking case.
By 2010, the Department seemed to be firmly resigned to the safe road, relying
entirely on settlement agreements with the major players involved in the 2008 financial
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crisis. Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said in an October
speech at the American Bar Association entitled, “The Future of White Collar
Enforcement,” that although the Department was committed to its long-standing goals of
aggressively pursuing financial fraud to ensure the safety and fairness of financial
markets, “especially now, with the economy down, public frustration up, and epic frauds
surfacing with increasing frequency,” its attorneys were also conscious of collateral
consequences. Prosecutors are aware, he emphasized, “that with our subpoena and grand
jury power comes the power to injure individual lives and destroy corporate
reputations. So, we must always take care to exercise our discretion with great care and
an even hand.”145 In other words, be cautious. It is hard to imagine a prosecutor saying
this of Enron CEO Ken Lay, or a person accused of robbery, for that matter.
Bharara said he expected his Assistant U.S. Attorneys to be tough but fair,
aggressive, creative, open-minded, and “supremely principled.” He also said he was open
to meeting with defense attorneys personally, if there were a complaint or appeal.
However, despite private lawsuits and news articles piling up on the reality of toxic
mortgage-backed products, Bharara spent much of the speech talking about insider
trading; a seemingly tone-deaf choice. It is unclear why Bharara would focus on insider
trading, rather than the hot topic of fraud. Based on the cases made from his office, one
could speculate that he was setting expectations. Insider trading cases might be easier to
prosecute because the government can show that a person bought or sold a stock and
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received relevant and non-public information. Wire taps or emails can show what
information a person received and when he or she received it. Then, the purchase or sale
of a stock can be easily discerned. A more straightforward case is easier to prove to a jury
when trying to show intent. Securities fraud cases are more technically complicated,
allowing for the used car salesman defense: the seller of mortgage bonds can plead that
he was simply being an aggressive salesman. The remainder of the speech called on
attorneys and companies to self-police and self-report issues, a strategy that the crisis
itself showed to be unrealistic. 146 Bharara closed his speech by saying, perhaps a bit too
idealistically given his office’s lack of action:
And so the truly great lawyer – motivated by conscience, guided by principle, and
empowered by training – can serve as the greatest antidote against a creeping
corporate corruption that has so sapped people’s faith in our economic order. In
the end, the good lawyer makes a living; the great lawyer makes a difference.147
Contrary to this sentiment, government lawyers relied increasingly on settlements
known as deferred and non-prosecution agreements. It is worthwhile to note that deferred
prosecution agreements usually become de facto non-prosecution agreements, as
prosecutions have never followed from deferred prosecution agreements used in the
crisis, even when the banks fail to follow all requirements. However, when the initial
announcement is made that the bank will not face prosecution as long as it “behaves” and
it comes with a sizeable settlement amount, the Justice Department looks tough. Media
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attention moves on before anyone checks whether the reforms were made. These
agreements were attractive for an embattled and gun-shy Department, in that they
required significantly less time, money and risk than criminal prosecutions and could be
presented as “wins” to the public, with large dollar amounts making news headlines.
These settlement agreements attempt to impose various reforms on banks in order to
correct a criminogenic or unethical environment, but do so without the usual constraints
applied to both regulation and litigation. 148 This change results from “increased emphasis
on corporate (rather than individual) liability, skyrocketing monetary penalties, and the
nearly exclusive imposition of those penalties via innovative legal instruments that
facilitate out-of-court settlement.”149 There is little or no judicial review, as there would
be in litigation. For better or worse, the public comment process, interest group input, turf
battles, congressional involvement and administrative agency actions can be avoided as
well, unlike in legislation. Additionally, although settlements are made with single
institutions at a time, they effectively establish widely applicable legal standards.
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Figure 3.4
Justice Department Settlement Agreement Trends 151
The Justice Department increasingly relied on non-prosecution and deferred-prosecution
agreements in the years after the Supreme Court overturned the Arthur Andersen
conviction and the Department took the blame for the unnecessary destruction of a
prominent company.

For example, J.P. Morgan’s $13 billion settlement agreement may have sounded
impressive to an angry public, but these fines, which punished blameless shareholders,
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employees, and vendors and not necessarily the individuals responsible, permitted
corporations to return to normal business operations and profit margins. With little or no
sign of customers avoiding admittedly guilty companies, the financial services business
continued as usual; extravagant bonuses to top executives grew unabated. In fact, in the
midst of the crisis the banks consolidated, aggressively encouraged by government
officials, becoming even larger. Indeed, they are now even more “too big to fail.”152
Mortgage securities attorney Isaac Gradman said the reliance on civil settlements creates
a perverse incentive scenario for “Too Big to Fail” bank executives.
They fall out in the wash when you factor in how much money the banks made
from the entire enterprise of packaging and selling subprime Mortgage Backed
Securities. The only real deterrence that I have found is the threat of criminal
prosecution and the threat of personal disgorgement of profits from individuals.
Otherwise there really is no deterrence for them not to perpetuate the exact same
fraud in the future and just find more creative ways to do that. It’s just the cost of
doing business in that scenario. 153
In other words, the settlements that the increasingly skittish Justice Department
began to rely on made no meaningful law enforcement impact, and Department
prosecutors’ work environment changed. “They all become gun-shy about prosecuting
individuals,” Eisinger said. “They lose the skill set.”.154
Despite white collar prosecutions being at a twenty-year low, there was some
activity in 2010 and 2011. The FBI’s 2010 – 2011 crime report said that as the economy
began to crater during the crisis, the
FBI witnessed a steady rise in securities and commodities frauds as investors
sought alternative investment opportunities … Since 2008, securities and
commodities fraud investigations have increased by 52 percent, and the FBI
currently has over 1,800 pending investigations. During this period, the losses
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associated with these types of schemes have increased to billions of dollars. The
losses are associated with depreciative market value of businesses, reduced or
nonexistent return on investments, and legal and investigative costs. The victims
of securities and commodities frauds include individual investors, financial
institutions, public and private companies, government entities, pension funds,
and retirement funds.155
Perhaps the most famous among these cases are Bernard Madoff and Raj
Rajaratnam. Madoff, who devised a massive Ponzi scheme, was turned in by his sons,
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 150 years in prison in 2009, slightly before the spike
in cases outlined by the data,. 156 In 2011, Rajaratnam, an enormously wealthy insider
trader, was undone by wire taps, a tactic that had previously been reserved to drug and
organized crime cases, and sentenced to eleven years in prison. Reporting on the appeals
court’s ruling, the New York Times’ DealBook column applauded government
prosecutors for their “aggressive” efforts on insider trading cases.
The ruling validates the aggressive tactics deployed by federal prosecutors in the
government’s sweeping investigation into insider trading on Wall Street, which
has resulted in more than 70 convictions or guilty pleas since 2009.157
The FBI and its Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force partners conducted
“Operation Broken Trust,” a sweep targeting companies and individuals for various
securities fraud schemes occurring between August and December 2010, resulting in both
civil and criminal cases. 158 On December 6, 2010, Attorney General Holder announced
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that the results of Operation Broken Trust were 343 criminal defendants – both
individuals and corporations – including “more than 120,000 victims with losses
attributable to alleged criminal activity of more than $8 billion.” 159 According to the
report, the most common types of securities and commodities fraud during this time
period included Ponzi schemes, pyramid schemes, market manipulation schemes,
confidence scams, foreign currency exchange fraud, precious metals fraud, broker
embezzlement, and trading shares during prohibited hours. At the end of fiscal year 2011,
the FBI reported 1,846 cases of securities and commodities fraud, 520 indictments, and
394 convictions. This is up from approximately 1,200 pending securities and
commodities fraud cases in fiscal 2008. 160 This may seem like a flurry of activity and
aggressive enforcement. However, none of these cases were brought against individuals
in charge of systemically important or “Too Big to Fail” institutions. In other words,
those executives and companies that were charged criminally were less likely to have
seemingly endless resources for defense and negotiation than those of the megabanks.
Nor would it likely have an impact on the global economy. Most importantly, it wasn’t
much of a deterrent for the leaders of megabanks in the future.
If the major cases highlighted in the FBI report included important sounding
companies with big dollar values, the settlements were such that the banks could
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generally live with them. The major examples in the FBI report include “Joseph Blimline,
who orchestrated one of North Texas’ largest oil and gas investment Ponzi schemes,
defrauding 7,700 investors of over $485 million;” seven officials from A&O Entities of
Richmond, Virginia, which sold shares in life insurance policies to mostly elderly
investors in a $100 million Ponzi scheme; and New York-based Nicholas Cosmo, who
ran a Ponzi scheme worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 161
The report also details the agency’s efforts in prosecuting mortgage fraud,
financial institution fraud, and other crimes. The agency boasted 1,223 indictments and
1,082 convictions; $1.38 billion in restitutions; $116.3 million in fines; $15.7 million in
seizures; and $7.33 million in forfeitures in fiscal year 2011. The FBI lists such mortgage
fraud cases in this period as Luis Belevan and The Guardian Group, LLC of Phoenix;
Howard Shmuckler, The Shmuckler Group of Washington, D.C.; and Carl Cole; David
Crisp of Sacramento.162 However, Angelo Mozilo, co-founder of Countrywide Financial
– responsible for billions of dollars in subprime mortgages and one of the biggest
contributors to the financial crisis – learned in June 2016 that he would face neither a
criminal nor a civil case from the Justice Department for mortgage fraud. (He settled with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for $67.5 million, avoiding a civil trial, and the
Justice Department simply dropped its criminal investigation).163 Mozilo has been an icon
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for public anger, while those men listed as case highlights in the FBI’s report were
comparably meaningless or irrelevant to the grander scheme of the subprime mortgage
crisis.
Likely as a response to the immense public criticism the Department received for
not prosecuting important executives, Assistant Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates
issued her own memo on September 9, 2015, urging prosecutors to charge individuals.
“One of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such accountability
is important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in
corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions,
and it promotes the public's confidence in our justice system… There are, however, many
substantial challenges unique to pursuing individuals for corporate misdeeds. In large
corporations, where responsibility can be diffuse, and decisions are made at various
levels, it can be difficult to determine if someone possessed the knowledge and criminal
intent necessary to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is particularly
true when determining the culpability of high-level executives, who may be insulated
from the day-to-day activity in which the misconduct occurs. As a result, investigators
often must reconstruct what happened based on a painstaking review of corporate
documents, which can number in the millions, and which may be difficult to collect due
to legal restrictions. These challenges make it all the more important that the Department
fully leverage its resources to identify culpable individuals at all levels in corporate
cases.”164

This change of tune by a Department that had been increasingly cautious on white
collar crime again shows how sensitive the Department is to public criticism (usually), as
the Department took much public flack for not prosecuting any executives from the 2008
crisis. Yates articulated the challenge of prosecuting any executive individually,
especially in a megacorporation like an international investment bank, in which there are
many layers of management to insulate those at the top. Instead of simply tapping
phones, the government would have had to build mountains of evidence using other
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methods, like following extensive paper trails and inducing lower level employees to
testify against their superiors – read: more time consuming and expensive. Yates wrote in
her memo that the difficulty of reaching well-insulated executives was all the more
reason the Department should use its might to do so. Her memo, she wrote, was the result
of a working group that met to outline new and existing measures for the Department to
achieve these goals. But by 2015, due to a likely five-year statute of limitations, it was
probably too late. If it that were not the case – it is possible the savings and loan era
FIRREA law could have been used to extend the limit to ten years - the fact remains,
these hard cases would have had true public value for their ability to remove the
incentives for destructive financial fraud crimes and restore public trust in the
government and its justice system. However, they never occurred.
This narrative shows what kind of incentive structure prosecutors face within an
evolving Justice Department that is sensitive to outside criticism. It is reasonable for a
government agency, funded by taxpayers and run by appointees chosen and monitored by
democratically elected politicians, to be sensitive to outside criticism, at least to some
extent. A democratic society necessitates accountability. However, the rule of law, which
governs the way a fair and democratic society must conduct its affairs, necessitates that
criminal prosecutions are based on an egalitarian application of the laws as much as
possible. To be sure, neither total accountability to affected groups, nor an entirely
unbiased application of the laws is realistic. These two goals are both important and but
also can be in conflict, not to mention law enforcement is conducted by human beings,
not emotionless, selfless computers. Do prosecutors act on behalf of a nebulous notion of
“the people?” Who are the people anyway? Corporate executives? Homeowners? An
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unclear notion of “the masses?” The truth is that prosecutors are human beings who have
personal interests to consider, such as the ability to support themselves and their families.
A better salary is a powerful incentive for even those most civic-minded, especially in an
overwhelmingly expensive city like New York. If the Justice Department’s recent past
missteps make it clear that a prosecutor who takes too much of a risk to bring justice to
those most responsive for the 2008 crisis that he could be risking a future livelihood, it is
hard to imagine many people willing to act counter to these incentives. Before the
Andersen embarrassment – such as during the savings and loan and earlier Ernon-era
prosecutions – being aggressive was a great career move. Now it could be career suicide.
How can anyone expect many a reasonable person to jump off that cliff?

Chapter 4: A Summary of the Crisis
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) became a popular investment tool in the last
few decades of the twentieth century. They were initially seen as a safe investment for
government pension funds, community banks, and other conservative institutional
investment funds seeking to create a moderate return for their pile of capital; as few home
owners were likely to default on their payments, they were presented as highly safe
investments by bankers selling them and the credit rating agencies reviewing them.
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Initially, these investments were indeed relatively safe during the era of carefully vetting
borrowers for the ability to repay before granting them a loan. With borrowers meeting
loan standards of twenty-percent down, a stable job with enough income to meet a steady
monthly fixed payment for a thirty-year mortgage, and a good credit score, an investor
could be relatively sure he would receive the periodic payments promised for buying a
share in a pool of hundreds or thousands of mortgages. Investors looking for the least
risky mortgage-based investments - as was the case for many institutional investors were told that the mortgages in the package met traditional underwriting standards like
those just detailed, making default unlikely. Also, there were other safeguards built into
the lowest risk-lowest return parts of mortgage investments as well, such as geographic
diversity, bond insurance and higher-risk-higher reward slices or “tranches” of the
mortgage bond that would take losses first.165 Figure 4.1 shows how mortgages flow
from originators, are grouped together in a large pool and then divided into slices or
“tranches” based on the likelihood of repayment. Most of the mortgages are considered
highly likely to be repaid and would therefore be considered low risk, yet low yield.
Ratings agencies would give them a score of AAA, or the same risk level as U.S.
Government bonds. However, various tranches would be created for those wanting more
reward for more risk. These “lower” tranches would be paid after those above them,
making it more likely for them to lose money if any of the homeowners in the mortgage
pool defaulted on their payments. For taking on these higher risk groups, investors would
get higher returns. The lowest tranches would sometimes get repackaged themselves.
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Figure 4.1
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Illustration 166
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings

In the last few decades of the 20th century, the investment banking industry began
to change, and MBS went along with it. As William D. Cohan writes in Why Wall Street
Matters (2017), beginning in 1969 these banks began to change from partnerships to
public corporations. As partnerships, they had drawn on funds from the partners, who
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were accordingly risk averse; as corporations, they could draw on vastly greater debt and
equity financing, other people’s money, and became more willing to gamble; a system of
executive bonuses heightened the risk-taking incentive.167 Soon the prime borrower
market was tapped out, and investment banks were left with a demand for more MBS
investment opportunities than they could deliver. Investment banks received millions in
fees for packaging and selling these mortgage-based bonds and executives were rewarded
accordingly. Banks also invested in MBS products themselves, using massive amounts of
“leverage,” or borrowed money, to do so. Leveraging is risky if the value of an
investment drops, but much more profitable than investing with only the cash on hand. At
this point, they needed more loans to package and sell.
The investment banks began to encourage commercial banks originating the loans
to be increasingly lenient with their standards to obtain more loans to package and sell to
investors, as the demand for these investments outpaced the supply of prime mortgages.
This was in combination with the government’s pressure for the banks to do the same
through semi-private Government Sponsored Entities (GSE) – Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac - that helped Americans get home loans by buying loans off the books of mortgage
banks, freeing them up to make more loans. In the early years of the 21st century in
particular, after the dot-com bubble burst, investors needed to make more money and the
Federal Reserve had lowered interest rates. Home buying thus became much more
attractive, as monthly payments seemed within the reach of many who had considered
themselves excluded. Mortgage-based investments were the way to go. To obtain more
loans for these investments, banks began easing down-payment requirements until many
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Americans began purchasing homes for no money down and with no documentation
proving ability to repay. Credit scores and income requirements dropped as well. These
lower-standard loans were known as “subprime” and were riskier loans to make. Figure
4.2 shows how subprime loans went from 8.3 percent of all new mortgages in 2003, to
almost a quarter of new mortgages within three years.
Figure 4.2
Frequency of Subprime Mortgages 168
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings

Banks made millions of dollars in fees originating and servicing loans and passed
on the risk by selling these loans to investment banks to package and sell to investors.
Banks charged borrowers a myriad of fees when making the loan. Some also had
“servicing” divisions as well, in which they collected monthly payments, earning fees
that way, too, and at times charging pre-payment and late fees.
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Countrywide Mortgage Lenders LLC is a prime example of an originator bank
becoming a “fee machine.”169 In 2006, it had revenue of $11.4 billion and pretax income
of $4.3 billion.
When borrowers close on their loans, they pay fees for flood and tax
certifications, appraisals, document preparation, even charges associated with emailing documents or using FedEx to send or receive paperwork, according to
Countrywide documents. It’s a big business: During the last 12 months,
Countrywide did 3.5 million flood certifications, conducted 10.8 million credit
checks and 1.3 million appraisals, its filings show.170

During the peak years of subprime lending, these borrowers were often given
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), as compared to prime borrowers, who typically agree
to fixed-rate mortgages, with a steady interest rate locked in for the life of the loan.
These ARMs often had low interest rates to start, which then skyrocketed after two or
three years, when the introductory “teaser” rate period expired, and the new rates
fluctuated with market rates. Other subprime loans featured negative amortization,
meaning the principal balance grew over time. Subprime loans were often so complex
that average borrowers could hardly be expected to understand the terms, perhaps trusting
the expert bankers giving them the loan. However, Countrywide and its commissioned
employees were incentivized to push riskier, high-cost loans on borrowers because they
garnered more in fees. Riskier loans, like those with prepayment penalties and adjustable
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interest rates, were more attractive in the secondary market because as borrowers paid
more, more cash would be flowing to mortgage backed security investors.
Some borrowers who could have qualified for lower-cost loans – like government-backed
Federal Housing Administration or Veteran’s Administration loans - were pushed into
riskier loans for this reason. In this quest for fees, race came into the picture as well. In
December 2006, Countrywide settled with then New York Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer to end a two-year investigation into allegations that the lender was specifically
pushing black and Latino borrowers into high-cost loans. Countrywide agreed to
compensate these borrowers, improve internal fair lending policies, and pay three million
dollars for an independently run mortgage education program targeting minority
communities. 171
Although Countrywide was certainly not the only subprime lender fueling the
bubble and preying on borrowers, “In terms of being unresponsive to what was
happening, to sticking it out the longest, and continuing to justify the garbage they were
selling, Countrywide was the worst lender,” Ira Rheingold, executive director of the
National Association of Consumer Advocates told the New York Times in 2007. “And
anytime states tried to pass responsible lending laws, Countrywide was fighting it tooth
and nail.”172
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Eventually the housing market became saturated, and prices began to drop due to
excessive supply. At the same time, the Fed increased interest rates again, causing a
shocking and unaffordable increase in monthly mortgage payments for many Americans
and an inability to sell off their now unaffordable homes. Many homes were “under
water,” that is, worth less than what was owed on the house. Housing values continued to
plummet in a positive feedback loop. Loan defaults and foreclosures began en masse.
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The three major rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings, Fitch
Ratings Inc., and Moody’s Investor Services Inc., which were paid by the investment
banks to rate their products, initially gave most of these mortgage-backed investments
AAA ratings, the safest score possible and the same as a U.S. government-backed
treasury bill. Due to creative packaging, the safest loans could be pooled, protected with
an insurance buffer and diversified by region. These investments seemed safe, as many
homeowners would have to default all at once for them to lose money – a prospect that
seemed impossible before the housing crisis - and they promised relatively high
returns.174
However, millions of homeowners did begin to default on their loans all at once,
and the mortgage securities that relied on these loans began to drop in value, as did more
complicated variations of the MBS, called collateralized mortgage obligations (CDOs),
synthetic CDOs, and CDOs squared.175 These investment products further amplified
losses throughout the system. A full understanding of CDOs is complicated. Figures 4.3
and 4.4, as well as a previous figure in this chapter, are taken from Stanford Law
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School’s website. The figures may not demonstrate to the lay reader how these financial
products truly work with a perfect understanding. However, the figures are intended more
for the purpose of demonstrating the increasing complexity of these products beyond
MBS. The lesson to take here is that these products were massaged, manipulated and
repackaged until the original loans underlying them were a distant memory. Some
financial products, such as synthetic CDOs, had no actual home loans underlying them at
all. They were mirrors of others that did.

Figure 4.3
Collateralized Debt Obligation Example
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings
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Figure 4.4
Synthetic CDO Example176
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The rating agencies dropped the AAA ratings on many investments, as defaults
continued to mount, eventually lowering many of them to junk status. A 2011
congressional report blamed this mass downgrade for the financial crisis. 177
Like a massive and dangerous game of musical chairs, when prices began to tank, many
banks were caught with bad assets on their books, as they invested in mortgage
securitizations, as well as sold them. Once many began scrutinizing the products more
closely, they already had them on their books and couldn’t get rid of them, as everyone
wanted to sell at once. Some investment banks had credit default swaps (CDS) –
essentially insurance contracts or hedges on the mortgage securitizations, sometimes even
the very ones they had sold to their own customers. Others tried to offload these
mortgage-backed investments as far as possible once they heard the music nearing its
end. When the music stopped, some banks were in a better financial position than others.
The increasingly precarious financial condition inside some became known, and they
stopped lending to each other, which was an essential function for daily operation.
Investment banks began hoarding cash, and this credit seizure rippled into all corners of
the economy. 178
The federal government in the waning days of the Bush administration took
extensive measures to stabilize the economy, starting with the investment banks. The
government aided J.P. Morgan in taking over the failing investment bank, Bear Stearns
Companies Inc., in March 2008, while letting Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declare
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bankruptcy in September 2008. Government regulators encouraged other mergers
designed to rescue banks teetering on the brink of failure, including Bank of America
Corporation’s purchase of Countrywide Mortgage and Merrill Lynch. 179 American
International Group Inc., known as AIG, was by far the largest issuer of CDS policies,
and when many insurance payouts all came due at once, the company faced insolvency.
The insurance company received a $122 billion bailout loan from the government. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac became insolvent, too, and as already quasi-government agencies,
they were taken over by the government in 2008. 180 Congress passed a $700 billion
bailout package known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program designed to provide
liquidity to the major banks. President Obama took office in 2009 and focused on further
stabilizing the economy with a massive stimulus package. In 2010, he also oversaw the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform act to help prevent the kind of liquidity and
credit problems that occurred during the crisis. Banks paid billions of dollars in fines –
which could be used for tax write offs and was paid by the company rather than by any
person - for their actions during the crisis. Yet, no executive responsible for the systemic
damage done to the economy and millions of Americans by the MBS securitization
machine was criminally prosecuted. This inaction left those responsible for the fraudulent
misdeeds contributing to the crisis without punishment. There remains little disincentive
for this type of behavior to reoccur.
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Chapter 5: Case Studies from the Crisis - Potential Evidence for a Case?
Was there really fraud? Or was it just a series of bad business decisions and
irrational overinvestment in a bubble market? Some industry defenders, such as a former
prosecutor and current white-collar defense attorney, say people were simply overly
exuberant. Their argument becomes problematic when they acknowledge that the
government did prosecute for fraud some much less influential mortgage industry people.
This is evidence that the government recognized there were bad actors in the financial
crisis. The attorney said investment bankers packaging and selling the securitizations
based on these loans likely suffered from misunderstanding, bad incentives, and poor
forecasting, but not bad faith or criminality. 181 It seems highly unlikely that all the worst
actors were those without powerful companies behind them and influential corporate
executives were simply too bullish. The small fries are criminals, but the big wigs are
gutsy investors? That scenario strains credibility.
I will show in this chapter that there is an abundance of evidence for criminality
and bad faith at the highest levels of investment banking during the 2008 financial crisis.
The following examples are only a selection of what could have been explored by an able
team of federal prosecutors with the right incentives structure and the full weight of the
Justice Department’s resources to make a case with a decent chance of success. No doubt
these would be difficult cases to win, but it seems negligent on the part of the Justice
Department to pursue settlements with companies that were essentially get out of jail free
passes for the individual actors.
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John Moon, a former white-collar federal prosecutor, pointed to the level of
complexity as the difference between savings and loan-era prosecutions and the subprime
mortgage and subsequent financial crisis. He said that the “bad acts” committed during
the savings and loan era were simply easier to prove in a criminal case than those of the
more recent crisis. “Everyone can understand giving out bad loans or phonying up
documents used to apply for the loan. Everyone can figure out that’s bad behavior,”
Moon said of the earlier crisis. 182 In contrast, the 2008 crisis’ mechanics would have
been much harder to explain to a jury, Moon said.
To explore this idea a bit further, we must first understand which laws they may
have broken. Prosecutors could have brought a case under a variety of statutes, including
those dealing with mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and others, as
outlined in a previous chapter.183 Generally, a criminal conviction would require proof
that the actor intended to commit the fraudulent act or was willfully blind to it, and that
the government had proven its case “beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than the lower
civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” In other words, a criminal conviction
requires proof with almost total certainty, while a civil case only needs a likelihood of
more than half. This is a challenge in itself, and rightly so. If the state wishes to deny a
person of their constitutional right to liberty, it should have to meet a high burden. Still,
criminal cases are made successfully in American courts of law every day.
More specifically, a securities fraud case would be relevant for banks issuing
mortgage backed securities and related investments. According to the American Bar
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Association, most securities fraud cases are brought under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which prohibit any untrue, misleading or omitted “material”
information in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. This kind of securities
fraud claim would also need proof of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing, a reliance on
this information by investors and their related economic loss.184 In other words, did the
seller knowingly give false or misleading information, or leave out anything important;
did the buyer rely on the seller’s word, and did the buyer lose money.
The major difficulty in bringing these types of cases is proving intent to defraud
or the “knowingly” part. A person’s knowledge or intent is hard to prove. Company
officials can claim they could not foresee bad outcomes and were simply aggressively
doing business with the best knowledge they had at the time, and this claim may very
well be honest. Salesmen often use puffery as a defense, in other words, pardonable
exaggeration. However, this explanation is not always the truth. This is the defense used
successfully in the Bear Stearns hedge fund manager trial in 2009 and is likely the
biggest obstacle the government would have faced in bringing criminal charges against
high-level executives. Recent federal court decisions have highlighted, if not increased
this challenge. For example, in December 2010, a federal appeals court overturned the
conviction of Prabhat Goyal, the former chief financial officer of Network Associates, on
fifteen counts of securities fraud, making false filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and making false statements to the company’s auditors, citing lack of
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sufficient proof of intent to defraud.185 Additionally, executives may be well insulated
from decision making, citing lower level managers and employees with their names on
sales documents. Therefore, these cases are challenging to bring successfully even
without top dollar defense lawyers, which finance executives would obviously employ. I
am certainly not arguing a criminal case against a high-level executive would be easy.
However, long-lasting public resentment of “the 1%,” increasing mistrust in the
American justice system, and the following examples suggest that further efforts were
warranted. I argue more aggressive prosecutors with the right incentives and resources
could have brought some effective cases. At the very least, the American rule of law
required some public efforts to hold finance executives accountable, such as the
government did in previous financial crises. Even if not all cases were won, there would
at least be a public discussion on what truly happened at the highest levels of these
financial institutions. If courts of law found there were no laws broken, these trials would
at least give the public more information to decide whether new criminal laws were
necessary. Congressman Al Green, Democrat of Texas, summed up during an April 20,
2010 hearing on the Lehman bankruptcy the frustrations of the American public and
many elected officials:
How can this kind of thing … how can this go on and no one suffers some sort of
criminal investigation to the extent that the public is aware of it? This is just
amazing. When I read this information, I was thunderstruck. Because I couldn't
believe that all of this information is available and we haven't seen anyone
arrested. The public at some point has to see some sort of effort to bring to justice
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people who do this and that take advantage of so many others with these
misleading and incorrect documents.186
Clayton Holdings LLC – When bankers wanted to create a mortgage backed
security for sale to investors, they needed to purchase thousands of loans for each one. To
be sure these loans were likely to be repaid, they could examine them for quality.
However, the purchasers - often investment banks known as the securitizers - found it
impractical to do so for each one, so they would take a sample to examine instead. A
sample could be between thirty percent of the loan pool to as little as two or three percent
at times. They could check a random sample of the loan pool or focus on those loans
most likely to be problematic. Examiners – who may be in-house at the securitizing
institution or a third-party company – would use three main criteria in their examination:
to what extent did the loan comply with the originator’s and sometimes the securitizer’s
stated underwriting standards; did it comply with federal and state laws; and to what
extent were there ‘compensating factors’ that may offset any non-compliant parts of the
loan. For example, an applicant with a lower stated income may have considerable
savings in the bank or cash from relatives. The examiner would compile a report for the
pool as a whole based on what they saw. With that knowledge, the securitizer could
eliminate loans that did not meet these guidelines and negotiate a price for the entire
pool.187
Clayton Holdings is a third-party company that examines loan pools for banks.
Their information has been instrumental in some civil cases and investigations
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surrounding the financial crisis. Clayton’s executives told the federal government’s
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that in the eighteen months preceding June 30,
2007, it examined 911,039 loans for Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche
Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
UBS Group AG and Washington Mutual. Out of these nearly one million loans, fifty-four
percent met all guidelines (known as Grade 1), eighteen percent were approved with
compensating factors, such as extra savings or assets (known as Grade 2), and thirty-nine
percent were deficient without sufficient mitigating factors (known as Grade 3).
However, the securitizers can choose to “wave in” loans anyway, and the banks did so for
thirty-nine percent of those found deficient, or eleven percent of the total pool. 188 One
possible reason for waiving in so many of these loans was that securitizers were desperate
for them, according to Clayton President Keith Johnson.189
Moody’s rating agency told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that noncompliance with standards may be a misleading qualification because banks use different
measures. In other words, standards aren’t standardized. However, the potentially
fraudulent behavior was not lack of compliance with standards, it was banks saying they
complied when they did not. The banks packaging and selling the MBS and related
products created sales statements, known as prospectuses, in which they categorized the
nature of the underlying loans. According to Clayton’s data, they knowingly provided
false information in these statements. “Prospectuses indicated that the loans in the pools
either met guidelines outright or had compensating factors, even though Clayton’s
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records show that only a portion of the loans were sampled, and that of those that were
sampled, a substantial percentage of Grade 3 loans were waved in” according to the FCIC
report.190 Column E of Figure 5.1 shows high waiver rates at many of the major
investment banks during the peak months of frenzied securitization, shortly before the
crash. Recalling our earlier definition of fraud as knowingly providing false or
misleading information that causes a purchaser to lose money, this should have pricked
up the ears of government prosecutors. Clayton’s data has been used in various noncriminal cases. It makes a compelling argument for a criminal one as well. It lays out
very clearly the knowingly and misleading components, and any quick glance at a
newspaper from the time period would make it clear that anyone holding an MBS
investment was losing money. One potential defense is that the purchasers of MBS were
sophisticated professionals, and therefore should have known better. But caveat emptor is
not a defense for outright fraud. If a seller is outright untruthful, rather than simply
exaggerating, there is always an information imbalance and no amount of sophistication
can overcome this imbalance. This is the very essence of why securities laws were
written originally.
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Figure 5.1
Rejected Loans Waived in, by Bank191
From the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission findings

Countrywide Mortgage Chairman, CEO and Co-Founder Angelo Mozilo and
Bank of America Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lewis –
At the height of the financial crisis, in January 2008, Bank of America (BofA)
bought Countrywide as the once-giant mortgage company was collapsing under the
weight of the subprime mortgage crisis that it had been instrumental in fueling.
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Countrywide reported a $1.2 billion loss in the third quarter of 2007 after twenty-five
years of profit, and saw its shares drop seventy-nine percent in 2007. At the time of the
BofA purchase, a CNN Money article reported “Bank of America Chairman and CEO
Kenneth Lewis suggested he was aware of the troubles that his firm was taking on, but
said acquiring Countrywide was a ‘rare opportunity’ for his company.” Lewis said his
company was obtaining a valuable mortgage platform for a deeply discounted price. 192
The office of Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen A. Cazares, of the Central District
of California began a grand jury investigation of the former Countrywide executive in
2008. The district covers Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, Los Angeles, San Luis
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura, and Calabasas, California – the former home of
Countrywide Financial Corp. However, by 2011, California prosecutors wound down the
case without filing any criminal charges. "Sometimes the public thinks all you have to do
is to indict someone and that’s it," an anonymous federal source told the Washington
Post, regarding the Mozilo case. "But you have to be able to prove your case, and it can
be worse losing a case than not bringing one at all." 193 This quote shows the abundance of
caution these prosecutors felt. The question is, who is it worse for; the Justice
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Department, the American people, the economy? No, it was none of the above. Logic
dictates that the speaker was talking about himself.
The Justice Department may have different goals depending on the political
philosophy of those elected and appointed to run it. Which laws it enforces and how
aggressively it does so is always a decision to be made. Certainly, it could be worse for
the Department’s reputation and operation if it continues to lose cases or does so in a way
that harms many Americans, such as Enron’s accounting firm Arthur Andersen going out
of business, which punished many innocent employees and others. However, in cases
where there is strong evidence and the very trust in the rule of law and judicial fairness
hangs in the balance, a somewhat less cautious approach should be taken, lest the
American public believe there is no justice if one is rich and powerful enough. That,
arguably, turned out to be the case. The economy depends on enforcement of its basic
rules to run smoothly. Similar to a National Basketball Association game, if the referees
never blew the whistle, players would descend into anarchy and score baskets however
they could. A chaotic basketball game is no game at all. Similarly, an economy without
proper enforcement of rules – such as contracts, property rights, currency and truthful
exchange of information – is no economy at all. The economic system would descend
into a state of nature, a war of man against man. However, if we look at the individual
prosecutor, it would make sense to be more cautious if the incentives pointed in that
direction. A big winning case would certainly help a future career, but a high-profile loss
would certainly look worse than a more cautious settlement when applying for a partnertrack position at a white-collar defense firm a few years later. The Securities and
Exchange Commission settled with Mozilo in late 2010 for $67.5 million, $45 million of
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which he repaid to shareholders based on what the government said were “ill-gotten
gains.”194 This settlement avoided a civil trial on charges of fraud and insider trading, and
the Justice Department simply dropped any criminal inquiry.
The office of Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, brought civil charges against Bank of America as Countrywide’s legal successor,
as well as against former Countrywide executive Rebecca Mairone, in October 2012 for
Countrywide’s fraudulent activity. A Manhattan court found Mairone and Bank of
America guilty in this civil case, which centered on a Countrywide program, headed by
Mairone, known as “The Hustle.”195 The Hustle is the HSSL or High-Speed Swim Lane
mortgage lending program of 2007 that quickly processed loans removing traditional
“toll gates” slowing down the lending process. These gates were important in preventing
fraud, according to the complaint. 196 Bharara released a statement after the verdict was
handed down in October 2013 saying that Countrywide
treated quality control and underwriting as a joke… In a rush to feed at the trough
of easy mortgage money on the eve of the financial crisis, Bank of America
purchased Countrywide, thinking it had gobbled up a cash cow. That profit,
however, was built on fraud, as the jury unanimously found.197
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Bharara’s statement also said, “This Office will never hesitate to go to trial to
expose fraudulent corporate conduct and to hold companies accountable, particularly
when it has caused such harm to the public.”198 This is the correct thinking on this issue
of national importance and public trust in the rule of law. However, his office sought no
criminal charges against any Countrywide or BofA official. Perhaps vindicating
Bharara’s decision not to pursue criminal charges, in 2016, an appeals court overturned
the decision because it said the government failed to prove intent to defraud. It instead
treated the case as a lesser breach of contract matter. 199 This outcome certainly lends
credence to the idea that intent, especially to a higher standard of evidence, is hard to
prove. Mairone was a mid-level manager. Bharara’s neighbors in the Eastern District of
New York also brought a losing case against mid-level managers of Bear Stearns. I argue
that they ultimately failed because their efforts were half-measures. Corporate entities
and mid-level managers were ultimately not responsible for the bad actions. C-suite
officers are paid increasingly high sums because of what good they can do for the
company. Mid-level managers and corporate non-humans with many innocent employees
are not the reason fraud occurs. CEOs’ golden parachutes must not deploy while those
with less power to set company policy and direction are blamed.
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The S.E.C.’s civil case was more appropriately targeted. It alleged that Mozilo
and two other top Countrywide executives - David Sambol, chief operating officer and
president, and Eric Sieracki, chief financial officer – failed to disclose the increasingly
lowering lending standards, when it described its company’s lending policies in legally
required disclosure forms to the government in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Countrywide has
historically focused on loans that conformed to safer lending standards set by the thengovernment sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, Countrywide
approached the booming mortgage market with a “supermarket strategy,” the complaint
said, seeking to match any lending standard offered by other lenders. For example, if a
competitor would write a loan for no money down and a low credit score, Countrywide
would offer that deal as well. As another example, the complaint alleged that Mozilo and
Sambol knew as of June 2006 that an internal audit showed that fifty percent of the
“stated income loans” – meaning the borrower need not show proof of income at the time
of receiving the loan - showed a more than ten percent or greater variance from the
borrower’s income, as per Internal Revenue Service filings. In other words, half of these
loans, sometimes called “liars’ loans,” were, not surprisingly, based on lies. Of those
“liars’ loans”, sixty-nine percent had more than fifty percent difference in stated and
actual income, as per IRS filings. In other words, a vast majority of half of these loans
Countrywide made were based on incomes that were half or less than half of what was on
the document. As a journalist covering MBS litigation, I recall court cases putting
examples of these “liar’s loans” on display, although they were not limited to one lender.
The examples showed people employed in careers like restaurant server or hairdresser
making six figures of income, and not in high-end eateries or salons in places like New
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York City or Los Angeles. Some people blame the “liars,” the individuals taking out
these mortgages. Whether or not they deserve some of the blame, certainly the balance of
responsibility must go to the lending institution. Firstly, as stated, Countrywide had a
policy of matching any other bank’s best offer. Additionally, their HSSL policy shows
how willing they were to make a loan in almost any circumstance. Perhaps most
compellingly, the most sophisticated home mortgage borrower is still at an information
disadvantage compared to the bankers, who have inside information on the company and
perhaps what others in the industry are seeing as well. For example, the borrower may
not know that a loan officer’s manager is pushing him to make a certain number of loans
per month, or a certain number of subprime loans per month. It is safe to say that most
borrowers would not be nearly as sophisticated and educated about home mortgage
products as those people working for the mortgage lender. It defies logic to argue that
most Americans understand the various details and myriad complexities involved in
mortgage policies. Most people go to a mortgage broker to get a mortgage not only
because they are the ones empowered to lend, but also because they are the experts in
doing so. Why not trust the expert when he says you should give a higher than accurate
stated income or take out a mortgage with a low introductory rate that balloons in two
years? The possibility of a small to vast informational imbalance must put the burden on
the lender, not the borrower, for selling these products while knowing the danger they
could cause, and did, in fact cause when the subprime mortgage bubble burst.
The fraudulent acts occurred when the results of this internal investigation were
not disclosed to investors, as would have been required by law, according to the SEC
complaint. By 2006, the government alleges, Mozilo and Sambol were aware that many
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of the loans they were making would not be sellable to the secondary market, meaning
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the investment banks packaging and selling
MBS, but this key information was not disclosed to investors. Mozilo and the other
executives signed the relevant government disclosure forms in which important or
“material” information about the company’s practices and risks were not disclosed,
according to the complaint. 200 Additionally, the government charged:
Indeed, Mozilo, Sieracki and Sambol each made public statements from 2005
through 2007 that were intended to mislead investors about the increasingly
aggressive underwriting at Countrywide and the financial consequences of those
widened underwriting guidelines. 201

Therefore, it is clear that Mozilo and his co-executives were aware of the serious
problems with a core part of their business, but failed to tell shareholders in legal
documents requiring them to do so. This type of information withholding seems like a
blatant example of what fraud statutes were designed to prevent, and it is the federal
government itself announcing the proof. It stretches the imagination, at least of someone
outside the Justice Department, why this wouldn’t make a compelling case for criminal
fraud.

Lehman Brothers C.E.O. Richard Fuld – For twenty years, Lehman Brothers
had been heavily involved in the mortgage origination, underwriting, and securitization
business. But in March 2006, Lehman C.E.O. Dick Fuld announced to the company that
it would change its strategy to hold more mortgage assets on its books as long-term
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investments. The investment bank increased its mortgage-related assets investments to
$111 billion in 2007 from $67 billion in 2006, and Lehman continued to up its ante on
real estate into early 2008 (before it declared bankruptcy in September 2008). However,
this investment strategy ignored the firm’s own risk policies and advice from risk
managers. For example, the firm’s SEC auditor said Lehman should begin selling some
of its real estate investments to avoid losses. Instead, the firm ignored this warning and
employed an “accounting gimmick,” as described by Lehman executives. Shortly before
each reporting period, Lehman would employ a technique known as “Repo 105” that
moved $50 billion in assets off its balance sheets temporarily, making the company
appear more financially stable to its shareholders. Lehman’s own president and chief
operating officer as of June 2008, Bart McDade, wrote in an email that the Repo 105
transactions were “another drug we R on.” Lehman’s auditor, Ernst & Young Global
Ltd., was aware of the Repo 105 scheme but did not question the bank’s failure to
disclose it. The accounting firm maintained it was not required to do so. 202 203 Fuld told
the United States House of Representatives’ Financial Services Committee on April 20,
2010 that
I have absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything about Repo 105
transactions while I was CEO of Lehman. Nor do I have any recollection of
seeing documents that related to Repo 105 transactions. The first time I recall ever
hearing the term “Repo 105” was a year after the bankruptcy filing in connection
with questions raised by the Examiner. 204
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Anton R. Valukas, Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner also testified before the House
committee on April 20, 2010. He told the committee that Lehman’s usage of the Repo
105 transaction in the way it did without disclosure was not appropriate. “In light of the
market’s focus on the leverage of investment banks in late 2007 and 2008, I found that
sufficient evidence exists for a judge or jury to find that Lehman’s reported net leverage
ratio was materially misleading during that period.” 205 When asked if Fuld’s statement
that he did not know about the Repo 105 transaction was credible, Valukas replied:
We concluded in the report that a fact finder could conclude that in fact he did
know and acted upon information he knew or should have known. There was at
least one witness who testified that he discussed Repo 105 transactions with him.
In the magnitude of those transactions, there were documents that were sent to
him by e-mail and otherwise which reflected the Repo 105 transactions which
were dealing with balance sheet which were a great issue and concern to Lehman
Brothers at the time. The two presidents of Lehman Brothers acknowledged they
knew about Repo 105. The three CFOs during that period of time claim they
knew about Repo 105 and numerous other executives. Mr. Fuld's position was
that he did not know about it. If an action is brought, someone will determine
whether that is or is not credible. 206

This example seems to be a slam dunk for the government. Valukas did their job
for them. Valukas is a litigator and senior partner at the prominent law firm Jenner &
Block, and a former United States Attorney who was appointed by the court to lead the
Lehman bankruptcy examination, which was the largest such case in United States
History.207 The extensive “Valukas Report,” provided a gold mine for federal prosecutors
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to argue that Fuld knew he was fraudulently deceiving his shareholders about the actual
amount of toxic mortgage debt on the company’s books.

Citigroup – In November 2007, a senior vice president at CitiFinancial Mortgage,
Richard M. Bowen III., emailed warnings to company executives, including Executive
Committee Chairman and former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. As head of
correspondent lending in the Consumer Lending Group, Bowen had been speaking out
since June 2006 about problems with the bank’s guarantees made to entities like Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and others purchasing loan packages for sale to investors. Bowen’s
group at Citi included 220 underwriters who would examine a small sample of these
mortgage loans worth approximately $50 billion each year purchased from 1,600 other
banks, which had originated the loans. Citi had not done the original underwriting on
these loans, but through examining a sample of them, it would ensure to investors that the
loans adhered to Citi’s credit standards. Bowen told the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) that an increased volume of loans and staffing limitations made this
task more difficult. Before selling loan packages up the securitization chain, Citi policy
demanded that ninety-five percent or more of the loans sold adhere to bank credit
standards and contain enough documentation to prove it; otherwise, Citi could demand
that the originator bank repurchase the loans. Bowen told the FCIC that he began warning
managers in mid-2006 that he found sixty percent of the loans sold were defective, when
Citi said they were not. He worried that this could trigger massive losses for the bank, as
these loans would be subject to repurchase agreements, like a money-back guarantee of
quality. Bowen continued his warnings through 2006 to no avail. Yet the rate of defective
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mortgages climbed to eighty percent, he told the Commission. During this time, he also
watched as the Wall Street Chief Risk Officer overturned the decision on many loan files
from “denied” to “approved” for sale. “In the sample on one $300+ million Merrill Lynch
subprime pool the underwriters turned down 716 mortgages as not meeting Citi policy
guidelines,” Bowen told the FCIC. “The Wall Street Chief Risk Officer personally
changed 260 of these “turn downs” to “approved.” The pool was purchased.” 208
Bowen then emailed the highest level of bank management, asking for an internal
investigation outside of the Consumer Lending Group, as his warnings within the group
had fallen on mostly deaf ears. Bowen’s direct manager was also concerned and
continued to press for changes. By early 2007, however, the manager’s responsibilities
were distributed to others and he then retired. 209 If Bowen had come forward as a
whistleblower, it would have been an explosive event. However, among the other
testimony given to the FCIC, it seems to have only stood out mildly. This is one of many
examples of outright lying that was documented and brought to the attention of
executives. They knowingly continued operations which can be likened to piling clearly
rotten meat into a stew and calling it fresh. (The idea for this analogy is credited to a
demonstration by Anthony Bourdain in the movie version of The Big Short) Certainly if
the most egregious cases, such as this won’t be pursued by law enforcement, the
incentive remains to repeat it.

AIG Financial Products C.E.O. Joseph J. Cassano - American International
Group, the largest insurance company in the world as of 2004, had a problem child. AIG
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had a AAA credit rating from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. This highest possible
rating was exceptionally rare for a private company, and it allowed AIG to borrow money
cheaply. Capitalizing on the perfect credit rating and easy capital through its parent, in
1998, a unit of the company, AIG Financial Products (FP), began a lucrative business
issuing unregulated insurance contracts for Wall Street. Investors in CDOs210 could buy
so-called Credit Default Swap contracts to hedge against any potential losses in the value
of the CDO. (For a visual explanation, see a very condescendingly explained version to
the only female in the room in the movie Too Big to Fail.) In other words, in exchange
for paying a regular premium to AIG, investors could guarantee they would not lose
money on their CDO investment because AIG would pay out if the CDO value drops.
This isn’t too far from the way many insurance policies work, except instead of
promising a payment to help you fix your car if it is damaged in exchange for monthly
payments, CDSs are more like hedging bets in Vegas. Essentially, AIG was betting
CDOs wouldn’t take much losses because the housing market would never go down
enough for them to do so. Those buying the CDSs were betting the market might go
down, while they also purchased CDOs, meaning a bet that the market would rise. Hence,
they were hedging their bets. AIG made hundreds of millions of dollars each year in fees
selling these CDS contracts on CDOs and other types of bonds as well.211
However, since CDS policies were not actually a regulated type
of insurance, they were not subject to requirements that the insurer have a reserve pool of
money for payouts. Also, by having protective CDS contracts on these mortgage backed
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CDO investments, banks were subject to much lower requirements to hold cash on their
own books. Lower requirements for cash meant more money that could be invested for
higher returns. Goldman Sachs was AIG’s biggest customer for these policies.212
Banks and hedge funds sold CDS policies as well, but they were on both sides of
these CDS trades, whereas AIG only sold them. This was a fine business model for AIG,
so long as the assets – home mortgages - underlying the bonds they insured maintained
steady payments. However, when the subprime mortgage crisis hit and many CDOs and
related bonds lost value all at once, AIG could not pay out on so many policies at once. In
hindsight, this seems like a disaster waiting to happen, but many will say no one could
have foreseen the traditionally reliable housing marking crashing so dramatically. Clearly
there was no way to know they would be in trouble, right?
In 2005, before the worst of the crisis hit, AIG lost its AAA credit rating when
auditors discovered it inflated its earnings in the previous five years by $3.9 billion.
Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, who had been C.E.O. for thirty-eight years and was forced
out by the company’s board, told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that the
Financial Products group should have stopped writing these risky CDS policies at that
time. Cassano, head of the Financial Products group, allowed his team to write another
$36 billion in CDS contracts for another year, despite warnings from some of his
executives about the increasingly precarious state of the housing market. Meanwhile
Cassano took home at least thirty-eight million dollars in each year between 2002 and
2007. 213
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Cassano knew about risks the company was taking that were not disclosed to his
executives or investors via SEC filings, as they are legally required to do. AIG Financial
Products executive Gene Park said that by June 2007, most executives at AIG FP knew
the company would need to pay out if many borrowers defaulted on their loans. However,
they did not know that payouts would be triggered if the market value of the bonds
declined or credit rating agencies downgraded the bonds. This meant that payouts may be
owed even if no cash losses occurred. Cassano told the FCIC that he was aware of this
provision, but AIG’s regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision was not.214 The FCIC
also reported that Cassano was generally less than cooperative with the regulator.215
On July 27 Goldman Sachs officially requested a $1.8 billion payout, claiming the
market value of $20 billion in insured CDOs had dropped fifteen percent, a more
aggressive markdown than other CDS policy holders would claim. AIG disagreed with
this calculation, a battle that was likely predictable since there was little transparency or
liquidity in this type of trading. It wasn’t exactly the New York Stock Exchange with a
ticker in Times Square. On the same day as this collateral request, Goldman purchased
$100 million in protection from another firm against the possibility that AIG might
default on its obligations; a hedge on a hedge. In the next year, Goldman would continue
to purchase CDS contracts against AIG, while battling the company for payouts on its
CDOs insurance contracts, sending AIG a demand daily. By this point, AIG FP had
insured $79 billion in bonds that were mostly backed by subprime and Alt-A (nearly
subprime) home loans. AIG’s parent company only reported $95.8 billion in capital and
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AIG FP had done almost no hedging of its own because AIG FP executives believed
“there could never be losses.” The company initially purchased a $150 million hedge, but
had begun to lose money on it, so Cassano refused to spend any more. “I don’t think the
world is going to blow up,” Park quoted Cassano as saying.216 The world didn’t so much
blow up as implode.
In 2007, the CDS contracts threatened to take down the entire company that had
only a few years prior been rated AAA. On a third quarter earnings call in November
2007, AIG disclosed a $352 million claim for payout on its CDS portfolio, based on a
new valuation model. This was a new model – in the sense that it never had one before,
not that it replaced an old one - to mark the current value of its CDS portfolio. AIG had
previously relied on companies like Goldman – one that would demand a payout - to let
them know when a market price changed. That is like if Geico relied on my word to
decide how much I should get for damage to my Subaru Outback. On the earnings call,
Cassano said AIG had more than enough money to make any payouts that may be
necessary, but he believed it was highly unlikely they would have to pay. To further the
analogy, so what if I tell Geico my car is worth $20 million. I am a great driver. They
should just trust me not to plow into my neighbor’s mailbox.
However, Cassano did not disclose on the call that AIG’s private auditor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, pointed out various significant problems with the new
model and questioned its relevance. By the end of the month, the model was
abandoned.217 On a December 5th call with investors, a bank analyst asked about disputes
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with banks regarding payouts and the valuation model mentioned in the third quarter call.
Cassano responded that there was no hostile disagreement about payouts owed.
Sometimes companies came calling with higher requests than AIG believed they owed,
and either the requesting company would “go away” or they would negotiate a
compromise. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission:
Cassano did not reveal the $2 billion collateral posted to Goldman, the several
hundred million dollars posted to other counterparties, and the daily demands
from Goldman and the others for additional cash… Investors …did not know that
AIG’s earnings were overstated by $3.6 billion – and they would not learn that
information until February 11, 2008.218
Clearly, Goldman wasn’t going away.
Pricewaterhouse auditors concluded in late 2007 that AIG’s publicly reported
numbers were wrong. They cited a lack of effective and experienced leadership at AIG
FP. They agreed to continue auditing AIG as long as Cassano did not “interfere in the
process.” When the overstated earnings were announced on February 11, 2008, the
ratings agencies again downgraded AIG. Goldman continued to demand more payments
from AIG and buy hedges against its failure at the same time. On February 28, AIG
announced a net loss of $5.29 billion, mostly due to AIG FP’s $11.12 billion in losses in
value, as well as $2.6 billion in losses by another AIG subsidiary that had been investing
in mortgage backed securities itself. Cassano’s retirement was also announced that day.
However, he was still retained as a consultant making a million dollars a month in
addition to the $300 million he had earned between 1987 and 2008.219
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By September 2008, AIG FP was severely weighing down AIG. Although the
company had a trillion dollars in assets, most of the liquid assets were held by more
regulated subsidiaries that could not provide cash for AIG FP. The subsidiary now faced
$23.4 billion in requests for payment. At the same time, the banks that lend money to
other companies to operate daily – the lifeblood of the financial industry - refused to
provide AIG with cash, and a different AIG subsidiary that had invested $75 billion in
mortgage backed securities hemorrhaged billions as well. Lastly, as if to rub salt on
AIG’s wound, Goldman Sachs analysts had written a report in August warning clients not
to invest in AIG due to severe losses and another potential ratings downgrade for AIG.
The insurer was rapidly running out of funding, having only days to live, particularly if it
was downgraded again. Fearing a run on AIG’s remaining assets and a subsequent
bankruptcy, which would in turn cause massive losses for the twelve largest banks in the
United States and Europe, AIG received an $85 billion loan from the Federal Reserve,
which could only lend to non-banks in this way under extreme circumstances. The
government later added another $49.1 billion under the congressionally approved TARP
bailout program.220 While Goldman seems like the bully in this scenario, AIG FP was not
a helpless middle schooler on the playground. Cassano knew what he was doing, did not
disclose it, and caused economic havoc in the process.

Ratings Agencies - When banks packaged and sold mortgage backed securities
and CDOs, they needed ratings for the various components of these investment products.
After all, investors want to know how much risk they can expect. Some investment
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managers, such as those in charge of a public employee retirement fund or a university
endowment, will be required to invest only in AAA-rated products – ostensibly the safest
one could get - since they are playing with the ability for teachers to retire or schools to
build new libraries. Many investors, even those willing to risk losing money in turn for
higher returns, will only invest in the BBB-rated or higher slices of MBSs or CDOs. A
rating of BBB or higher is considered “investment grade.” 221 The ratings range all the
way down to DDD. Regardless, investors want to know what they can expect.
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, said at an October 22, 2008 hearing on the rating
agencies’ role in the financial crisis that although the C.E.O.s of the three major ratings
agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch –would testify that they could not have
foreseen the crisis, documentary evidence obtained by his committee would prove
otherwise.222 The problem for the three major agencies was they portrayed themselves as
independent assessors, but they were anything but. Indeed, they were paid by the banks
for rating their investment products. This is a clear conflict of interest, and it is almost
impossible to imagine how they could keep from becoming fraudulent with two
fundamentally opposed directives – make money and provide “objective” bond ratings.
Standard & Poor’s, for example, charged hundreds of thousands of dollars for
each individual MBS or CDO it rated and continued to monitor. The global CDO rating
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division saw revenues of ninety-six million dollars in 2005 grow to $182 million in 2006
and to $203 million in 2007. Another division rating similar bonds took in revenues of
more than $278 million in 2006 and $243 million in 2007. If a bank does not like the
policies of one rating agency, it can threaten to take its business elsewhere. Therefore,
banks have the agencies at a financial gunpoint. Clearly, the loss of any deal, let alone all
of a bank’s business, would be a major financial loss to the agency. For a profit-seeking
institution like a ratings agency, that simply isn’t an option.
The government alleged that S&P represented its ratings as “objective,
independent and uninfluenced by any conflict of interest,” and therefore knowingly and
intentionally defrauded investors. Internal emails cited in the complaint show debates
about lowering rating standards to remain competitive with Moody’s. Meanwhile the
company’s executives continued to tout its objectivity in rating and monitoring mortgagerelated securities. 223
In February 2013, the Justice Department filed a civil case against Standard &
Poor’s and its parent company, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., for mail fraud, wire fraud,
and financial institution fraud under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989. “To date, the government has identified more than $5 billion in
losses suffered by federally insured financial institutions in connection with the failure of
CDOs rated by S&P from March to October 2007,” according to a Justice Department
press release.224 The complaint was filed against the company, but it named specific
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executives who were responsible for corporate policies and decision-making. Some of
these individuals could have been held responsible individually and criminally.
Employees doing the ratings work were keenly aware of the dangers of the
perverse incentive system and corporate policies. The following except from the
complaint deserves to be included in its entirety:
“On or about April 5, 2007, two S&P CDO analysts engage in an instant message
exchange expressing their belief that the S&P CDO rating model severely
underestimated credit risks:
[Analyst 1] btw that deal is ridiculous
[Analyst 2] I know right…model def[initely] does not capture half of the … risk
[Analyst 1] We should not be rating it
[Analyst 2] we rate every deal….it could be structured by cows and we would rate
it
[Analyst 1] but there’s a lot of risk associated with it – I personally don’t feel
comfy signing off as a committee member 225
The complaint lays out the myriad ways in which Standard & Poor’s “scheme to
defraud investors” breaks the FIRREA law. It also notes that FIRREA, a savings and loan
crisis-era statute enacted to combat this very type of behavior, can carry criminal, as well
as civil penalties. 226 But by February 2015, Standard & Poor’s settled this and other
cases with nineteen states and the District of Columbia for a total of $1.5 billion. Why not
pursue charges against the individuals responsible for this company that knowingly
mislead investors, causing massive losses? In portraying themselves as independent
arbiters of bond quality and an entire financial industry relying on these ratings, one
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could argue the agencies should be an obvious target for serious and meaningful law
enforcement efforts. Yet the entire effort to hold them liable went out with a whimper.
But at the time, $1.5 billion makes a good headline, prosecutors look tough without
trying too hard, and everyone goes home.

Chapter conclusion
In conclusion, I have shown that various industry executives knew important and
relevant facts about their company’s financial products and chose not to disclose them,
causing millions in losses. These seem to be textbook examples of criminal fraud. So why
didn’t any of these people face criminal prosecution? To be sure, prosecuting financial
crime is difficult. It may be true that the 2008 crisis was in some ways more complicated
than previous ones. The more complicated the scheme, ostensibly, the harder it would be
to prosecute. However, the overwhelming amount of evidence I have offered in this
chapter makes a total lack of criminal prosecution after the 2008 financial crisis hard to
defend and there’s no reason to believe government prosecutors aren’t smart or skilled
enough. Indeed, they are consistently picked from the most prestigious law schools.
In a criminal trial, a jury would not necessarily be familiar with the financial
products involved. Selling someone a fake share in a company is simple to explain.
Insider trading is easy to understand. Someone sold another something that didn’t exist,
someone bought or sold a stock based on information they shouldn’t have known. Those
are unfair. Those are illegal. Those are simple. Even Ponzi or pyramid schemes aren’t
terribly hard to comprehend, although they do take a bit more work to explain. In the end,
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most people can understand the logic behind and problem with what is essentially a game
of hot potato or musical chairs. We played these in our childhoods.
Additionally, as I have shown in this chapter, there are ways to tell the stories of
the 2008 crisis in a manner so the average juror could not only understand but feel
enraged and wronged by these people. The narrative and the emotion it evokes, after all,
is what sways the jury. Simply put, the story would be told about people who lied and
said their product was good when they knew it was actually dangerous. The finance
industry likes to compare itself to car salesmen and promotes a caveat emptor mentality.
Unfortunately for them, there is only so far that idea will take them until they run afoul of
criminal fraud statutes. The problem for both victims of financial fraud (and car
manufacturer malfeasance, among others), is not so much the ability to make a criminal
case against a powerful entity or individual, as the willingness to do so. In subsequent
chapters, I will show why government prosecutors lost this willingness after 2008, but
not in previous crises.

Chapter 6: Justice Department Prosecutors’ Incentives/Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors, like everyone else, respond to incentives. What incentives affect
prosecutorial decisions? In this chapter I will show that government prosecutors facing
the prospect of a high-profile trial against systemically important finance executives had
a different incentive structure in 2008 compared to the savings and loan era, and even
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compared to only a decade prior in the Enron era. Specifically, the amount of money
these prosecutors could make in the private sector as a partner in a prestigious law firm
had drastically risen, compared to the top government salary they could expect to make.
These law firms prize government experience in their white-collar defense practices, as
evidenced by the staff bios on firm websites that tout this background. For example, elite
white-collar defense firms Debevoise & Plimpton and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison both list approximately half of their attorneys as having federal government
experience. They figure a former government prosecutor would be the best defensive
weapon against current government prosecutions, as they would best understand the
thinking and strategies of the Justice Department. However, someone who spent his or
her time at the Department focused on one or two very high-profile case or cases that
resulted in a very public loss would be a much less attractive candidate than someone
who took the gettable wins, such as a multi-million- or billion-dollar settlement. In the
past, as this chapter will show, top government prosecutors would expect to earn salaries
that were more comparable to their private sector counterparts. However, around the turn
of the 21st century, that gap began to widen. This change in incentives provides a
compelling argument for why these prosecutors were not willing to risk the possibility of
losing a high-profile case.
Very often, the incentives driving employees that are not looking to run for office,
but simply are trying to succeed in their careers, involve status and money. Moral
satisfaction – “doing good” or “helping society” - may often come into play as well,
particularly among those in government service. However, lawyers often carry significant
debt from law school. They also presumably work very hard and want to be rewarded for
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this work with at least a comfortable life for themselves and their families. Particularly
those attorneys living in the most expensive cities like New York - or even California or
Washington D.C. - where most high-level finance cases would be prosecuted - would
need to consider salary as a major incentive.
New York City and its metropolitan area in particular is where high-profile whitecollar cases are normally brought. New York is home to the country’s major financial
exchanges; NASDAQ, American Stock Exchange, New York Mercantile Exchange, and
New York Stock Exchange; as well as major investment banking and other important
financial corporations. The Southern District of New York, which covers Manhattan, the
Bronx and suburban counties of New York City, has a long history with high-profile
white-collar prosecutions, with the infrastructure in place to conduct them. This U.S.
Attorney’s office’s criminal division includes Securities and Commodities Fraud Task
Forces and a Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit.227 It is reasonable to assume that a
talented and ambitious government prosecutor would be likely to work in New York City
while at the Justice Department and continue to seek employment there in the private
sector as well. Many of the white-collar defense firms are in New York as well. This also
makes sense considering New York is where their clients in the finance industry do
business and where their clients would face prosecution as well. Therefore, I will focus
on New York City as the strongest example of the living environment that would help
shape the incentives faced by a government prosecutor.
Cost of Living
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Living in New York City is incredibly expensive. According to a Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study estimates that a sole provider would need to make at least
$61,800 to make a bare minimum living wage for a family of four in Manhattan. This
doesn’t consider the added expense of law school student loan payments or any upgrades
a person may want in terms of material comfort in exchange for their advanced education
and hard work, including private schools, comfortable housing, travel or entertainment.
For example, the MIT assumes a monthly housing cost of $1,637.228 There are few places
one could find safe and clean housing in New York City for that amount. According to a
report by Douglas Elliman Real Estate and Miller Samuel Real Estate Appraisers &
Consultants, the average price per month to rent a New York City apartment as of May
2018 was $4,881 for a two bedroom and $7,959 for a three bedroom. Lest a reader
assume this number is skewed by a handful of outrageous outliers at the high end, the
median cost for a two bedroom in Manhattan as of May 2018 was $4,295 per month and
$5,650 for a three-bedroom (or larger) apartment. The price doesn’t drop much even
when a family considers living in an outer borough in New York City. The median rental
price in Brooklyn for a two-bedroom apartment was $3,092 and $3,700 for a threebedroom (or larger) apartment as of May 2018. Northwest Queens is even more
expensive, with median rates at $3,450 for a two-bedroom apartment and $3,750 for a
three-bedroom (or larger) apartment as of May 2018. A family wanting to purchase a
home on a government salary in New York City would be even more hard pressed, with
the median 2-bedroom co-op in Manhattan selling for approximately $2 million and the
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median three-bedroom co-op selling for $4.025 million as of May 2018. As with the
rental market, sales prices are relatively comparable in parts of Brooklyn and Queens that
would allow for reasonable commutes to Manhattan. 229 These examples only consider the
extremely high cost of housing in New York City. Schools, entertainment, food and other
daily necessities and pleasures of life are similarly cost-inflated in New York. Clearly the
MIT estimate of the cost of living in New York City is quite underestimated. A recent
survey conducted by Purdue University and GoBankRates.com found that in order to “be
happy” in New York City, residents feel they need to make $220,000 per year. In San
Francisco, the figure people reported needing to be happy was $319,935. Nationally, the
average was much lower at $105,000. 230
High prices in New York is not a recent phenomenon. It has long been a relatively
expensive city compared to others in the United States. Comparing the federal
government’s Consumer Price Index for 1985 through 2015 for all United States urban
areas and New York, one can see New York is always somewhat more expensive than
other cities. There are periods of real estate slumps in New York City, but the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, as illustrated in two charts below, shows that on average, New
York is a relatively more expensive city compared to the national average for all urban
areas. Therefore, average cost of living in New York was just as expensive for
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prosecutors pursuing white collar cases out of the Southern District of New York in the
1980s, 1990s and early 2000s as it was in the years following the 2008 crisis.

Figure 6.1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Areas

127
Consumer Price Index is a measure of cost of living for a particular area.
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
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Consumer Price Index for New York City Metropolitan Area
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Compared to Figure 6.1, this figure shows the New York City Consumer Price Index is
consistently higher than the consumer price index for all ubran areas by about 20 points
at any time.
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA (CBSA)
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But if we look a bit closer, there is a financial change that occurred in New York
City between the time prosecutors would have worked on savings and loan cases and
immediately after the 2008 financial crisis. In 1994, the city took a step to decrease rent
stabilization rules that had been in place since 1969. This move had a lasting impact for
the ensuing decades, driving up the city’s cost of rent. Known as “vacancy control,” the
city council and mayor allowed landlords to increased rents to market rates when tenants
move out of apartments costing $2,000 a month or more. Although at the time, few
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apartments garnered that price, as the median rent was $600 a month. Landlords
exploited loopholes to take advantage of the new law, using renovations to push up rent
prices as well. In 1997, the state legislature took away the city’s power to reverse the
vacancy control law by voting it into state law. In 2003, the city also allowed landlords to
jack up rents when a lease comes up for renewal if they had not increased them in the
previous years. Since the mid-1990s, 250,000 of the 860,000 rent stabilized units in the
city have been taken off rent stabilization protection and the median city’s rent has
doubled or more in some places. 231 Therefore, late 1980s and 1990s and early 2000s
New Yorkers, including attorneys working on earlier financial crime cases, generally saw
lower rent prices than those post-2003. Of course, not all cases have been filed in New
York. For example, Charles Keating of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association was
convicted of racketeering, fraud and conspiracy in a Los Angeles district court. However,
it can hardly be said that Los Angeles or Washington, D.C. have been in the past few
decades so much less expensive than New York that it creates an entirely different
incentive structure. Additionally, the last few decades of the 20th century saw
deregulatory trends in all sectors, nation-wide. Therefore, while New York is the best
estimation of white-collar criminal case’s jurisdiction, Washington D.C., L.A. and San
Francisco, some of the U.S.’s largest cities, would also serve as case studies in the need
for more money to live a comfortable life as the 20th century turned into the 21st century.
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Salaries
The main difference for attorneys prosecuting white collar cases – whether in
New York, Washington D.C. or Los Angeles - between the earlier crises and the 2008
crisis is the change in public versus private sector salary. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
placed the average salary in 2015 for a New York or District of Columbia metropolitan
area private sector attorney at approximately $167,000.232 The average compensation for
a partner in one of American Lawyer’s top 100 firms was $1.1 million in 2015, with some
earning much more. 233 In contrast, the most an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
could make, and only after nine or more years of service, is $136,874. However, that
same experienced attorney, or even one on the job for decades, could make as little as
$80,514. The average salary for an AUSA with nine or more years of experience was
$108,694. 234 Even Attorney General Eric Holder – the top public prosecutor in the
country, made $199,700 in his job as AG, according to the National Law Journal. In
2009 at Covington & Burling, he made $2.5 million. If less than $200,000 is the most that
anyone could ever earn as a public prosecutor, and of course it’s very unlikely to become
the USAG, a rational person would look to the private sector. On average, the difference
in pay for a white shoe law firm partner and an average U.S. attorney is almost $1 million
per year.
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This pay gap was not always so extreme. The pay differential between
government prosecutor and law firm partner was narrower in the savings and loan crisis
days. Generally, the government employee top rate in 1985 was $84,157.235 In
comparison, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1985 the average for top-level
corporate attorneys was $91,690 236 and a partner in a top firm made approximately
$300,000 per year.237 This means that in jumping from a top job in the public sector to a
private sector partnership would certainly have been a boost in pay – it could have meant
a raise of about $215,000 - but significantly less than jump meant in 2015. In 1996, a
partner in one of the top 100-grossing law firms averaged $489,753 per year238, while a
senior executive attorney in the Justice Department – meaning a political appointee level
or similar - could make up to $118,400 per year.239 The attorney looking to move to a
private sector partnership would likely have gotten a raise of approximately $371,000.
This is a better raise than ten years earlier, but still a fraction of 2015’s differential.
Something changed in the last years of the 20th century and the first few years of the 21 st
century. It is difficult to say whether the pay differential would have occurred before,
after or during the accounting scandal crises of the early 2000s, but certainly by the time
cases would have been made for the 2008 crisis, the landscape had changed.

Figure 6.3
Change Over Time in Pay Disparity Private v. Public Sector
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Data from Justice Department Website and American Lawyer Magazine
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$1,070,000

$907,900

2015

$199,700

$1,100,000

$900,300

In 2005, the average top-100 firm partner made $1.07 million per year, while the
highest paid government attorneys could make up to $162,100.240 By this time, the
difference between government salary and private practice was enormous. A partner
could now move into millionaire territory. Average partner salary has not grown much
since 2005, but it has also become harder to achieve equity partner status. In the past ten
years, firms have turned more to non-equity partnership. Indeed, the number of nonequity partners has almost doubled to forty percent of the top 100 firm’s partners. 241 In
1985, thirty-six percent of all lawyers at the top fifty law firms were equity partners. By
2017, that number had dropped to twenty percent. Therefore, prosecutors looking to
become equity partners would need to become as attractive to these firms as possible.
This is certainly a powerful incentive to choose settlement agreements over riskier
prosecutions.
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What Firms Want
To understand how important previous government experience is to these whitecollar defense firms in New York or Washington, D.C. that were paying top dollar, I
looked at what they choose to advertise on their websites in their attorney biographies. I
chose law firms – Debevoise & Plimpton; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison;
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Davis Polk; Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler;
Covington & Burling; and Ropes & Gray - with a presence in New York City and ranked
National Tier 1 in Criminal Defense: White-Collar by U.S. News and World Report242.
The importance of government prosecutorial experience is evident on these sites.
Debevoise lists forty-four attorneys on its firm website under the “white collar and
regulatory defense practice” heading. Eight of those attorneys are listed as practicing
outside of the United States. Out of the remaining thirty-five, eighteen, or fifty-seven
percent have either Justice Department or Securities and Exchange Commission
experience. Some of these attorneys have high-level experience, such as former SEC
Chairwoman Mary Jo White; some were line attorneys at DOJ, an AUSA office or the
SEC; and a few were both. Andrew J. Ceresney spent time as Deputy Chief Appellate
Attorney for the Southern District of New York before he joined the firm in 2003. During
his 10 years at Debevoise he became co-chair of the White Collar and Regulatory
Defense Group and he “played an integral role in negotiating the historic $25 billion
national mortgage settlement between the federal government, 49 state attorneys general
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and some of the country’s largest banks.”243 Choosing to highlight this in a short online
bio shows Ceresney is valued at the firm precisely for his role in a huge monetary
settlement. This shows clients that he is tough and smart, exactly the kind of lawyer
they’d want on their side now. Additionally, the site says from 2013 to 2017 he served as
director of enforcement at the SEC and returned to the firm as a partner in 2017. 244
Again, this boasts that he led the enforcement charge against banks, so he has the best
understanding of how to defend against this fight.
The Debevoise website boasts many more attorneys with prosecutorial
experience. Another white-collar litigation defense partner at the firm, David A. O’Neil,
worked in various high-level positions at the Justice Department for eight years –
including, heading the Criminal Division at the Southern District of New York.245 David
Sarratt, now a partner at the firm, worked as an Assistant United Sates Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York from 2010 to 2014. James Johnson, Winston M. Paes, Mark
P. Goodman, Matthew E. Fishbein, Robert N. Shwartz, Helen V. Cantwell and Matthew
L. Biben all spent time as Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Southern or Eastern Districts of
New York. Many of their website biographies boast the number of trials and appellate
hearings they prosecuted while at the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Like Ceresney, Goodman
traveled between positions in the firm and a government prosecutor’s office more than
once.246
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As for Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, the firm lists forty-three
attorneys in its “white collar and regulatory defense practice.” Nineteen of these attorneys
have experience as government prosecutors, or a total of forty-four percent of the
practice. Like Debevoise, their biographies boast government experience, including how
many cases they have tried and any major figures they have successfully prosecuted. For
example, Richard C. Tarlowe spent eight years as a federal prosecutor,
“where he was Chief of the Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and a member
of its Securities & Commodities Fraud Task Force … He played a critical role in
the government's crackdown on insider trading and litigated some of the most
significant and high-profile securities fraud trials in the country, including the
successful insider trading prosecution of Rajat Gupta, a former Goldman Sachs
board member and chair of McKinsey & Co. Richard also handled cases
involving public corruption, investment advisor fraud, accounting fraud and
market manipulation.”247
Various attorneys on Paul Weiss’s white-collar defense roster spent
approximately six years as an Assistant United States Attorney, according to the firm’s
website. These attorneys include Roberto Finzi, Justin Anderson, Harris Fischman,
Christopher D. Frey, Michelle K. Parikh, and Adam B. Schwartz. 248
At Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Jodi Avergun, chair of the firm’s White
Collar Defense and Investigations Group, spent time as an Assistant U. S. Attorney in the
Eastern District of New York.249 Daniel S. Ruzumna, a partner in Patterson Bellknap’s
white collar defense practice, spent six years as an Assistant United States Attorney in the
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Southern District of New York. Joshua A. Goldberg, also a partner in the firm’s whitecollar litigation defense practice, served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern
District for eight years, according to the firm’s website. 250 The story looks similar on the
Davis Polk website. Greg Andres, a partner in the white-collar defense litigation
department, served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Criminal Division at
the Justice Department and Chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office
of the Eastern District of New York. While at Main Justice, he served on the Financial
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (and before that, the Corporate Fraud Task Force).251
Martine M. Beamon, also a partner in Davis Polk’s white collar litigation defense
practice, worked as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York for five years. The firm’s white-collar defense litigation department’s partner roster
also boasts Denis J. McInerny, who returned to the firm after serving as Chief of the
Fraud Section (2010 – 2013) and then Deputy Assistant Attorney General (2013 – 2014)
of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. He previously served as
Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York (1989 – 1994). In between his government service, he worked at
Davis Polk, representing Arthur Andersen in the infamous obstruction of justice case. 252
Michael G. McGovern, a partner in Ropes & Gray’s white-collar litigation
defense practice, spent seven years as an Assistant United States Attorney for the
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Southern District of New York. 253 Ropes & Gray Partner Joshua S. Levy also practices
white collar litigation defense. He worked as a federal prosecutor for the United States
Attorney’s office in Massachusetts for seven years, and before that worked at Ropes &
Gray, as a litigation associate.254 Covington & Burling’s white collar litigation defense
practice boasts such partners as Lanny Breuer (Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division at Main Justice from 2009 – 2013) and Eric H. Holder, Jr. (United
States Attorney General from February 2009 to April 2015). Both men were political
appointees during the window when a case against prominent bank executives could have
been brought. Although they would not have been tasked with making these difficult
cases, they could have made a serious effort to demand and direct resources to aggressive
fraud cases. President Obama established by executive order the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force in November 2009. The order placed the Department of Justice
at the head of the task force. “But that was just a coordinating body. The only resource
was one guy. It wasn’t a task force. A task force is having dedicated resources,” said Neil
Barofsky, a task force member and Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program, otherwise known as “the bailout.”
While there may be some additional considerations for the highest-level political
appointees in the Department – such as the desire to avoid embarrassment and criticism
for the Department - the incentives faced by prosecutors at the Department are relevant
from the line prosecutor to the Attorney General. These personal and institutional
incentives are particularly important when considering the immense amount of
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prosecutorial discretion given to government prosecutors, who conduct their business
almost entirely outside of public view, since almost all federal cases are settled before
reaching a courtroom. Although it isn’t apparent publicly which attorneys would have
potentially worked on a financial crisis case against major executives, we can infer this
information by looking at the roster of white collar and regulatory defense practices at
prominent New York and D.C. law firms. Their online biographies boast any federal
prosecutorial service. While the evidence is anecdotal at this point, we see a number of
attorneys who have worked at the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of
New York, or the Eastern District of Virginia, which are offices most likely to prosecute
this kind of case. For example, Adam B. Schwartz is now listed as counsel at the
Washington D.C. office of the white shoe law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison. According to the firm’s website, Schwartz spent six years as an Assistant
United States Attorney at the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
Virginia. He served as a federal prosecutor in the precise window of time (2008 – 2014)
during which a case could have been prosecuted against a bank executive for the financial
crisis. The firm’s website says that he tried more than 40 federal cases and “argued
numerous evidentiary motions and appeals.” It doesn’t specify the nature of these cases
specifically, other than to say they involve supervision of “the investigation, indictment,
and trial of complex conspiracies, homicides, public corruption and racketeering.” 255 For
another example, David Sarratt served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the
Eastern District of New York from 2010 to 2014 and is now a partner at the elite law firm
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Debevoise & Plimpton. The law firm’s website boasts that as an Assistant United States
Attorney he successfully supervised and participated in a variety of investigations and
prosecutions, successfully tried numerous cases and briefed and argued appeals to the
appeals court. Although the biography on the firm’s website doesn’t offer specifics, it
lists financial fraud among Sarratt’s cases. 256
It is easy to see why white shoe firms would prefer lawyers with government
experience. These lawyers would understand how the system works from the adversary’s
perspective and doubtless could boast many useful contacts. Similarly, while some
prosecutors spend their careers working for the Department, there has been a stronger
incentive for these attorneys to leave for white shoe firms, as the difference in salaries has
widened over time.

Reacting to Justice Strategy
Additionally, what the defense firms are looking for in their former Justice
Department attorneys have changed as the Justice Department’s strategy itself has
changed. This then becomes a positive feedback loop, wherein the Justice Department
gravitates toward flashy settlement agreements and the private firms want attorneys who
can get their clients the best outcome using this strategy. In the past, although many
federal cases were settled before they reached trial phase, prosecutors also tried many
cases in a court of law. However, as I have already shown, by the time the financial crisis
hit, the Department was primed to rely on settlement agreements. After the Andersen,
KPMG, Ted Stevens, and Bear Stearns embarrassments and the subsequent backlash
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from the media, the American Bar Association, and corporate America, the Department’s
reliance on settlements meant that white collar defense firms also had to change their
strategy. Like changes in evolutionary patterns when an animal’s environment changes,
the defense firms had to adapt. Firms now needed former government attorneys who had
experience in these types of settlement negotiations, precisely what the firms would need
to defend against for their clients.
The relative ease of settlements creates a strong disincentive for the Department
and its ambitious attorneys to do the work necessary to flip lower level individuals as per
usual in cases seeking to charge individuals. As Rakoff observed:
You’d have to get into a long-term investigation still to make a high-level case.
And second you’d have already gotten the political bang with a big press
conference announcing a big fine and compliance terms. You didn’t have quite
the same incentive to put seven assistant US attorneys on the case.” 257
Bill Black, who was involved in the jailing of hundreds of executives during the
savings and loan crisis, also stressed the need to flip lower- and mid-level employees to
testify against executives, though he acknowledged that a settlement is faster and less
expensive. Similarly, Rakoff noted, “You can see why a Department would be attracted
to a different resources allocation.” U.S. Attorneys’ offices are notoriously big on
production and numbers, said Black. The chance of success in a financial fraud case is
lower than others, especially considering that executives have tremendous resources to
mount the best defense. “You get very low numbers if you do complicated fraud cases
that are ultra-fact-heavy,” Black said. Prosecutors “are almost exclusively in the business
of negotiating a plea deal. Many prosecutors view this case as having very little ‘jury
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appeal’ because they are more jargon paper cases.” A successful prosecution, moreover,
may only result in probation or little jail time. “That’s the kind of thing that drives US
Attorneys crazy.”
Government attorneys want to bring high-profile cases, but losing such a case
would be worse than not bringing one at all. The Bear Stearns case was difficult for the
jury to understand, Moon said. “They lost their first major case they brought,” he said.
“No one wants to go around losing cases. That was a big wake-up call for Justice … A lot
of times they do go harder, their career will be better if they make a splashy case. But if
you lose a splashy case you are hammered.” Therefore, settlements are much safer bet.
Jonathan T. Molot argued in a University of Chicago Law Review article that
litigation risk is especially undesirable in the corporate world because it cannot be spread
or eliminated through market mechanisms, like other corporate risks. For example, an
airline worried about spikes in fuel prices may use hedge contracts or trade in futures
contracts, Molot says. This kind of hedge is not available for litigation risk. 258
“…even if lawyers could price the risk and find capital providers to absorb
it (as I argue is feasible in this Article), the lawyer’s professional
role nonetheless inhibits lawyers from using their skills as market participants
in their own right, or as brokers for profit-seeking capital
providers, rather than simply as agents for risk-bearing clients.”259
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Regardless of social pressure realities within these kinds of settlement deals, there
is the individual incentive for prosecuting attorneys that looms large – a much higher
salary in the private sector.

Conclusion
As I have shown, the changes in salary differences over the past few decades, as
well as the cost of living where attorneys live, provide a powerful incentive to behave in
a way the defense firms would find attractive. Behavior attractive to private sector firms
has always been a successful record as a prosecutor. Clients pay top dollar to these
defense firms because they believe they are their best chance against a government
prosecution, and who better to defend against a government strategy than someone who
worked on the inside of a government prosecutor’s office. The attorney must not only
have worked as a government prosecutor, he must be seen as a success. She must be
looked upon as the toughest, smartest and most knowledgeable in what would be a good
defense against a prosecution. Because of the Department’s own gradual change in
strategy after a series of embarrassments toward safer settlement agreements, the defense
firms have had to change strategy as well. As the Department relied more upon these
settlements, defense attorneys with settlement experience would be needed. And in turn,
this incentivized Justice Department attorneys to focus more on negotiating impressive
settlement agreements, to become more attractive for future defense firm employment. In
the past, when the salary differences were less significant, and the Department itself had
not suffered recent high-level embarrassments, government prosecutors could be more
aggressive and take on a risky, high-level prosecution. However, by the time the Justice
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Department attorneys would have had to decide between a prosecution or settlement
agreement for the 2008 financial crisis, the risk would not have been worth the potential
high-profile loss and all it could mean for one’s future career and lifestyle. In the next
chapter, I will explore alternative explanations as to why no major executives were
prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis, including popular explanations like money in
politics, presidential leadership and the clubby nature of Washington. Ultimately these
intuitive explanations will be rejected, however, as there was certainly lobbying and
money, presidential influence and in-group beltway preferences during previous crises
when major executives did see prosecution and jail time. The factor of resources
available for the Justice Department will be explored last in the next chapter. It will be
considered an exacerbating factor, but not ultimately the primary explanation.

Chapter 7: Alternative Explanations
Money in Politics/Capture/Interest Group Influence
Perhaps the most popular explanation for why no major executives were
criminally prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis is the idea that they simply are too
powerful to jail because they give a lot of money to politicians. This is a tempting theory
considering how powerful the finance industry had become by the end of the twentieth
century. However, upon closer examination, this theory has weaknesses when
considering money and lobbying was a significant factor across the crises examined here.
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In the twenty-five years preceding the 2008 financial crisis, the financial services
industry grew from five percent to eight percent of gross domestic product (GDP),
growing sixty percent faster than the economy itself, as part of the country’s late-20th
century move from an industrial economy to a service-based one.260 Additionally,
individual compensation grew dramatically in the financial services industry, when
investment banks went from private partnership to public companies in the 1980s and
1990s. By 2005, financial sector executive pay was the highest of any industry, averaging
$3.4 million per year.261 The finance industry’s contribution total to federal candidates
increased dramatically from $70 million in 1990 to $518 million in 2008 and $677
million in 2012. Adjusted for inflation, this is still a big increase, with $70 million in
1990 equating to $122.97 million in 2012 dollars.262 Lobbying efforts have also increased
with the industry having spent $200 million in 1998 ($264 million in 2008 dollars 263) and
close to $500 million each year since 2008. 264
Former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt told the
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission) that once word of a proposed regulation
got out, industry lobbyists would rush to complain to members of the
congressional committee with jurisdiction over the financial activity at issue.
According to Levitt, these members would then “harass the SEC with frequent
letters demanding answers to complex questions and appearances of officials
before Congress. These requests consumed much of the agency’s time and
discouraged it from making regulations. 265
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However, a large increase of money pouring into politics from the financial
services industry from one crisis to the next does not necessarily mean the executives
could buy their way out of trouble in the years after 2008 but not in the 1990s and early
2000s. Certainly spending has increased, but so have the cost of elections. For example,
the total cost of congressional elections in 2008 was approximately $37 million more
expensive than in 1998, adjusted for inflation. 266 267
Indeed, Calavita, Pontell and Tillman argue that political connections and
donations were at the heart of the savings and loan (also known as thrift) crisis of the
1980s and 1990s. They quote Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Chairman Edwin J. Gray as saying “The thrift crisis is, and has been from the beginning,
a political crisis.”268 More than 160 political action committees (PACs) represented the
savings and loan industry in the years leading up to the peak of the crisis and actually
ramped up contributions significantly as the worst of the crisis approached. Between
1983 and 1988, these PACs gave $4.5 million in campaign contributions for House and
Senate races and $1 million for individual members of the banking committee. In total,
estimates show the industry is responsible for approximately $12 million in political
contributions to federal candidates and political parties during the 1980s. 269 At the time
the financial industry was also the largest contributor of money for speeches, known as
“honoraria” and regulated as personal income, not campaign finance. The Reagan
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administration and congressional Republicans at the time were certainly ideologically on
board with the deregulation that benefited savings and loan banks and ultimately
contributed to the crisis. But Calavita, Pontell and Tillman argue that the politically
influential industry played a major role in shaping the details of that deregulation. 270
House Banking Committee Chairman Congressman Fernand St. Germain had called in
the 1970s for greater uniformity in regulations in the wake of the failure of Citizens State
Bank due to the actions of “fraudulent insiders and affiliated outsiders.” 271 By the early
1980s, St. Germain had co-sponsored two major pieces of legislation that phased out
interest rate caps, greatly increasing the ability of these federally-insured institutions.
Political science literature is mixed on whether or not money buys influence in
politics, but Hall and Wayman showed in 1990 that interest groups and individuals do
receive something for their money; time. This access can be helpful in lobbying
lawmakers on what types of legislation they should support, how they conduct oversight
of agencies and even what language to use when writing legislation. Especially when
focused at the committee level, political donations and lobbying money may not buy
votes or influence elections directly, so much as buy extremely valuable time and
attention from an elected official. Giving money to politicians who sit on the relevant
committee makes the money work harder, as it targets lawmakers who have the keenest
interest in the issue at hand and therefore likely to be sympathetic to the interest group.
Additionally, the committee level provides a less formal environment with less public
scrutiny that floor votes. Therefore, politicians can respond to monied interests more
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safely at this stage in the lawmaking process. 272 In 2002, Thomas Stratmann sought to
discover whether money influences votes or interest-group friendly lawmakers attract
donations with their votes. In other words, in what direction does the arrow of causation
point? He studied voting behavior of Congressmembers on key pieces of legislation in
1991 and 1998 that sought to dismantle the regulations set out in the Great Depression
era Glass-Steagall law, which separated investment banking, insurance and commercial
banking companies. He found that higher contributions led to a higher probability of a
lawmaker voting in the group’s interests, as well as against an opposing group’s interests.
273

The disagreement in political science literature over evidence for a measurable

influence of money in politics often comes down to how we measure influence.
University of Kansas researchers in 2009 found a useful empirical measure for lobbying
efficacy by measuring the amount of money spent influencing the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004. This bill allowed multinational corporations to repatriate earnings
for a one-time lower tax rate. With these companies subject to public disclosures, the
researchers could compare the company’s savings achieved in that single tax year to the
amount it spent to push for the policy, providing a unique opportunity to measure the
effect of lobbying and money in finance. Indeed, the researchers found the companies on
average gained $220 for every $1 spent lobbying lawmakers regarding this Act, for a
22,000% return on their investment. 274 While the efficacy of lobbying – or at least the
best way to measure its efficacy – is not universally accepted in the political science field,
an abundance of research, as well as common sense, dictates that companies and groups
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spend money on lobbying because it gets them something beneficial in return. Certainly,
there is compelling evidence for the idea that lobbying is a powerful tool, even if there
isn’t a consensus for precise causal effects.
However, we must not forget that this discussion is about prosecution by
government lawyers, not policies or laws made by politicians. Lobbyists focus their
attention on elected officials, not prosecutors, for the most part. There are groups, like the
American Bar Association, that lobby the Justice Department in a sense, but not as
directly trying to influence specific outcomes as is done in the legislative arena. Indeed, a
prosecutor’s deliberations and decision making is a secretive process, whereas
lawmaking is both public and multi-staged, providing ample access points for lobbyists.
Could being a powerful political donor really extend to an effective get out of jail card for
the 2008 financial crisis, despite Justice Department’s relatively apolitical reputation and
mission? It is true that these same wealthy donors can afford the best attorneys to
negotiate with government prosecutors even before any charges would be filed and this
has myriad benefits. Aside from the ability to negotiate away charges, these attorneys can
also provide the most skilled defense, as well as other benefits that are described in other
chapters. However, the best defense money can buy is not the same as the notion that
campaign donations or lobbying is what saved these finance executives, as the popular
narrative would hold.
Political influence by monied interests, whether it comes in the form of direct
campaign or political contributions, influence-peddling or access-buying is the popular
reason for why Wall Street executives didn’t face prosecution for the 2008 crisis.
However, this narrative falls short since monied interests worked their will on the
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political system in the late 1980’s and early 1990s when the savings and loan crisis saw
hundreds of bank executives criminally prosecuted and in the early 2000s when company
executives like Enron’s Chairman Kenneth Lay were successfully prosecuted for their
corporate crimes. Additionally, lobbyists do not have access to the prosecutorial decisionmaking process like they do to the public and multi-access point law-making process.
Therefore, despite the popularity of this explanation, it ultimately fails as a satisfying
answer at this time as capture and political influence have been consistent factors across
financial crises of recent decades and elected officials were not the decision makers in the
choice whether or not to prosecute.

Presidential Leadership Style
To understand whether presidential leadership style could explain why executives
were prosecuted during earlier crises and not in 2008, the role of the president must be
examined across these events. The relevant presidents for this discussion are George H.
W. Bush, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. When considering the 2008 crisis,
President Obama is the only player I will consider. President George W. Bush left office
while the crisis was still raging, and he and his administration were focused on the
immediate danger. Therefore, it would have been unreasonable to expect him to focus on
prosecuting executives with the extensive efforts needed for success, at the same time he
was dealing with the severe crisis at hand. George W. Bush, however, was in office when
prominent executives were criminally prosecuted for the accounting scandals in the early
2000s, and his father George H.W. Bush held the presidency when many cases were filed
during the savings and loan crisis. While presidential leadership is another attractive
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popular theory, it ultimately falls flat when considering the norm of generally allowing
the Justice Department substantial political distance from the Oval Office. Exceptions,
such as Trump and political firings under the later years of the George W. Bush
administration, are considered scandalous, and therefore are exceptions that prove the
rule. To be sure, the president appoints the most senior leadership of the Justice
Department, including the Attorney General and the United States Attorneys in the
various federal districts. A president can and does appoint like-minded individuals to lead
these offices. Ultimately, I find the President to be too far removed from the decisionmaking point to have made a substantial difference. It should be noted that Congress
could also be examined as a factor for this study. Congress’ relevancy here would be in
allocating the federal budget, including that of the Justice Department. I ultimately
declined to include Congress, as it is one step further removed from the decision-making
process than the president and therefore outside the scope of this inquiry.

How presidents influence
The primary ways that a president would have influenced the decision to
prosecute, at least in the pre-Trump era, would be through appointees, allocation of
existing resources and rhetoric. However, I will first examine the idea that a president
can, as the head of the executive branch, direct the Justice Department in its decision
making. The Justice Department is ostensibly the most apolitical of all government
actors, along with the judiciary. Fordham University Law School Chair Bruce A. Green
and New York Law School Professor Rebecca Roiphe call prosecutorial independence
“the cornerstone of American democracy,” in a 2018 research article. The presidencies of
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Richard Nixon and Donald J. Trump put this idea to the test. While Nixon fired Attorneys
General until he found one that would act according to his wishes, but did not explicitly
claim he could order the Justice Department to make specific decisions, Trump has done
both.275 He directly called for his political enemies to be prosecuted innumerable times
and claimed that he has absolute control over the Justice Department.
Donald Trump, however, did not adhere to preexisting norms, therefore
highlighting their existence. Trump sparked a conversation around what a president could
or could not do. Americans quickly realized that many things thought impossible for a
president, like interfering in criminal prosecutions, were simply norms and traditions,
which could be broken. Trump has certainly broken through those norms in many ways,
such as with his attempts to call for his political enemies to be criminally investigated and
prosecuted and finding an attorney general, Bill Barr, who will do his best to be Trump’s
political ally. For example, Barr’s Justice Department filed a motion to withdraw the
criminal case against former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn. Jonathan
Stevenson, a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a
former National Security Council Director for Political-Military Affairs, Middle East and
Africa from 2010 to 2013, wrote in the New York Review of Books that this move is
unprecedented for the Justice Department because it came after Flynn already plead
guilty more than two years ago to lying to the FBI regarding his involvement with
Russian interference in the 2016 election. 276
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Such motions are extremely rare to begin with, and after guilty pleas they are
unprecedented. This particular motion is also a freakish document that distorts the
law and misrepresents the views of former senior Justice Department officials
involved in the Flynn case. Bureaucratic and legal outrages—from officials’
systematic subversion of the mission of the departments they head to the “unitary
executive” theory espoused by Attorney General William Barr—are routine in the
Trump administration. But this latest instance is a major advance in the
president’s and Barr’s political weaponization of the Justice Department. The
motion was signed only by Timothy Shea, a Barr loyalist and acting US attorney
for the District of Columbia, and not by any of the prosecutors involved, one of
whom withdrew from the case.
277

Trump makes it clear that although he hasn’t had much success in jailing those
that threaten his power, he can get his allies out of jail. However, Trump’s use of the
Justice Department in this way only has the support of a few of the most loyal members
of his inner circle, like Barr. His previous Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, despite being
a solidly Republican partisan, refused to bend justice to Trumps will. He was
subsequently forced to resign as Attorney General in November 2018 when he recused
himself from investigating the Russian interference of the 2016 campaign, of which he
was an active member. 278 Despite his intense loyalty to Trump, Sessions ultimately put
the rule of law over partisanship in this instance. This example echoes Green and
Roiphe’s argument that the professional norms instilled in the minds of all lawyers help
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make it possible for Justice Department norms of prosecutorial independence to be
largely upheld, despite the few Trump loyalists that do his bidding at Justice. “In order to
ensure democratic accountability, the President’s legitimate policy agenda may shape
prosecutorial priorities, but partisan politics and personal interest must play no role in
determining the course of individual cases.” 279
They and other scholars argue that there is abundant evidence against a true
unitary executive, but more of a complicated web of departments checking each other
within the Executive Branch. In addition to the long-established rule-of-law norms
instilled in all lawyers during school and training, the Constitution can be referenced to
assess the president’s power over the Justice Department. While it doesn’t specifically
prevent the president from directing the Justice Department, it also does not permit him
to do so. It ultimately gives Congress the power to determine whether a president can
interfere in specific prosecutorial decisions rather than setting general policy and
appointing leaders.280 However, Congress and the president have battled since the
country’s founding over control of the bureaucracy. Scholars debate the issue, while
presidents and Congressional leaders put theories to the test with specific actions that
push the boundaries and in the process shape norms. Therefore, it is a de facto ongoing
conversation about who controls the Justice Department. Certainly, it began as and
continues to remain among the most independent parts of the bureaucracy.
Moving on from direct orders, I will examine the softer powers a president may
use to control prosecutions. Barack Obama took office in January 2009, also preoccupied
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with easing the crisis and stabilizing the economy. However, by the end of 2009, though
a full recovery was far off in the future, the recession was over, and the economy was
growing again. This was the time when he could have focused on correcting the ills that
caused the crisis. Indeed, his administration did focus extensively on passing the DoddFrank financial reform law in 2010. Additionally, he was responsible for setting the
rhetoric during this time. Would he set a tone of a sheriff going after lawbreakers or a
negotiator trying to find resolution? He brought at group of thirteen major bank leaders
into his White House to discuss the crisis. He told them that he and his White House were
the only thing standing between them and “the pitchforks.” He would be the negotiator,
the peacemaker and the healer. Certainly, he did not take on a tone of “sheriff,” looking
to round up lawbreakers and bring them to justice. This approach could explain an
abundance of settlement agreements over prosecutions, which is what occurred after the
2008 crisis. In comparison, prosecutions for the savings and loan and accounting scandal
crises under the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations respectively
may be surprising for business-friendly administrations.
It is possible that the Bush presidents focused more on law enforcement rather
than new regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank law of 2010 pushed by the Obama
administration. But both Bush administrations did see prosecutions, as well as new highprofile laws like the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as McCainFeingold. Another possible explanation is that the notoriously business-friendly Bush
administrations had to prosecute these cases, lest they look unwilling to hold their own
friends accountable and lose support from those who seek to keep the power of
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corporations in check. Conversely, President Obama was thought of as left-leaning or
liberal and therefore may not have wanted to appear too harsh on corporations. The
Obama administration also had to handle the optics of the first black presidency. Looking
too aggressive in certain areas may have been more difficult with this already groundbreaking presidency. He entered office with much political capital based on an electorate
wanting “hope” and “change” after eight years of the Bush Administration and two wars
and simply focused that capital on other things. Obama’s political capital was essentially
spent on the Affordable Care Act (known as Obamacare), the $787 billion American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (known as the stimulus), the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,281 not encouraging white collar
criminal enforcement.
Certainly, President Obama may be described as assertive in many ways. Indeed,
for a person to win election to the presidency of the United States, let alone to accomplish
this twice, he must be intensely driven. However, it seems to be part of Obama’s
personality style to seek compromise, rather than battle. Similarly, the Obama Justice
Department’s approach to white collar crime, specifically, may be one example of that
“negotiator” approach. It is reasonable to assume that a president would appoint likeminded individuals to his cabinet, which includes the Attorney General. Then the
Attorney General can set a general tone of the Justice Department. Indeed, some have
said the Department suffered from an overabundance of caution. 282 “I think the Holder
Justice Department was very risk averse,” said Neil Barofsky, former Special Inspector
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General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (otherwise known as the “bailout”) and a
former Southern District of New York prosecutor. During previous crises, the
administration created a task force, made of up members from various relevant federal
agencies, to coordinate enforcement efforts. Those earlier task forces were taken much
more seriously than the one established by President Obama in 2009. 283 “The Obama task
force did nothing. I am told by people on the task force that they weren’t asked to do
anything. If not for political pressure, they wouldn’t have done what they did (civil
settlements). They kept upping the fines – that’s just the cost of doing business,”
according to a knowledgeable source.284
Of course, it is hard to know whether this reflected an overabundance of caution or
the correct amount of caution, for we cannot know the consequences of more aggressive
prosecutions during that time period. The Department may have feared spooking the
recovering market by looking “too tough” on the banks into which it had just poured
massive federal resources. On the other hand, if criminal charges had been brought after
the crisis had ebbed – the statute of limitations was five years for some charges and ten
for others – perhaps this negative impact would no longer have been an issue. 285
Additionally, cases against individuals could be framed as brought against “bad actors”
rather than institutions as a whole. Although the longer they waited, the harder it would
have been to make the case, as memories of potential witnesses would have faded and
some evidence might have been lost, Barofsky said. Previous administrations took the
stance that charging individuals was an important component of corporate law
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enforcement. Indeed, a memo written by George W. Bush administration Assistant
Attorney General Mark Filip on August 28, 2008, calls for individuals to face prosecution
for corporate crimes.
Because a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of individual
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate
wrongdoing … Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued,
particularly if it relates to high-level corporate officers, even in the face of an
offer of a corporate guilty plea or some other disposition of the charges against
the corporation. 286
It is unclear how much the overall Department “tone” impacts specific
prosecutorial decisions, especially when it comes to the work of prosecutors making the
cases, rather than those who are politically appointed. What leadership pushes for, either
publicly or privately, may be an important factor for those bringing the cases. Ultimately,
direct incentives for the prosecutors making the cases are more compelling than an
intangible tone in the Department overall, especially since the memo’s tone would have
competed with a serious note of caution, as described in an earlier chapter.

How presidents are influenced
I have discussed what influence presidents have in prosecutions, but what
influences their decision-making? Many things factor into decision-making and it
certainly varies for each president. Ultimately, we can never know how or why a
president truly came to a decision in his mind. He is influenced by a variety of factors,
including advisors, his political party, voter opinion polls and Congressmembers. Perhaps
the most popular explanation for what motivates any elected official is money. Indeed,

286

Flilp memo, 2008

158
money to run a successful election or reelection campaign is essential, especially in the
current age of television ads and the personality-focused presidency. Voters want to get
to know the candidates personally and television ads are very expensive. Enter, political
donors. Specifically, it is easy to see how important the finance industry is to presidential
campaigns. In the 2004 presidential election, the list of the top five largest donors to both
the George W. Bush campaign and John Kerry’s campaign include financial services
companies. John Kerry’s fourth and fifth largest donors were Goldman Sachs ($314,000)
and Citigroup Inc., ($300,325) respectively. All five of Bush’s top donors were financial
services companies. 287

Figure 7.1
Top Campaign Contributions to George W. Bush 2004 Election Cycle288
Data from Opensecrets.org
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Financial services companies contributing large sums of money to presidential
campaigns, especially the business-friendly George W. Bush, does not come as a
surprise. However, the industry’s donation patterns in 2008 may have been unexpected.
McCain’s top five donor list includes more financial service companies, but the financial
services business (in italics – see figure 7.2) that gave to Obama gave much more.
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Figure 7.2
Top Campaign Contributors to Barack Obama and John McCain 2008 Election Cycle
Data from Opensecrets.org
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Barack Obama

John McCain

University of California - $1,799,460

Merrill Lynch - $354,570

Goldman Sachs - $1,034,615

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. - $336,605

Harvard University - $900,909

Citigroup Inc. - $330,502

Microsoft Corp - $854,717

Morgan Stanley - $264,501

JPMorgan Chase & Co. - $847,895

U.S. Government - $235,304
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The finance industry gave large sums to John McCain, but they gave much more
to Barack Obama overall; $43,744,789 to Obama compared to $31,043,978 to McCain.291
Do these large campaign donations from the financial elite explain why the Obama
Administration declined to prosecute them? This is certainly a common refrain heard
among the lay public, but it falls short as an explanation because presidents have taken
money for their campaigns from financial services companies across the crises in
question. To be sure, logic dictates that it would be difficult to aggressively prosecute
people responsible for hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in campaign support.
However, this theory is ultimately not compelling because of the distance between the
president and federal prosecutorial decision making. Additionally, prosecution of major
political benefactors in previous crises also makes the argument weak.
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The starkest example of the flaw in the idea that campaign donations bought a get
out of jail free card is Kenneth Lay, the founder and chairman of Enron Corporation. Lay,
nicknamed “Kenny Boy” by President George W. Bush, had given more than $550,000 to
Bush’s campaigns for governor and president over the years of their friendship back in
Texas. Not only was Lay a major donor for Bush, but both men agreed on major policy
areas, such as energy market deregulation. Lay also helped to fundraise for Bush’s father,
President George H. W. Bush, and helped to bring the Bush Presidential Library to
Houston. Yet, once the accounting fraud scandal within Enron came to light in the early
2000s, the Bush White House sought to distance itself from Lay and the Bush Justice
Department created a task force to pursue criminal charges within Enron. 292 Lay was
ultimately convicted in May 2006 of six counts of fraud and conspiracy, with each count
carrying a maximum sentence of five to ten years jail time. However, he died in July
2006 at his home in Aspen, Colorado at the age of 64 before the court handed down a
sentence, which was scheduled for the fall of that year. He had been free on a $5 million
bond.293

Cultural Capture
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Cultural capture is different from traditional capture in the sense that it is
emotional and mental processes that make a regulator favor someone, rather than direct
or future monetary gain. Cultural capture has three components; in-group preferencing the idea that people in the same social and cultural circles tend to favor each other; status
– admiring and treating preferentially those who are perceived as higher status; and social
connections – treating preferentially those with whom we have social connections. This
theory provides an interesting possible explanation for a non-prosecution scenario.
However, it is a difficult theory to investigate and more importantly, this phenomenon
existed across all crises in question. Nonetheless, it is worth a discussion, at the very least
to consider another popular narrative that says Wall Street executives have connections
that get them out of jail. Imagine prosecutors and wall street executives in a room
together. They all look like middle- or upper-class people. They might all be white.
Whether or not their clothes and grooming cost a lot of money, or just look smart for the
price, they are all dressed in a suit and are clean cut. They look like they belong in a room
together. On the other hand, a “common street criminal” may appear very different from
a prosecutor. They would be dressed more casually and may have vastly different
hairstyles, body adornment, speech patterns, etc. They appear to be adversaries.
While it is reasonable to assume that as humans we are more likely to favor those
with whom we identify, it is difficult to gauge what components of a person’s identity
will motivate them the most. It may be appearance, as in the scenario above, or it may be
education, social class, race, geographic region, religion, etc. According to Jesse Eisinger,
Pro Publica reporter and Pulitzer Prize winning author of a book on the Obama Justice
Department called The Chickenshit Club, the Obama Justice Department was staffed by
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those who are educated at more elite institutions and favor the “professional class.” “The
Obama administration is a bunch of technocrats, beltway establishment Democrats with
corporate backers. They are very smart people, very accomplished. They think they are
very reasonable. They do not see corporations as malefactors or enemies or systemically
rotten,” Eisinger said.
Eisinger painted a picture from his interviews of the well-appointed conference
room, in which attorneys for the government and a bank or bank executive would meet to
discuss a settlement deal.
No one comes in and blusters and fights and has a lapel that’s too wide. No one is
making any class faux pas in these meetings. They are all reasonable, calm and
smart and give a beautifully detailed PowerPoint presentation about why there
hasn’t been a crime here, why a settlement would be reasonable, if you really
want to go for something and why you’re going to lose in court. It all comes
across at the time very reasonable. 294
The idea is to look tough but not unreasonable, and, above all, not to alienate
superiors in the Department or prospective defense firm employers. Moreover, as these
cases are likely very difficult, their superior will not want to invest in these cases at the
expense of relatively simpler cases, Eisinger said. It is also often the case that the young
Justice Department or U.S. attorneys may be negotiating with their former superiors, who
have already made the jump from Justice Department to defense firm, adding further
social pressure to come to a settlement agreement.295
In contrast, the George W. Bush administration began with prosecutors who were
more eager to enforce laws aggressively, according to Eisinger. Certainly, the Bush
administration could not be called unfriendly to corporations. What was it about these
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prosecutors that prevented them from identifying with corporate executives? It is hard to
say, and I don’t see much reason to believe they wouldn’t identify as in-group peers.
Eisinger explains the change of focus in the Justice Department by looking at the way
prosecutors in the Obama administration saw themselves, compared with Bush-era
prosecutors. With the later years of the Bush Justice Department plagued by politicallymotivated U.S. Attorney firings, the Obama Justice appointees saw a need to
professionalize the Department, Eisinger said. Eisinger claims the Obama Justice
Department heads like Attorney General Holder and Criminal Division Chief Breuer
preferred prosecutors from “big law,” who are hesitant to bring aggressive cases.
Holder may be contrasted with Dick Thornburgh, for example, whose Justice
Department successfully prosecuted hundreds of executives in the savings and loan crisis.
While Holder explained publicly why a criminal prosecution was generally not wise or
possible, Thornburg spoke very differently about the financial executives of his day: “My
experience as a United States Attorney and Assistant Attorney General, and as Attorney
General teaches that the best way to deter fraud is with tough, timely and effective law
enforcement,” Thornburgh told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs on February 9, 1989.296 The Justice Department during this era indeed prosecuted
hundreds of bank executives for the misdeeds of the savings and loan crisis. Did
prosecutors really see themselves as more aligned with corporate executives in the
Obama years compared to the Bush administrations? Obama-era prosecutors may have
seen themselves as more professional, intellectual and reasonable, akin to the corporate
executives they negotiated settlement agreements with. They may have even sent their
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children to the same private schools or were members of the same country club. This
could explain why they hesitated to jail those they saw as their “friends” or at least peers.
But how do we truly know what these or any other prosecutors felt most important to
their identity. For example, President Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder may
identify as an upper class, Harvard-educated corporate lawyer, he may identify as a
middle aged African American or anything else that he finds meaningful. Identities may
also be situational and fluctuate over time. To make matters more complicated, Holder
may not be fully aware of what factors shape his identity most. James Kwak, a University
of Connecticut Law professor and a prolific writer on corporations, economics and
policy, provides a compelling narrative for cultural capture in his book 13 Bankers, but
he ultimately also acknowledges the difficulty in proving cultural identity and its
influence on a person’s decision making. 297
More importantly for this study, the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush
administrations’ prosecutors may have been less polished in some ways than Obama-era
prosecutors, they hardly excluded Harvard-educated attorneys and clubby relationships
with industry executives. A close relationship between regulator and regulated could not
be illustrated better than that of George W. Bush and Enron executive Kenneth Lay,
whom Bush affectionately referred to as “Kenny Boy.” As detailed in a previous section,
Lay was also a major contributor to Bush’s campaigns. Calavita, Pontell and Tillman
write that during the savings and loan crisis, regulators also saw themselves not as foes of
the finance industry, but protectors of the economic system. In the case of the savings and
loan crisis, regulators saw the crackdown on fraudulent actors in the industry as a way to
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stabilize the economy. 298 If regulators see themselves as the same type of professional as
finance industry executives and see the government’s job as protecting the economy
across the various crises discussed here, it isn’t reasonable to assume that the Bushes
appointed business-friendly regulators in its agencies except the Justice Department. The
fact that cultural capture has been present across all crises in question means it is weak as
a variable explaining a change in prosecutions. Kwak said as much in a 2013 article on
the financial crisis and cultural capture:
Cultural capture is not a complete explanation of financial regulators’ behavior in
the run-up to the financial crisis for another reason: the mechanisms that produce
cultural capture are basic features of human interactions and therefore predate the
recent cycle of financial deregulation. 299
However, he argues it is an important part of the explanatory picture. He writes
about regulators, though, which need to be examined separately from prosecutors. As
discussed earlier, legal industry norms promote a more rational and neutral mentality than
regulators, who are free to pursue a certain philosophy of the public good, i.e. boosting
Wall Street helps the public by creating a strong economy. Kwak argues that the status of
financial services people rose in the decades leading up to the financial crisis, as banks
used increasingly complicated mathematical and computer models in trading,
necessitating and attracting employees from elite universities. Kwak points to this as a
reason to take the potential resultant cultural capture into consideration in explaining the
financial crisis of 2008 because it may have prevented regulators from taking a firm
approach with industry.300 However, since the increased status accumulated over decades,
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it can’t explain the difference in treatment after the 2008 crisis compared to previous
crises discussed here, as they all took place within the same few decades.

Resources - Counterterrorism & Case Referrals
An important corollary to prosecutorial incentives is a lack of available resources
to make a strong case. This is a second factor that changed between crises, along with a
change in private sector compensation for white collar criminal defense attorneys.
Whether the topic of resources deserves to be a co-equal factor, or a supporting factor is
unclear, but it is certainly a contributing factor. If a prosecutor must be extra cautious
against a high-profile loss to please the needs of future employers, certainly having less
money and no case referrals from other agencies further increases the risk. In the
previous crises I have examined, prosecutors had more resources both inside the Justice
Department and from other regulators. A Justice Department Office of the Inspector
General Report said in September 2005:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Justice Department, including the
FBI, saw a massive shift in money and manpower to counterterrorism at the expense of other areas
of law enforcement. we found that prior to 9/11, although the FBI identified counterterrorism in its
top priorities, the FBI utilized the majority of its agent resources in traditional criminal
investigative areas, such as white-collar crime, violent crime, organized crime, and
drugs. Following 9/11, agent usage on terrorism-related matters dramatically increased.301

Former FBI director, Robert Mueller said mortgage fraud needed to be considered
“in the context of other priorities,” such as terrorism. Mueller told the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission that the agency had asked for more resources to fight mortgage
fraud during its budget process with Congress, but the Bureau did not get as much as
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requested, and its resources may have been insufficient.302 By 2008, the FBI lost 625
agents investigating white collar crime, or 36 percent of its 2001 levels.303
At the peak of the subprime mortgage frenzy and just before the crash, Bush’s
Attorneys General Alberto Gonzalez (2005-2007) and Michael B. Mukasey (2007-2008)
were aware of or might have done more about white-collar crime related to mortgages but
had other pressing issues, namely terrorism.304 It seems like the federal white collar crime
cops had almost all left the beat. “I was in DOJ on 9-11” Barofsky said, “and I saw all my
really good FBI agents go over to terrorism. The best agents before who wanted to do
complex fraud cases wanted to get Bin Laden.” 305
This is in stark contrast with the savings and loan era, where Congress devoted
more resources to prosecutorial efforts, both legally and monetarily with the broad-based
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. The
law also increased prison sentences for financial institution crimes committed after
August 9, 1989; extended the statute of limitations for these crimes to ten years from five;
authorized increases in FBI and prosecutorial staff; and added seventy-five million
dollars annually for three years to prosecute these crimes. The Crime Control Act of 1990
increased the annual dollar amount for prosecution to $162.5 for 1991 through 1993.306
Proving criminal fraud in front of a jury, whether against an executive or a director or a
company, both with tremendous defense budgets and some of the best lawyers in the
world, would prove more difficult for the government’s lawyers with reduced financial
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resources. This put increased pressure on prosecutors thinking about the defense firm’s
preference for successful DOJ attorneys to settle with those companies responsible for the
crisis. They could seek large civil fines to appease an angry public and look tough
without much risk.
Additionally, the Justice Department lacked help from other federal agencies that
they had in previous prosecutions of finance executives. Regulatory agencies may have
more familiarity with the financial institutions and products at the heart of any potential
fraud and can be an important source of support in making a complicated and difficult
case. William Black has spoken out about the importance of case referrals from
regulatory agencies in building financial fraud cases. Black, a former litigation director of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and senior deputy chief counsel at the Office of
Thrift Supervision (the Bank Board’s successor), said during the savings and loan era, his
agency filed more than ten thousand referrals to the Justice Department. It also gave
Justice attorneys guidance on to how to spot, track, and document financial crimes,
resulting in more than a thousand criminal convictions with a success rate of ninety-one
percent.307 However, Black says in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which he
categorizes as seven times larger than the savings and loan crisis, federal regulators
referred a total of zero cases.308 Without these case referrals, which would provide a
wealth of background information on potentially fraudulent behavior, the risk of a very
public loss is higher.
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The underlying question here is why there were no case referrals. There has been
a fundamental shift in the federal financial regulatory environment since Black’s tenure,
he said. As this industry has pushed for increased deregulation, it was able to consolidate
its power through major financial mergers made legal by the 1999 repeal of the
Depression-era Glass Steagall Act, which disallowed savings banks and investment banks
or insurance companies to operate under the same parent company, as well as disallowing
nationwide megabanks to form. Consolidated bank holding companies formed and could
in turn use their increased financial and political power to lobby for their own interests.
Although basic Depression-era fraud laws remained intact, new financial products that
emerged in this period remained unregulated. Credit Default Swaps are an important
example of this phenomenon, as they played a major role in the financial crisis, allowing
banks to take on increased risk and exposing AIG to massive losses.309
With less supervision of the sometimes newly created and often poorly
understood financial products that were at the heart of the financial crisis, it is no wonder
regulators did not refer material for criminal cases to Justice. According to Black, the
shift in case referrals came with the Clinton administration and the “New Democrats.”
Bill Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Coalition (DLC) took a turn away from New
Deal Democratic policies that some saw as hostile to the wealthy. It could be categorized
as a centrist or right-wing economic turn for the Democratic party that helped it gain
Wall Street backers and win back the White House after twelve years of Republican,
deregulatory leadership. Black said he left his job as a government regulator when he was
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told to defer to the bankers and “treat them as our customers.” 310 Thomas Frank, in his
book, Listen Liberal, says the DLC favored upper-class professionalism and abandoned
the New Deal economic coalition that supported working-class policies.311 When viewing
bankers as customers, regulators are encouraged to work with them, rather than maintain
an adversarial stance. Neil Barofsky also describes the friendly relationship between
bankers and regulators during his time in Washington as the Special Inspector General of
the bailout fund.312 It should be noted that putting this change at the Clinton
Administration makes referrals a weaker explanatory variable since it does not explain
why the Enron-era accounting scandal era executives were prosecuted and 2008 financial
crisis executives were not.
Nonetheless, case referrals establishing some of the evidentiary groundwork for a
case or much technical assistance from regulatory experts would have been helpful for
Justice Department prosecutors who wanted to make a successful fraud case against any
banking industry executive after 2008. While the federal government has a tremendous
amount of resources at its disposal, one class of defendants can notoriously outspend the
government on the best attorneys money can buy – white collar defendants. This has been
the case throughout the past few decades. However, as we have seen, the government’s
massive resource shift within the Justice Department after September 11, 2001 puts it at a
further disadvantage against the wealthiest, highest profile defendants in the finance
world – executives at major systemically-important institutions. Lack of resources for
aggressive government prosecutions must not be ruled out as a possibly contributing
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factor in the change in prosecution of finance executives in light of the post 9-11 resource
shift at Justice, with September 11, 2001 marking a dividing line between crises that saw
top executives prosecuted, and the 2008 crisis that did not.

Chapter 8: Conclusions
Throughout this project I have shown that the answer for one of the most
important political questions of our time is not necessarily the most obvious or popular
one. The response I get from most people when I tell them I am researching the question
of why no high-level executives were jailed for the financial crisis is often the same.
Most people say rich people who have connections to government officials through the
power of their money can get away with anything. To be sure, there is much reason to
think that money influences the political process in many ways. It seems obvious to many
people that a person or group would not pay for lobbying or campaign donations without
any expectation of benefits, and political science research bears this out, as outlined in a
previous chapter. Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, in cases like
Citizens United v. FEC for example, based on the idea that money in politics equals

173
speech and therefore should be subject to the same strict scrutiny. 313 What’s more, neither
major political party has the monopoly on significant donations and lobbying from the
financial services industry. 314
While this aspect of the political process may have had a hand in the weakening
of regulations and regulatory enforcement leading up to the crisis, it could not be a
sufficient explanation for why no major executives faced jail time afterward. Although
political appointees run the Justice Department and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the majority
of case work is done by career attorneys who are by-definition not influenced by
campaign donations. Lawyers’ professional norms and education also instill the values of
due process, rule of law, etc. Therefore, they are highly sensitive to criticisms of
politicization. Recent exceptions prove the rule. FBI Director James Comey’s disclosure
of an investigation into Hillary Clinton’s emails shortly before the 2016 presidential
election caused intense uproar. He followed up with a book written to in part make his
case that his decision was a well-intentioned attempt to be non-partisan. Additionally,
Comey writes that Trump demanded mobster-like loyalty from the FBI, which Comey
decries in the book. 315 Trump has also often stated on Twitter his frustration over his
inability to control the Justice Department.316 He found in Bill Barr an attorney general
willing to act in his interest, but he has not found widespread support following his lead
at Justice, as shown previously. However, by the time Trump took office, the financial
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crisis was well in the rear-view mirror, and statutes of limitations passed. President
Obama made no attempts, at least publicly, to influence Justice prosecutions. In fact, his
background as a lawyer and the professional norms most lawyers follow make it unlikely
that he would secretly influence the process as well.
Most importantly, for this study, however, is the fact that monetary influence in
the political process was at work across the savings and loan, Enron-era and 2008
financial crisis eras, as detailed in a previous chapter. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that capture - money in politics for Congressional campaigns, lawmaker and
agency lobbying, or any presidential influence that it might by - falls short as an
explanation as to why there were no systemically influential executives criminally
prosecuted for the 2008 financial crisis. Presidential control of the charging process is
also a week explanation, as the Justice Department was relatively independent across
crises and the presidents in office during the earlier crises were very business friendly.
Cultural capture is also a compelling theory, but it does not explain the change in
approach by the Justice Department toward high-level finance executives either, as it has
been in effect across all three crises as well. It may be intuitive to ask the question: since
humans are more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to those with whom they identify,
socialize and admire, are ivy-league educated, white-collar attorneys less aggressive in
prosecuting white collar criminals than street criminals? The answer very well may be
sure, but this is nothing new. Cultural capture appears as an explanatory variable in Jesse
Eisinger’s Chickenshit Club, Matt Taibbi’s The Divide, and James Kwak’s 13 Bankers,
but Kwak says this is a difficult theory to prove and says that it needs more study.317 As
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Kwak points out, it is at least a potential factor to consider and further explore, but again,
this is not a phenomenon unique to 2008. Although Eisinger argues that the Obama
Justice Department officials saw themselves as educated elite like the increasingly
educated elite finance professionals, we cannot know for sure how a prosecutor may see
him or herself, and therefore know with whom they identify and admire. Additionally, it
is a further assumption to apply a particular identity to a whole group of prosecutors. For
example, an Assistant U.S. Attorney may come from a poor neighborhood, attend an Ivy
League school on scholarship, belong to a country club, volunteer with underprivileged
children and send his own children to a top private school. Does this attorney identify
with the upper class or the poor? Would he admire a Wall Street executive or a workingpoor family who lost their home? Even if he could tell us, would he tell the truth? Would
he even really know the truth, or would his unconscious motivations be unknown to him?
Also, Wall Street executives are not always seen as consistent entities. Sometimes they
are glamourized in novels and films, and sometimes they are vilified. These masters of
the universe may have been depicted as smart people who got into a jam, but they also
could have been seen as greedy and unethical as well. Therefore, we not only have
trouble measuring what prosecutors might truly feel and think, but it is also unclear
whether Wall Street executives are figures that they admire, resent or anything in
between.
Resource availability is a compelling explanation for the purposes of this study. It
is indeed difficult to make an effective criminal case when Department resources are
shifted in large quantities to other priorities. In the case of this post 9-11 shift of
resources toward terrorism, the timing lines up as well. This occurred in the years just
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prior to the 2008 financial crisis but after the savings and loan and Enron-era crises cases
were made. In itself this is an incomplete explanation because it leaves out the agency of
those actors bringing the cases. They are not faceless bureaucrats. They are individuals
with pressures from both inside and outside of the Justice Department. They must
consider how much money and manpower the Department has for a case to be sure, but
they also must consider the needs of those employers likely to provide them with
significant raises upon completion of a successful stint at the Justice Department. A
winning high-profile aggressive prosecution would be a bonus for a young prosecutor’s
career. However, at a time when the Justice Department focused on lucrative settlement
agreements rather than seeking jail time after a series of embarrassments, such as the
Arthur Andersen case, a high-profile loss would seem to be unnecessary career suicide.
What’s important here is not what it actually would mean for this prosecutor’s future
career, but what he or she believed it would mean. Why go out on a limb and take the risk
- assuming an AUSA team could even do so without being chastised internally for taking
on too much risk - when the Justice Department’s focus was lower-risk, impressive
sounding settlement agreements. White collar defense firms, having responded to this
change in Justice’s strategy, also sought people who could succeed in negotiations and
settlement agreements, rather than litigators. By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, a
change in strategy inside Justice and the defense firms facing it, and the amount of money
being offered as a private sector partner, just became too great to throw away one’s
chance at it for a prosecution that would be an incredible challenge.
The people given the great power and responsibility of prosecutorial discretion
are just that; people. Particularly since these attorneys often live in expensive cities like
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New York or Washington, it would be particularly difficult to expect them not to want a
significantly higher salary to support a family. It is clear that while a career prosecutor
could make more money in the private sector for a long time, the pay differential between
practicing government prosecution of white collar crime and defense against it as a
partner in a top firm has ballooned in the 21st century, compared to the latter decades of
the 20th. There may be many individuals who are motivated to remain in public service
and are driven by that desire above all else, but even the most ideal among us are
motivated by the need to support ourselves and our families. A young, talented Assistant
United States Attorney may face six figures in debt from law school, an astronomically
high cost of living for a family in New York or Washington, and other expenses in life.
While a top salary of almost $200,000 is enviable for most people, it is hard to argue with
being paid $1 million or more for the same hard work on the other side of the courtroom.
Therefore, a smart attorney would have a strong incentive to create a resume necessary to
obtain this prestigious and lucrative partnership by working on shorter and less risky
positive outcomes.
All employees respond to the incentives placed before them within the context of
the established institutional structures. Although there are many moral and social reasons
why one may choose a career, a job’s primary purpose is to sustain one’s ability to
support themselves and those that depend on them. If we expect these human beings to
uphold justice as disinterested robots, we are being naïve and unrealistic as a society.
If our goal as a society is to create a Justice Department that upholds and enforces the law
in the most even-handed, egalitarian way possible, we must design an institution that
incentivizes just that kind of behavior. As it stands, we have incentivized quite the
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opposite scenario. Pay disparity between the private sector and government service has
risen to an unsustainable level. If we wish to incentivize bright and ambitious prosecutors
to take on difficult, time-consuming, but nationally important tasks, such as either
prosecuting or investigating evidence of widespread and massively damaging fraud, we
must give prosecutors the institutional support and financial incentives to do so. Is the
solution to pay top government prosecutors $1 million per year to prevent them from
moving to the private sector? That very well may be what is needed, or there may be
alternative institutional designs that could incentivize these attorneys to act more in the
public interest and not shy away from a difficult, but important case. Regardless, it is
unreasonable to expect enough hard-working and ambitious attorneys to take these
difficult but important cases out of a sense of moral obligation, overriding an instinctual
and powerful need to have a comfortable life for them and their families.
A high level of difficulty should not preclude a fair application of criminal justice,
but I am not insensitive to the tremendous challenge posed by these cases. Neil Barofsky
said that a serious task force should have been well funded and organized by the Justice
Department to overcome the challenge of making a successful criminal case. If no
charges were warranted, a task force report could have explained this to an angry
American public, he said. This would have been a step toward trying to restore faith in
the rule of law and justice for all, regardless of financial status, and may have changed
the course of populist anger in the years that would follow. Instead, we witnessed the
Trump era, somewhat spurred on by those voters who felt government was not on their
side, wherein the move away from rule of law has become even more pronounced.
Showing some effort to deeply investigate and report on the public’s widespread and
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persistent suspicion of unpunished criminality on Wall Street, regardless of outcome,
would have been worth government resources. In times of major public crisis, such as the
Kennedy Assassination, Watergate, and Trump’s Russia scandal, independent
investigations and subsequent reporting have been warranted, even if no criminal
prosecutions resulted. To be sure, government commissions do not always restore public
faith. The Warren Commission investigated the Kennedy Assassination and concluded
Oswald was the lone gunman, yet many conspiracy theories remain popular. Yet, imagine
if no commission or a skeleton of one were created? Imagine how much more
government mistrust there would have been in that case. There is no guarantee that a
commission report would have cured what ails the American public’s faith in the rule of
law. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did a thorough investigation on the causes
of the crisis and pointed to instances of potential fraud.318 A similar criminal investigation
resulting in either a public report or criminal charges would have been appropriate to at
least give the American public an answer to this open and important question, as long as
the investigation was thorough and as nonpartisan as possible.
Instead, we received vague explanations that seemed more like excuses from the
Obama Justice Department, and the public retained a deep sense of unfairness. The
Trump campaign successfully played on this idea that Washington worked only for the
rich and powerful. The idea that no fraud existed is difficult to take seriously, as one
would have to ignore a mountain of potential evidence from civil government cases,
settlements and private civil cases, as detailed in earlier chapters. At a time when
Democratic norms are crumbling under the Trump presidency, it is at least important to
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use this example to rethink the incentives structures that exist in the Justice Department.
In the Madisonian notion that we cannot rely on humans to be angels, so therefore
government must be designed to check our worst impulses and foster our best, we must
be sure that institutional design does so as well in the Justice Department, an important
bulwark against those who would have the United States abandon the rule of law for
corruption, dishonesty and self-dealing.
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